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Abstract
In the last decades several economists and practitioners have pointed out the impor­
tance of financial markets for real economic activity. In this dissertation we analyse 
the interaction between credit, especially banking, and real activity. While we deal 
also with the interaction between credit and firms’ behaviour at the microeconomic 
level, our main emphasis is on the impact of credit on aggregate variables. Our 
target is, taking as primitive distinguishing features of intermediaries (banks), to 
understand how these features affect the fink between intermediation (banking) and 
real variables. In the dissertation we focus both on features of the financial structure 
of intermediaries, like the structure of banks’ liabilities, and on features of their ac­
tivity, like intermediaries’ superior ability in gathering information and monitoring 
borrowers. The dissertation offers several policy implications. The banking sector 
is one of the most regulated sectors in modern economies: besides being subject to 
regulation directly, the activity of banks is also constrained by other branches of 
the legal framework like the bankruptcy law. Throughout the dissertation we de­
vote particular attention to regulatory and legal prescriptions and to the way they 
are concretely implemented. Overall, the dissertation suggests several mechanisms 
of interaction between the credit sector and the real economy that deserve further 
attention in future research.
Thesis Supervisor: Nobuhiro Kiyotaki 
Title: Professor
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0.1 Introduction
0.1.1 R elated Literature
In this dissertation we analyse the interaction between credit, especially banking, 
and real economic activity. While we also deal with the interaction between credit 
and firms’ behaviour at the microeconomic level, our main emphasis is on the impact 
of credit on aggregate economic activity.
The impact of credit on real variables has received increasing attention in the 
last twentyfive years or so. Previously, most of the literature had treated financial 
and real aspects in isolation, relying on the results of Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
Modigliani and Miller had shown in fact that, under a number of assumptions such 
as absence of taxes and perfect capital markets, the composition of external finance 
did not affect firms’ investment and production decisions. Prom the seventies a 
growing literature has departed from their result showing that financial and credit 
markets matter. The literature on asymmetric information and agency problems 
has been crucial for this change of perspective. Many studies have shown that 
adverse selection and agency (hidden action and hidden information) problems are 
finked with the mix internal/external finance and with the mix debt/equity of a 
firm.
In the seventies the main applications were in corporate finance and analysed at 
the microeconomic level how the financial structure of a firm affects its value. The 
pioneering contributions of Jensen and Meckfing (1976) and Ross (1978) showed 
that the ratio debt/equity of a firm affects agency problems and concurs to signal 
its value, respectively. Prom the eighties this new perspective has found widespread 
application also in macroeconomics, particularly in the explanation of business fluc­
tuations (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997, for a review).1 Starting from Parmer (1984) 
and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) several studies have constructed frameworks in 
which the fink between firms’ ratio internal/external finance and the cost of exter­
nal finance acts as a “financial accelerator” of exogenous shocks. The idea of these 
studies is that a lower (higher) firms’ net worth encourages (discourages) firms to
1For an analysis of the implications of credit frictions for growth see, for instance, Bencivenga 
and Smith (1991).
8
undertake “worse” (e.g. riskier) projects, thereby increasing (decreasing) the cost 
of external finance. Since the cash flow of firms and the value of their assets change 
prociclically, the cost of external finance moves anticyclically (see Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989 and 1990 for models emphasising the role of cash flow and Kiyotaki 
and Moore, 1997, for a model emphasising assets values).2 For instance, when, 
during recessions, firms’ cash flow and assets value fall, impairing their net worth, 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems become more severe, leading to an 
increase in the cost of external finance. In turn, the increase in the cost of external 
finance depresses investment and production, amplifying the recession and further 
eroding firms’ net worth. Credit frictions have been introduced in a broad range 
of macroeconomic frameworks. Credit frictions have been introduced in otherwise 
standard real business cycle models and have been shown to propagate technologi­
cal shocks (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997). Credit frictions have also been introduced 
in models with money and nominal rigidities and have been shown to magnify the 
effects of monetary policy shocks (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 2000).3
The last decade has witnessed a further step forward in this literature. Instead 
of considering external finance as a black box, several studies have differentiated ex­
ternal finance according to its nature (debt or equity) (see, for instance, Williamson 
1986 and 1987) and, especially, to differentiate credit according to its source. In 
particular, the literature has differentiated credit extended by non-atomistic inter­
mediaries (banks, finance companies, credit companies etc.) from credit provided by 
dispersed investors (bond-holders). Given their overwhelming importance among 
financial intermediaries, banks have received a special attention. At the microeco­
nomic level an increasing emphasis has been placed on understanding how the mix 
bank/dispersed debt of a firm affects its decisions (Diamond, 1991; Besanko and 
Kanatas, 1993; Rajan, 1992).4 At the macroeconomic level some studies have ex­
plored the role of intermediaries in the business cycle (Bernanke and Gertler, 1987;
2Gertler (1992) extends the Bernanke and Gertler (1989) framework, showing that with mul­
tiperiod contracts future profits partially act as substitutes of internal finance in lowering agency 
costs. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) considers a framework in which, unlike in Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989), employment is flexible and agency costs affect labour demand.
3In this introduction we focus mainly on the theoretical literature. For a review of the empirical 
analyses on credit frictions and aggregate economic activity see Chapter 7 of Walsh (1998).
4Most of this literature has focused on the different implications of dispersed debt versus bank 
debt in periods of corporate distress, when this difference seems to matter the most.
9
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997); other studies have proposed a bank lending channel 
of transmission of monetary policy, showing how the presence of retail, reservable 
deposits among banks’ liabilities leads banks to respond differently from other in­
termediaries or from dispersed investors to a monetary policy shock (Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1988). In some macroeconomic frameworks the imperfect substitutability 
between intermediate and dispersed credit, which makes intermediaries relevant, is 
derived endogenously from arguments of corporate finance and banking. For in­
stance, in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) intermediaries are seen as active monitors 
which enable firms with low net worth to commit to safe projects, thereby giving 
them access also to public debt. In other frameworks (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988) 
the presence of intermediaries is simply assumed, relying on the empirical observa­
tion that especially for some categories of firms, like small ones, banks are the main 
source of financing.
Our thesis finds its suitable collocation in this literature on the link between 
intermediate credit and real activity. Our target is, taking as primitive distinguish­
ing features of intermediaries (banks), to understand how these features affect the 
fink between intermediation (banking) and real variables. In the dissertation we 
focus both on features of the financial structure of intermediaries, like the structure 
of banks’ liabilities, and on features of their activity, like intermediaries’ superior 
ability in gathering information and monitoring borrowers.
0.1.2 C ontents
The thesis is divided in five chapters, of which three have a macroeconomic cut while 
two have a microeconomic perspective. Broadly speaking, in the first three chapters 
we analyse how nominal and real shocks can get propagated by affecting banks’ 
balance sheets (in particular capital and deposits). In the first chapter we construct 
an economy where, in the presence of binding regulatory capital requirements, a two 
way interaction between banks’ capitalisation and the quality of funded projects 
propagates negative shocks to technology or regulation. By shrinking the scale of 
their activity, a crunch in bank loans discourages entrepreneurs from sustaining the 
set-up effort of high quality technologies, pushing them to shift to lower quality 
projects. This shift in technology choice erodes the value of bank assets and, hence,
10
banks’ capitalisation and loanable funds. We show that lack of information on the 
quality of bank assets in the secondary market magnifies the propagation and makes 
it robust to agents’ reactions to the shock.
In the second chapter, employing evidence from banks’ balance sheets and from 
construction activity, we find empirically a two way link between banks’ capitalisa­
tion and real estate activity in the Nordic crisis (1990-1994). We also find that an 
inaccurate banking supervision magnified this link, exacerbating the impact of the 
decline in real estate activity on banks’ capitalisation.
In the third chapter we analyse whether monetary policy shocks affect house­
holds’ residential investment by draining deposits from banks and, hence, inducing 
a contraction of bank mortgages. We employ a structural VAR approach to test 
a credit channel of monetary policy and especially a bank-lending channel in four 
European housing markets (Finland, Germany, Norway and the UK). We relate the 
relevance of the credit channel to the structural features of their housing finance 
system, in particular efficiency and institutional organisation. The results of this 
chapter support the existence of a broad credit channel and, in some contexts, of a 
bank-lending channel. More importantly the results show across countries a clear- 
cut relationship between presence of a credit (bank-lending) channel, efficiency of 
housing finance and type of institutions active in mortgage provision.
In the fourth chapter we focus on the advantage of banks as information collec­
tors and on the use that banks can make of their superior information during the 
reorganisation of distressed firms. By emphasising the double use that banks can 
make of information (to increase their bargaining power in the reorganisation of a 
firm and to restructure more efficiently), we construct a model that rationalises the 
choice of a firm to borrow simultaneously from relationship and from arm’s length 
banks. We show that, by borrowing simultaneously from relationship and from 
transactional banks (“diversified funding”), a firm minimizes the risk that banks 
opportunistically restructure bad projects with the only intent of seizing assets 
during the reorganisation. Transactional banks veto the continuation of bad firms 
that relationship banks would continue with the only intent of seizing assets during 
the restructuring. They do so, because, having less information than relationship 
banks, they expect to be “losers” in the seizure of assets. At the same time, be­
l l
cause of this asymmetry in the information between relationship and transactional 
banks, diversified funding reduces the probability that banks succesfully coordinate 
the reorganisation of a good project. We characterise the conditions under which a 
firm prefers diversified funding both when screening on projects’ quality is feasible 
and when it is not.
The model in the fourth chapter can be thought as the reduced form of several 
real world examples. A bank with superior information could be able to detect a 
situation of distress earlier, gaining an additional security interest in the assets of 
the firm. Alternatively, when the assets of the distressed firm are heterogenous in 
their redeployability, during a reorganisation a well informed bank could be able 
to “cherry-pick” the most easily redeployable assets leaving other creditors with 
specific, hence, less saleable assets. In the fifth chapter we develop a simple model 
that captures the latter idea. Having better information on asset redeployability 
and on the prospects of restructuring, relationship banks could have the incentive to 
continue a firm only to recover the most generic assets. By creating an asymmetry 
between the information of relationship banks and of transactional ones, diversified 
funding creates a conflict among banks that prevents the opportunistic continuation 
of bad projects. However, we show that this informational asymmetry can lead to 
the premature liquidation of good projects.
We believe that the model presented in the fifth chapter is more than a special­
isation of the model in the fourth chapter. First, it allows to derive the optimal 
degree of diversification of the firm-banks finks endogenously; secondly, it allows to 
relate the degree of diversification to observable characteristics of the firm, espe­
cially the nature (redeployabifity and heterogeneity) of its assets, and the costs of 
restructuring the firm in distress.5 In related work (Guiso and Minetti, 2002) we 
are testing the empirical implications of the model presented in the fifth chapter 
using data from small US businesses.
It is important to clarify what our dissertation is not about. In each chapter 
we isolate one distinguishing aspect of intermediation (banking) and we study its 
implications for real economic activity. In none of the chapters do we rationalise
5However, the lower level of generality of the model in chapter 5 hinders the tratment of other 
issues, such as the implications of screening on projects’ quality for the choice of diversified funding.
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the presence of intermediaries (banks). Moreover, we do not try to endogenise any 
of the distinguishing characteristics of intermediaries (banks) that are at the core 
of our results, taking them as given. For instance, in chapters 1 and 2 we focus on 
capital and capital regulation but we do not rationalise the existence of bank capital 
or the presence of regulatory requirements on its level.6 In chapter 3 we explore the 
implications of the presence of retail, reservable deposits among banks’ liabilities for 
the transmission of monetary policy to housing demand, but we take the financial 
structure of banks as given.7 In chapters 4 and 5 we focus on the strong ability of 
banks in information gathering and we analyse how this affects firms’ reorganisation 
but we do not endogenise the advantage of banks as information-collectors.8
0.1.3 Policy Im plications and Future Research
The banking sector is one of the most regulated sectors in modern economies. Be­
sides being subject to regulation directly, the activity of banks is also constrained 
by other branches of the legal framework like the bankruptcy law. Therefore, the 
role of the regulatory and legal frameworks emerges naturally in many analyses on 
the interaction between intermediation and the real economy. Throughout the dis­
sertation we devote particular attention to regulatory and legal prescriptions and 
to the way they are concretely implemented. We defer to the single chapters the 
discussion of the resulting policy implications.
We are working on a number of developments, some of which represent exten­
sions of the chapters while others follow lines of research more broadly connected 
with the dissertation.
We are currently exploring an extension of chapter 1 in which capital regula­
tion is endogenous. In this richer framework we allow the regulator to adjust the 
required capital adequacy to projects’ quality in order to minimise a loss function. 
Precisely, we introduce depositors explicitly and we assume that the regulator aims
6See Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) for models that endogenise 
bank capital and market determined capital adequacy. We are developing an extension of the first 
chapter of the dissertation in which capital regulation is endogenous (see 1.3).
7See Diamond and Rajan (2001) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991) for models that endogenise 
the presence of deposits on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets.
8See Diamond (1984) for a model in which intermediaries act as delegated monitors of dispersed 
investors.
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at minimising the volatility of depositors’ return (for instance because depositors 
are risk averse). The results show that such an endogenous banking regulation can 
further exacerbate the link between bank capital and real activity.
Currently, we are also testing the empirical implications of the model in chapter 
5 using data from US firms. We construct indicators of the heterogeneity of firms’ 
links with banks and we relate them to a number of firms’ observable characteristics, 
along the predictions of the model.
As to broader lines of research, in the next future our purpose is analysing the 
interaction between the structure of the credit (banking) sector and aggregate eco­
nomic activity. Currently, the issues we are considering are the relative importance 
of trade credit versus bank credit and, within the banking sector, the penetration 
of foreign banks into the banking system.
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Chapter 1
Bank Capital, Firm Liquidity 
and P rojects’ Quality
Abstract
We construct an economy where, in the presence of binding regulatory capital re­
quirements, a two way interaction between banks’ capitalisation and the quality of funded 
projects propagates negative shocks to technology or regulation. By shrinking the available 
liquidity and the scale of their activity, a crunch in bank loans discourages entrepreneurs 
from sustaining the set-up effort of high quality technologies, pushing them to shift to 
lower quality projects. The shift in technology choice erodes the value of bank assets and, 
in turn, banks’ capitalisation and loanable funds. We show that lack of information on 
the quality of bank assets in the secondary market magnifies the propagation and makes 
it robust to agents’ reactions to the shock.
1.1 Introduction
The link between declines in real activity and banking busts is regarded as an 
important propagation mechanism of recent crises (Texas, 1985-1987; New Eng­
land, 1991-1992; Nordic countries, 1990-1994; South East Asia, 1997-1998). During 
these crises, banks experiencing big loan losses were allegedly forced to shrink their 
loans to satisfy regulatory capital requirements. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
many entrepreneurs who were denied funds from their customary banks were un­
able to compensate with other sources of funding, being forced to a downward 
revision of production plans (Harris, Boldin and Flaherty, 1994; Peek and Rosen- 
gren, 2000). On the financial side, the crunch in bank capital and lending took 
place in environments characterised by lack of information on the loans extended
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during the previous booms. In many countries, the booms had been associated 
with financial liberalisation and banks, facing tougher competition, had tried to 
preserve profit margins redirecting their lending towards sectors “unfamiliar” to 
them. Such a portfolio-reshuffling had strained banks’ credit assessment (Klinge- 
biel, 2000; Wihlborg, Hutchison and Mueller, 1994). During the crises the resulting 
lack of information made it difficult for outsiders, like bank supervisors or buyers 
in the secondary market, to carry out a fair valuation of banks’ assets (Peek and 
Rosengren, 1992; Wojnilower, 1992).
The target of this chapter is to shed light on the link between banks’ financial 
status and real activity and on the role that the opaqueness of banks’ portfolios plays 
in this link. We construct an economy where, in the presence of binding regulatory 
capital requirements, a two way interaction between banks’ capitalisation and the 
quality of funded projects propagates negative shocks to technology or regulation. 
The key elements behind this financial accelerator are: i) entrepreneurs’ dependence 
on loans of customary banks; ii) moral hazard in entrepreneurs’ choice of projects 
related to the scale of their activity and, hence, to the available liquidity; iii) lack 
of information in the secondary market on the projects funded by banks.
The propagation mechanism works as follows (a summary is in Figure 1). A 
negative regulatory or technological shock induces a crunch in bank loans extended 
to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs cannot compensate for the squeeze in loans from 
their customary banks. The resulting drain in available liquidity pushes some en­
trepreneurs to shift to lower quality (productivity) projects, negatively affecting 
the value of related bank assets. The shift in technology choice occurs because the 
shrinkage in the scale at which entrepreneurs can run their projects makes some en­
trepreneurs “more lazy” , discouraging them from sustaining the set-up effort that 
high quality projects require.1 In turn, the fall in the value of banks’ assets, in­
creasing banks’ loss provisions and depleting their capital, negatively affects bank
1 There are several real-world counterparts of this set-up effort. For instance, it could be the 
effort that an entrepreneur must bear to screen high quality from low quality projects or to 
accumulate human capital or training necessary to run a high quality technology. It could also 
stand for the care that an entrepreneur must have in selecting good materials for building highly 
productive assets. In a different context a similar assumption can be found, for instance, in Aghion, 
Dewatripont and Rey (1999). Note that in the model we treat interchangeably a non-monetary 
private benefit for a low quality project and an effort for a high quality one.
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lending. In fact, all the banks have to shrink their loans further in order to keep 
complying with regulatory capital requirements. This further credit crunch pushes 
other entrepreneurs, initially not involved in moral hazard, to shift to lower quality 
projects and save the set-up effort of high quality projects and so on, propagating 
the shock.
We show that lack of information on the quality of funded projects in the sec­
ondary market magnifies the propagation and is crucial for its robustness. It magni­
fies the propagation because also banks with sound portfolios, i.e. whose borrowers, 
facing a lower set-up effort for high quality projects, have not shifted to lower qual­
ity ones, see their loans and collateral underpriced in the secondary market. This 
way, the credit crunch spreads to entrepreneurs who keep running highly productive 
projects, magnifying the output loss and possibly leading also these entrepreneurs to 
shift eventually to low quality projects. Asymmetric information in the secondary 
market is crucial for the robustness of the propagation because it shields the prop­
agation from strategies aimed at dampening the capital crunch, like banks’ refined 
strategies in shrinking credit or renegotiations of lending contracts that would bail 
out banks. This occurs because an uninformed secondary market, by pooling the 
assets of all the banks, prevents the single bank or entrepreneur from internalising 
the benefits of these strategies.
Even though broadly applicable, we believe that the model is well suited for 
rationalising the fink between banking busts and declines in the activity of some 
segments of firms, like small firms, or sectors, like real estate. In real estate (es­
pecially commercial real estate) the idiosyncratic nature of many projects makes 
an assesment difficult for new lenders, hindering the substitutability of the loans of 
customary banks (Peek and Rosengren, 2000). As to small firms, their size makes 
them “opaque” and dependent on local, informed banks (Harris, Boldin and Fla­
herty, 1994). Besides inducing dependence on customary loans, we think plausible 
that this opaqueness hinders the correct valuation of projects and assets in the 
secondary market, particularly when this market is thin as, for instance, during a 
recession.
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Figure 1. Propagation Mechanism
The chapter is linked with the literature on the role of credit in business fluctua­
tions (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 2000; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Kiyotaki 
and Moore, 1997; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 and 
1987; Farmer, 1984). The closest papers are Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and 
Bernanke and Gertler (1987) that, like us, focus on the role that bank capital plays 
in affecting the real sector. The first difference with these two studies is the channel 
by which bank capital affects the real sector. The shift in borrowers’ technology 
choice that drives the propagation is primitively related to the scale at which en­
trepreneurs run their activity according to the available liquidity and is independent 
of the ratio between borrowers’ net worth and external funding that is key in these 
papers. Hence, the chapter contributes in establishing a link between the “liquid­
ity flows” approach, that stresses firms’ access to liquidity rather than contracting 
problems related to their net worth, and the studies on the role of bank capital in 
aggregate economic activity. In addition to proposing a different channel of propa­
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gation,2 we describe a two way propagation mechanism that goes from bank capital 
to entrepreneurs’ choice of projects and then, from entrepreneurs’ choice of projects, 
feeds bank on bank capital rather than restricting the analysis only to the impact of 
bank capital on real activity. It is analysing the feed-back from changes in projects’ 
quality to bank capital that we can disentangle a “macroeconomic” role for the 
opaqueness of banks’ assets in magnifying the propagation and making it robust. 
This asymmetric information, external to the credit sector (i.e. to the relationships 
between lenders and entrepreneurs), has been neglected by the above literature, 
that has focused on lenders’ lack of information on borrowers.
The model empirical implications differ from those of related papers. The model 
predicts that the strength of the propagation is inversely related to firms’ liquid­
ity but indipendent of firms’ ratio internal net-worth/external finance. This is in 
contrast with the literature mentioned, including Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in 
which the impact of a capital crunch on real activity is inversely related to firms’ 
ratio internal net-worth/external finance. Moreover, our model emphasises a fink 
between banks’ capitalisation and the productivity of projects undertaken but not 
necessarily the number of projects funded. In Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) a fall 
in bank capital leads to a fall in investment but has no impact on the average pro­
ductivity of projects undertaken. Finally, the model implies a negative correlation 
between the strength of the propagation and the information on banks’ assets in 
the secondary market. Provided that a reliable proxy for the informational depth 
of the secondary market can be found, interacting projects’ productivity with this 
proxy should show that the better information is the lower is the feed-back from 
projects’ quality to banks’ capitalisation. To our knowledge such an implication 
cannot be derived, either directly or indirectly, from related studies.
2In Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) banks’ monitoring allows firms with low net worth to commit 
to safe projects, allowing them access to the public debt market. However, banks themselves 
are subject to moral hazard and need enough own capital to commit to monitoring ( “market- 
determined capital adequacy”). When banks’ capital and loan supply crunch increasing the cost 
of monitored finance, firms’ incentives to take risk increase. As a result, firms that before the crunch 
had just enough net worth to commit to safe projects become rationed and give up projects. In 
a section of their paper Caballero and Krishnamurty (2000) obtain mutiple equilibria following a 
reasoning similar to the one in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). High (low) interest rates self-validate 
implying low (high) collateral values, low (high) banks’ capital and low (high) credit supply. 
Building a dynamic general equilibrium model on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Chen (2001) 
calibrates a mechanism that shares some of the main features of Caballero and Krishnamurty’ s. 
These mechanisms and ours should be seen as complementary.
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The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
examines its robustness. Section 4 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
1.2 The M odel
1.2.1 Setup
E nvironm ent The economy lasts for two periods and three dates (£=0,1,2). The 
population consists of M  agents (M large) of which nM  (n <  1 /2) are entrepreneurs 
and (1 — n)M  are bankers. All agents care about their date 2 consumption of final 
good C2  deriving from it a utility of u fa )  = C2 . There are initially two goods, the 
final good and assets ( “buildings” henceforth).
E n trep ren eu rs  and  P ro d u c tio n  Technology At date 0 each entrepreneur has 
only one non-equipped building of size H. Entrepreneurs can run projects for 
producing final good.
In the first period, between date 0 and date 1, each entrepreneur can equip 
one building necessary in production in the second period. Each entrepreneur can 
transform her building into a good one (H ) or into a bad one (H_) where a good 
and a bad building differ in quality but not in size. Until date 1 the entrepreneur 
can switch from a good equipment to a bad one and viceversa at no cost but, once 
perfectioned at date 1, the quality of the building is irreversible.
Also during the first period each entrepreneur can invest X  < 1 units of final 
good obtaining at date 1 X j  =  X  units of intermediate input useable, in combination 
with the building personally equipped, to produce final good in the second period. 
For simplicity we assume that all the investment takes place at an intermediate 
time (£=1/2).
At date 1 each entrepreneur dies with probability s. If an entrepreneur dies 
all the intermediate input X i  depreciates and the residual project is the equipped 
building. The event “death” is independent across entrepreneurs; since M  is large 
this implies no aggregate uncertainty.
In the second period, between date 1 and date 2, each living entrepreneur can 
use the building personally equipped with any intermediate input personally trans­
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formed in a good (high-productive) technology or in a bad (low-productive) one. 
While the intermediate input is generic, a good (bad) building can be used only in 
the good (bad) technology. Each living entrepreneur derives also a non-transferable 
private benefit b from using a bad building personally equipped in period 1. This 
private benefit could easily be reformulated as the additional effort necessary for 
implementing a good building equipment instead of a bad one during the first pe­
riod.
Let yre be the final good produced by an entrepreneur active in the real estate 
sector (real estate output henceforth). Including any private benefit, the date 2 
returns that a living entrepreneur obtains from using the building and the interme­
diate input personally transformed are
Good technology : yre = R (X i  +  H)
Bad technology : Vre +  b — r (X i  +  H_) +  b
Entrepreneurs derive a different private benefit from using a bad building per­
sonally equipped. In the simplest framework b = B  for a fraction G of the en­
trepreneurs (hereafter “bad” entrepreneurs) and b = 0 for a fraction (1 — G) ( “good” 
entrepreneurs).
We introduce restrictions on the parameters:
Assum ption 1
1  T"» „
7 ------T < r < R  < 2
(1 - 8)
Assum ption 2
H (R  — r) < B  < (1 +  H )(R  -  r)
Assumption 1 places lower and upper bounds on the productivity of the two 
technologies. Assumption 2 restricts the private benefit of the bad entrepreneurs. 
In particular, Assumption 2 implies that, ceteris paribus, if a bad entrepreneur runs 
her project close enough to its minimum scale (H ) she prefers the bad technology, 
while, if close enough to its maximum scale (1+H), she prefers the good technology. 
Throughout the analysis we assume that, when indifferent between two technologies, 
an entrepreneur chooses the one with the highest private benefit.
23
B ankers an d  Lending C on trac ts  At date 0 each banker is endowed with 1 unit 
of final good; hence bank funds are more than enough to finance all the projects at 
their maximum size ((1 — n )M >  nM m ax(X ) = nM). Bankers can store, obtaining 
a certain zero net return, and lend. For simplicity, we focus on the case in which in 
period 1 each banker either stores all her funds or lends to one entrepreneur only 
and each entrepreneur is funded by one bank only. In 3.2 we will discuss why a 
framework in which each bank funds no more than one entrepreneur implies no loss 
of generality.
The date-0 contract between a banker and an entrepreneur looks like a credit 
line.3 The contract specifies the maximum amount of final good L that the en­
trepreneur can borrow from the banker at £=1/2 and the repayments to the banker 
conditional on the entrepreneur’s survival and death.4 For any L  the optimal date-0 
contract implies trivially the collateralisation of the whole equipped building contin­
gent on the verifiable entrepreneur’s death. In fact, since the entrepreneur enjoys 
utility only from consuming at date 2, she will always prefer pledging the whole 
residual project to the bank in case of death to obtain a “discount” on the repay­
ment in case of survival. We restrict the gross interest rate R B due at date 2 in 
case of survival on each unit of borrowed funds to be a non-contingent one. For 
instance, contingency on the output of the completed project could be hindered by 
a verification problem.
Throughout the analysis we assume that a banker cannot deny any loan con­
tractually committed at date 0, unless forced by the regulator. Moreover, the bank 
suffers a dead-weight loss 1 — £ on each unit of loan committed at date 0 but that 
it cannot make available at t = 1/2. The presence of this loss, due to the need of 
reorganising personnel and accounts, penalties for the unfulfilled commitment etc.,
3 Note that we also abstract from an active interbank market at date 0. The banks have no 
incentive to reallocate funds through an interbank market at date 0 and transaction costs would 
make it inactive. Allowing for interbank claims would not alter the core message of the paper but 
it would complicate the analysis.
4The chosen nature of the contract, while useful to simplify the analysis, is not crucial for its 
results. For instance, we could reason in terms of a contract with a partial extension of the loan 
at date 0 and a commitment for future dates or, with few changes, of a sequence of spot loan 
contracts. In our framework the agents are indifferent ex-ante between a spot loan contract and 
a loan commitment and we could think that, when indifferent, they choose a loan commitment. 
Alternatively, transaction costs, or other reasons not explicit in the paper, could make a loan 
commitment strictly preferable.
24
does not matter for the results.
B anking R egulation  At t = 1/2 bankers have to comply with a regulatory 
capital requirement. A third group of “shadow” agents, the bank supervisors, assess 
capital adequacy and enforce the requirement. We will assume that at time t = 
1/2 — e a zero-probability regulatory shock (change of the requirement) occurs.
We assume that the supervisors force each bank to satisfy L' < o'E'^R?), where 
V  stands for the loan extended by the bank at t — 1/2, E '{K 2 ) for the supervisors’ 
expectation at time t= 1/2 of the date 2 net worth (capital) of the bank and o' for 
the inverse of the capital requirement at t =  1/2.5 At t = 1/2 supervisors enforce 
the requirement calculating and communicating to each pair banker-borrower the 
maximum loan consistent with the capital requirement. In so doing they use all 
their information, including information on the contractual terms, interest rate and 
collateralisation, agreed between each banker and her borrower (see below for the 
information structure).
Secondary M arket At date 1 banks can sell the equipped buildings recovered 
from dead borrowers on a spot secondary market. Let p be the resale price of an 
equipped building of size 1. We assume that buyers in the secondary market consist 
of more than snM  new entrepreneurs who are born at date 1, while entrepreneurs 
survived from the first period cannot employ any building in addition to the building 
and the intermediate input personally transformed. The new entrepreneurs are 
identical to the dead ones except that they five for one period and have no initial 
endowment. Each new entrepreneur can use one liquidated building bought on the 
secondary market. Buyers can finance purchases of equipped buildings borrowing,
5 This requirement captures in a simple way the aspects of capital regulation relevant for the 
analysis. First, the bank’s assets are weighted: storage, proxying for cash or central bank reserves, 
has a 0 weight and the loan to the entrepreneur a 100% weight. Second, the capital base E '{K q,) 
subtracts from loans and storage any loan-loss provision for expected losses on these assets. This 
loan loss provisioning, and more so the possible inclusion of expected profits, could appear more 
forward looking than what implied by the accounting standards of some countries. For instance, 
while in the US, during the 1990-1992 crisis, examiners implemented many anticipatory write­
downs on loans that were still performing (Wojnilower, 1992), in Japan loan-loss provisioning has 
traditionally been much slower. However, we can always think of a bank holding in its portfolio 
several loans of the described type maturing at different moments. At each moment, the bank will 
make provisions for non-performing loans and will realise profits, if any, on maturing performing 
loans. In our framework we simplify considering only one loan with principal and interests due on 
a single date.
25
for instance, from the bankers not active in the credit market in the first period. 
If the share of entrepreneurs (n) is small enough (in particular n < 1/(2 +  sR H )), 
these bankers will certainly have enough funds to finance the purchase of liquidated 
buildings.6
In fo rm ation  In the economy there is asymmetric information on the chosen qual­
ity of the projects. Each entrepreneur privately observes the level of her own private 
benefit 6 at some time between date 0 and the time of the unexpected regulatory 
shock (£ — 1/2 — e)and the quality of the chosen equipment/technology. In the 
secondary market buyers cannot observe the quality of the single building but only 
the average quality of liquidated buildings. Even if unnecessary for the results of 
this section we assume that buyers are pretty unsophisticated: they are unaware 
of the underlying market mechanism and the only thing they can observe is the 
average quality of liquidated buildings.
Sum m ary  We summarise the sequence of events:
-Date 0: contracts are signed
-Period 1: from date 0 to date 1 entrepreneurs can equip one building. At 
t= l/2 -e  a zero-probability shock to the capital requirement occurs. At £=1/2 banks 
extend loans to entrepreneurs; from £=1/2 to date 1 entrepreneurs can transform 
the borrowed final good in intermediate input
-Date 1: entrepreneurs die or survive. Banks recover equipped buildings from 
dead entrepreneurs and sell them on the secondary market. Dead entrepreneurs’ 
intermediate input depreciates completely
-Period 2: living entrepreneurs can combine the intermediate input and the 
building personally transformed. Buyers can use alone buildings purchased on the 
secondary market
-Date 2: entrepreneurs repay loans and interests. Agents consume
6In fact at date 1 the storage of these bankers is at least M ( 1 — 2n), the number of dead 
entrepreneurs is snM  and R  is the maximum price of a building. It is easy to see that, provided 
the final output is verifiable, if a banker writes a standard debt contract with a gross interest rate 
of no lower than R /r  with a new entrepreneur, she will be guaranteed a net return of 0 on the 
loan for the purchase of one building.
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1.2.2 Equilibrium
Since at date 0 the credit market is competitive, the date 0 optimal contract between 
a banker and an entrepreneur maximises the entrepreneur’s expected return with 
respect to R B and L  subject to the relevant constraints. We assume that the value of 
o' announced (expected) at date 0 is high enough to make the regulatory constraint 
redundant. Clearly, the exact value of a' > 1 is irrelevant.
The optimal contract is found by solving
M axRBtL (1 -  s)E0 (R E(b))
s.t. R E(b) = max [R{L'(b) +  ), r(Z/(.) + H) + b]~ R BL'{.)
(1 -  s)R BEq(L '{.)) +  sH E 0{p) > Eo(L'(.))
L = max L'(.) =  max {arg max [i?£ (.) | L' < L \}
0 < L < 1
The first constraint is the resource constraint. It explicitly expresses the en­
trepreneur’s return in case of survival R E(b), taking into account her technology 
choice, the realisation of her private benefit b and the amount L'(b) < L  that she 
borrows at t = 1/2. The second constraint imposes that the bank expects at least 
zero profits, i.e., adding to both the LHS and the RHS storage 1—Eo(L'(.)), imposes 
that Eq(K 2 ) > 1. The third rules out trivial contracts in which L exceeds the maxi­
mum amount of final good that the entrepreneur is expected to borrow at the agreed 
contractual terms (max(L'(b))). The fourth constraint writes in a compact way the 
non-negativity and the capacity constraints on investment.
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Lem m a 1 At date 0, in equilibrium
L  =  £ '(.) =  1
j^b _  1 — sH R
1 — s 
Eo(p) — R
Lemma 1 shows that at date 0 each entrepreneur is guaranteed and expected 
to borrow at t =  1/2 a loan big enough to run her project at its maximum scale 
(1+H). As a result, all entrepreneurs are rationally expected to choose a good 
equipment of their building, i.e. the good technology, and the expected liquidation 
price of each equipped building on the secondary market is Eo(p) =  R.
1.2.3 Im pact of an U nexpected  Shock
We analyse the impact of an unexpected regulatory shock at time 1/2-e. It should 
be made clear that there is nothing special in a regulatory shock. All the qualitative 
results of the analysis could be obtained assuming, for instance, that at date 0 the 
regulator announces o' =  1 irrevocably and that at time 1/2-e a technological 
shock (say an increase of the probability of entrepreneurs’ death-distress s) occurs. 
Although regulatory shocks certainly occur less frequently, several pieces of evidence 
point to a stiffening of capital regulation in recent crises and to its role in initiating 
capital crunches.7
We assume that at time 1/2-e a new, higher capital requirement is announced 
so that at t =1/2 bank supervisors force each bank to satisfy L' < a 'E '{K 2 ) with 
a' <1. The contractual terms (in particular the gross interest rate R B that each 
entrepreneur has to repay for each unit of borrowed funds) are assumed to be non- 
renegotiable (see 3.1 for an analysis with renegotiation). Intuitively, the regulatory 
shock imposes a limit on the loan that each banker can extend to the entrepreneur 
lower than the one agreed upon initially. We crucially assume that at this stage
7In the US, regulators introduced conservative criteria in capital valuation, forcing banks to 
make provisions for declining repayment prospects and collateral values of perfuming loans (Peek 
and Rosengren, 1992; Wojnilower, 1992; Berger, Kyle and Scalise, 2001). In the Nordic countries, 
regulators increased their pressure on banks for a more timely recognition of loan losses in the 
accounts.
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each entrepreneur is locked-in with her original bank and cannot offset the loan 
crunch by obtaining funds from other banks; analogously, we assume that at this 
stage no bank can sell loans to other banks. If the loan crunch due to the regulatory 
shock is big enough, bad entrepreneurs, i.e. the ones with the high private benefit, 
will switch to the bad building equipment (remember that, from Assumption 2, 
when the project is close to the minimum scale, a bad entrepreneur prefers the bad 
technology). Moreover, since, because of asymmetric information in the secondary 
market, the capital base of each bank E '(K 2 ) depends on the expected average qual­
ity of a residual project (through E'{p)), this shift in technology choice determines 
a depletion of the capital base of all the banks active in the credit market, including 
the ones funding “good” entrepreneurs. As a result, supervisors force all banks to 
shrink their loans further so that banks keep complying with the regulatory capital 
requirement. In our framework the propagation stops at this point. In a framework 
in which also the good entrepreneurs enjoy a private benefit B ' from the bad tech­
nology (with H ( R —r) < B ' < B)  and hence are prone to moral hazard, this further 
loan crunch, if big enough, induces also them to switch to the bad building equip­
ment. This determines a new fall in the expected average quality of the buildings, 
and hence a further crunch of bank capital, loans and output. In the Appendix 
we analyse this straightforward extension. This two way interaction between bank 
capital and loans and projects’ quality can be a powerful propagation mechanism 
determining an output loss far larger than the one that would be induced by the 
shock alone.
Proposition 1 assesses the additional loan crunch due to the propagation mech­
anism. As a benchmark we take the loan that would be extended after the shock 
in an economy without moral hazard (6 =  0 for all the entrepreneurs). Trivially, in 
this economy the date 0 equilibrium would be the same.
P roposition  1 Let L* be the level of the loan at and below which the bad en­
trepreneurs choose the bad building equipment. L* satisfies
Let L' be the level of the loan that would be extended to each entrepreneur after
29
the regulatory shock in an economy without moral hazard (b = 0 for all the en­
trepreneurs ). V  satisfies
T =  o'js RH + t)
1 -  ct'(1 -  sRH  - 1)
Let the new regulatory ratio o' be such that L' < L* ( “big shocks’'). The amount 
lent to each entrepreneur after the shock is
=  a ' { s { ( l - G ) R + G r ) H  + e) ?, 
1 -  <7'(1 -  sRH  -  ()
Prom now on we restrict the attention to a regulatory shock such that Ll < L*. 
In Proposition 2 we assess the real estate output loss due to the propagation mech­
anism with respect to three benchmark economies. Note that, in each of these three 
cases, while we emphasize the loss of the output produced in the credit sensitive 
sector, the loss of total output (including storage), can be derived immediately from 
the real estate output loss (for details see note 7).
Ayre(i measures the overall real estate output loss due to the propagation mech­
anism, i.e. to entrepreneurs’ moral hazard and asymmetric information on projects’ 
quality. To assess A Y ^i we consider as benchmark an economy in which there were 
no moral hazard (6=0 for all the entrepreneurs). AYre>2  measures the loss of real 
estate output due to “lack of regulatory forbearance” , i.e. due to the decline in the 
valuation of the buildings E'{p) and, hence, in banks’ loans. To assess AY re>2  we 
consider as benchmark an economy like ours but in which bank supervisors kept 
on evaluating the buildings at their initial expected liquidation price (Eo(p) =  R). 
Note that in both these first two benchmark economies the loan extended to each 
entrepreneur after the shock would be V . Finally, AYre^ measures the loss of real 
estate output due to asymmetric information only. To assess A7re)3 we consider 
as benchmark an economy like ours but in which buyers in the secondary market 
knew the quality of each building.
Proposition 2 Consider a regulatory shock such that L' < L*.
(i) The loss of real estate output due to the propagation mechanism (i.e. to 
entrepreneurs’ moral hazard and to asymmetric information on projects’ quality)
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f a ' [ s H ( ( 2 - G ) R  + Gr ) + e } n  . , 1
re,1~ {  l - o ' ( l - s R H - i )   ^ s) + H j G ( R  r)nM  ( )
(ii) The loss of real estate output due to lack of regulatory forberance, i. e. to the 
decline in the valuation of the buildings E'{p) and to the resulting credit crunch, is
o ' s H G { R - r ) m ~ G )  + TG)
A n ‘’2 - ------- 1 - ^ 1 - s R H - t ) -------------------------- (2)
(iii) The loss of real estate output due exclusively to asymmetric information on 
projects’ quality in the secondary market is
<t'sHG(1 — G)(R — r )2 ,
We have already explained the rationale behind AYre,\ and A 7re)2.8 It can easily 
be seen that both AYre,i and AY T e ,2  are positively related to the productivity 
gap between the good and the bad technology (R  — r) and to the share of bad 
entrepreneurs (G).
As to AYre>3 , the presence of asymmetric information spreads the capital crunch 
to banks that have funded good entrepreneurs, implying that also these banks 
experience a decline in the expected resale price of their building and have to shrink 
credit further. If the secondary market properly evaluated each building, only the 
bad entrepreneurs would experience a downgrading of their loans and a further 
crunch. Hence, the overall crunch would be stronger for the bad entrepreneurs but 
weaker for the good ones. Since the bad entrepreneurs choose a less productive 
technology, this would lead to a smaller loss of real estate output (by AYre,3 ). This 
spill-over on sound banks can magnify the propagation even more dramatically in a 
framework in which also the good entrepreneurs are prone to moral hazard (see the 
Appendix). In this framework, if some conditions on the parameters hold, following
8 T o  get the loss of total output with respect to the first two benchmark economies just add to 
AYre.l and AYre>2 the funds that in our economy are initially committed to real estate but then are 
stored. On average each unit invested in real estate returns (1 — s) [R(l  — G) +  rG] while each unit 
committed but then stored gives £ (1 — I is lost). Since, from A l, (1 — s) [f?(l — G) +  rG ]> l> £  the 
total output in both the benchmark economies is higher than in ours.
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the further credit crunch suffered because of asymmetric information, also the good 
entrepreneurs will shift to the bad building equipment. In turn, their moral hazard 
will lead to a further downgrading of all the loans and to a further shrink of capital, 
loans and output.
1.2.4 Num erical Exam ple
For a quantitative assesment of the propagation, we have calibrated expression (4) 
below. Expression (4) gives AYre> 2  scaled by the real estate output that would 
realise both in our economy and in the benchmark economy with regulatory for­
bearance in the absence of the shock (i.e. Yrejo =  nM ( 1 — s)R( 1 +  H) +  nM sR H  = 
nM R( 1 — s +  H )). Hence, (4) measures the additional percentage loss of real estate 
output due to lack of regulatory forbearance. For simplicity, we set £=l-sHR. In
(4) o' stands for the ratio between the inverse of the capital requirement after the 
shock and the inverse of the capital ratio planned by banks at date 0 (in the model 
the latter is normalised to 1).
Ayre,2 a ' s H G ( R - r ) ( R ( l - G ) + r G ) M x 
1 ^ 7  = ------------(1—  + H ) R ------------ (1 " S) (4)
We choose the parameter values as follows, i) er'=0.98: we assume that the 
regulatory shock is such that new capital requirement exceeds the capital ratio 
planned by banks approximately by 2%. ii) we set s, that can be interpreted as the 
amount of non-performing (real estate) loans expressed as a percentage of total (real 
estate) loans, equal to 12%. iii) R H =1.085: RH  stands for the value of the building 
per unit of loan expected at the contractual stage. We proxy it with the reciprocal 
of the maximum LTV ratio, that measures the maximum loan as a fraction of the 
value of the building. We assume a LTV ratio of 92% (i.e. R H = 108%). iv) R = 1.24 
and r=1.14 (R  — r= 10%): the per-period productivity of the good entrepreneurs 
is set equal to 111.3%. The bad entrepreneurs are assumed to have a per-period 
productivity of 106.7%. v) we set G, i.e. the fraction of bad entrepreneurs, equal 
to 0.7.
Substituting these parameter values, AYre^ /Y re,o is approximately 0.34%.
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1.3 Robustness
In this section we show that asymmetric information on the quality of bank assets, 
besides magnifying the propagation, can make it robust to banks’ and entrepreneurs’ 
reactions to the shock. In 3.1 and 3.2 we explore two reactions of the agents to the 
shock that could dampen the propagation. In 3.1 we allow for renegotiation of the 
contracts; in 3.2, in a context in which banks fund more than 1 project in period 
1, we allow banks to shrink loans in a “selective” way, i.e. to squeeze some loans 
more and others less. The result in 3.2 will also vindicate the claim that a simplified 
framework in which each bank funds only one project in period 1 implies no loss of 
generality.
The intuition behind the results of this section is that an anonymous and un­
informed secondary market, by pooling the assets of the banks at date 1, prevents 
the single entrepreneur or bank from internalising the benefits of these strategies, 
discouraging their use. In 3.3 we discuss welfare implications.
1.3.1 R enegotiation
In the model in section 2 the parties cannot renegotiate the contract after the shock. 
We now show that, even allowing for a costless revision of the contractual terms 
(interest rate and building collateralisation), for big enough shocks renegotiation 
will fail and the post-shock equilibrium will be as in Proposition 1.
We assume that after the shock each banker can offer a new contract to the 
funded entrepreneur but the entrepreneur can reject this offer and stick to the 
initial contractual terms (i.e. renegotiation occurs only if it leads to an improvement 
for both parties). First, observe that after the shock neither the entrepreneur nor 
the banker would want to reduce the collateralisation of the building. A lower 
collateralisation would only reduce the banker’s capitalisation and loanable funds 
damaging banker and entrepreneur. Therefore, we can focus on a renegotiation of 
R B. The reason renegotiation can fail is the following. A banker will agree to a new 
contract only if it sets a higher interest rate R B and hence increases the expected 
return on her loan. The increase in the expected repayment on the loan will increase
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her capital base E'{K 2 ) allowing her to extend a bigger loan to the entrepreneur.9 
Intuitively, the entrepreneur will reject the new contract if the gain from a bigger 
loan is overwhelmed by the loss due to the higher interests to be repaid.
Let us consider the polar case in which the bank offers a new contract with a 
higher interest rate and a new loan limit equal to the maximum one consistent with 
the new capital requirement at this higher rate. Proposition 3 shows that, even in 
this case, if the new capital requirement is high enough, the entrepreneur will reject 
the contract offered.
P roposition  3 I f
1
-  (1 - s ) R - £  
no entrepreneur will accept renegotiation.
If the regulatory ratio a' such that L' = L* exceeds 1/ [(1 — s)R  — £], Proposition 
3 shows that we can partition the regulatory shocks identified in Proposition 1 in 
two regions. For shocks sufficiently strong, the bigger financing allowed by the in­
crease in the interest rate will not be enough to compensate an entrepreneur for the 
higher cost of the loan and the entrepreneur will reject renegotiation. For smaller 
shocks renegotiation will instead redistribute surplus from entrepreneurs to bankers 
dampening the credit and output crunch. Proposition 3 also shows that renego­
tiation is easier the higher the productivity of the good technology (R ) and the 
probability of entrepreneur’s survival 1 — s and the bigger the bank’s loss per unit 
of denied credit 1 — £.10
Asymmetric information on the quality of equipped buildings in the secondary 
market can play a role in the failure of renegotiation. If at date 1 buyers observed 
the quality of each single building, the entrepreneur could find convenient to accept 
an increase of the interest rate sufficient to keep the loan above L* and signal to the 
supervisors the choice of a good equipment (remember that when V  > L* an en­
trepreneur always chooses a good equipment). Signalling the choice of a good equip­
ment the entrepreneur would sustain the expected liquidation price of her building,
9For the impact of interest rate changes on bank capital see Jackson and Lodge (2000).
10The bigger (1 — £), the bigger the capital and loan crunch will be if the contract is not 
renegotiated.
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increasing the capital base of her bank and receiving a bigger loan. However, asym­
metric information in the secondary market prevents the single entrepreneur from 
internalising this benefit of renegotiation.
1.3.2 “Selective” Crunch
In the model in section 2 each bank funds one project in period 1. This automatically 
implies that loans are shrunk homogeneously. We argue that, if the concentration 
of the hanking system is low, this assumption implies no loss of generality.
Let us assume that at date 0 each bank had more units of final good and funded 
more projects, with each project still funded by only one bank. Let us assume also 
that at t = 1/2 each bank could impose a limit on the loan extended to any of its 
borrowers lower than the one contractually committed at date 0, facing a cost or 
penalty of 1—f! > sH R  for each unit of loan denied. It is straighforward that Lemma 
1 would be unaffected, i.e. L = L'{.) — 1 and R B — for each entrepreneur
and E q(p ) = R .u  In this framework, however, after the shock each bank could 
follow two strategies: it could squeeze loans homogeneously among its borrowers or 
could concentrate the downsizing on few entrepreneurs ( “selective crunch”). If the 
single bank were big enough relatively to the banking system, it would opt for a 
selective crunch. In fact fewer of its borrowers would have their loans cut and would 
potentially switch to the bad technology. By improving the average behaviour of 
its borrowers, the bank would increase the average quality of the buildings in the 
secondary market and hence E'(p), dampening the propagation.
Conversely, if the single bank were tiny, it would take the market resale price of 
any recovered building as given. Strictly speaking this would leave banks indifferent 
on the strategy to follow in shrinking loans and simply assuming that, if indifferent, 
they would opt for an homogeneous crunch could appear somewhat ad hoc. How­
ever, several reasons would make an homogeneous crunch necessary or preferable:
11 Given the cost or penalty for denial 1 — £, at t  =  |  a bank would never have the incentive to 
deny voluntarily any loan committed at date 0. Note also that, to match the basic model in full, 
each bank should fund either all good entrepreneurs or all bad ones. For instance, entrepreneurs 
could be clustered in groups (“cities”), with the members of each group having the same private 
benefit. In turn, each bank could specialise in lending to one group, for instance to save transaction 
costs. A perfect correlation within the single bank’s portfolio is an extreme, simplifying assumption 
but the role of asymmetric information in magnifying the output loss would be preserved also with 
a moderate correlation.
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i) banks could already have extended a fraction of their loans when the shock oc­
curs and be unable to call it back; ii) the most penalised borrowers could severe 
established relationships; iii) the penalties/costs that banks suffer from downsiz­
ing the credit line of a borrower could increase with the denied credit more than 
proportionately. Note that the basic model could be augmented with any of these 
three features in a straightforward way: i) allowing for a staggered loan, with a 
partial extension (say L  itself) at date 0; ii) and iii) assuming that £ decreases even 
marginally as the fraction of commitment denied to the single borrower increases.
To summarise, asymmetric information in the secondary market, together with 
a sufficiently low banking concentration, does not allow a single banker funding 
more projects to internalise the benefits of a selective crunch, leading her to behave 
like the sum of many smaller bankers each funding one project. Hence, we can use 
the simplified framework of section 3 without loss of generality.
1.3.3 Welfare
If the two strategies just discussed are feasible, the equilibrium that realises after 
the shock is constrained Pareto inefficient. For instance, assume that banks were 
run by a planner unable to observe agents’ private information. Without any of the 
additional assumptions discussed in 3.2, this planner would certainly implement a 
selective crunch, dampening the propagation. Interestingly, the role of the planner 
could be played by bank supervisors, who could guide banks to adopt better strate­
gies in their loan retrenchment. It would be worth analysing the extent to which 
regulatory authorities played such a role in recent crises.
1.4 Conclusion
We have analysed a model in which lenders’ (banks’) capitalisation interacts with 
borrowers’ liquidity and choice of projects, generating a powerful financial accel­
erator of negative shocks. We have also analysed how the opaqueness of banks’ 
portfolios reinforces this interaction.
There are at least two possible extensions of the analysis. The first is studying 
the propagation mechanism in an economy in which the shock has non-zero prob­
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ability and agents can write contracts contingent on the realisation of the shock. 
The second extension is endogenising the toughness of capital regulation. A pos­
sible direction is studying a framework in which banks also gather funds from risk 
averse depositors and the regulator adjusts the toughness of capital regulation with 
the institutional objective of smoothing depositors’ repayments. Such a framework 
would allow to analyse the interaction among toughness of capital regulation, bank 
capital and projects’ quality, offering further insights on the cyclical behaviour of 
capital regulation.
Finally, we identify two main policy implications of the analysis. First, the 
analysis suggests that, besides injecting capital,12 regulators can guide banks’ re­
actions to a capital crunch, weakening the link between bank capital and projects’ 
quality. Secondly, the analysis suggests that transparency of banks’ portfolios has 
a role not only as a deterrent against banks’ opportunistic behaviour but also for 
macroeconomic stabilisation.
1.5 Appendix to  Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1
For any gross interest rate R B that solves the zero-profit condition of the bank with 
the equality sign, i.e.
B E0( L ' ) - s H E 0(p) 
(1 -  s)Eo(L’)
ex-post the entrepreneur will always borrow the maximum possible L, i.e. Eq(L') = 
L'(.) = L. In fact, using also Assumption 1, R B = <- 1^7 ^
r < R, i.e. the entrepreneur’s return net of the repayment due to the banker will be 
monotonically increasing in her borrowing. Trivially, the zero profit condition of the bank 
will always be binding: if not R B could be lowered until it becomes binding, strictly 
increasing the entrepreneur’ s expected return. We can then substitute L  for X /(.) and 
solve for L  and R B explicitly. Substituting the above expression for R B into the objective 
function i?o((l — S)RE(P)) we obtain
( 1 - s )E0(R e (.))=E0 {max [(1 -  s)R{L + H),  (1 -  s)(r(L + H)  + b) ]} - L+sHE0(p)
Now let us maximise the objective function with respect to L. Under Assumption 1, 
since dE0( ( l - s ) R E)/dL > (1 - s ) r  >  1, the entrepreneur will prefer L= 1 (the capacity 
limit), whatever technology she chooses.
12Not surprisingly, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), a public recapitalisation of the banking 
system would be unambigously beneficial in our framework.
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Since everyone knows that, for any interest rate, at the capacity limit each entrepreneur, 
whether good or bad, chooses the good equipment, the rationally expected resale price of 
each project-building on the secondary market will be Eq(p ) =  R. Substituting L=  1 and 
Eq (p) =  R into the formula for R B we obtain the gross interest rate explicitly.
Proof o f Proposition 1
First, observe that the level of the loan L* at and below which the fraction G of bad 
entrepreneurs choose the bad technology satisfies
R(L*+H)(1 — s) =  (B + r(L*+H))(  1 -  s)
from which L* follows straightforward.
Then observe that, since no banker shrinks loans by more than what is strictly imposed 
by the regulator, L'=a' E' {Kf). Substituing this into the definition of capital base we get
E'{K2) =  Rb {1 -  s)o'E'{K2 ) 4- sE'{p)H +  i{  1 -  'E'(K2))
from which we can solve for E'(K2) and L' as functions of R B and E'(p). In particular, 
after substituting RB from the initial contract, we get
L, =  a'(sE'(p)H +  t)
1 -  a'(l -  sRH  -  t)
In an economy without moral hazard (b =  0 for all the entrepreneurs) each entrepreneur 
would choose the good equipment for any V . Therefore E'(p) =  R  and, substituing 
E'(jp) into Z/, L' =  l ! . Consider now a regulatory shock such that the L' <  L*. In
equilibrium L' =  L . In fact even at the maximum price of the building (R) the cor­
responding loan L' would be lower than L* . Hence the bad entrepreneurs will shift 
to the bad equipment and the expected resale price of each building will be E'{j>) =
(1 — G)R +  Gr. Substituting the latter value of E'(p) into U  we get L .
Proof o f Proposition 2
i) Derivation of A Yre)i .  In an economy without moral hazard each entrepreneur 
would receive a loan of L' and, if living in the second period, would use her building and 
the intermediate input produced with the loan in the good technology (with productivity
R). In our economy each entrepreneur receives a loan of L and, if living, produces on 
average i?(l — G) +  rG. In fact a fraction (1 — G) of entrepreneurs choose the good 
technology and a fraction G the bad one. In addition buyers use in period 2 the buildings 
left by dead entrepreneurs. Again, while in the benchmark economy all the recovered 
buildings would be well equipped, in our economy a fraction (1 — G) of these buildings are 
well equipped and a fraction G are bad buildings. Hence the difference in the real estate 
output produced in the two economies is
Ayre>1 = nM (  ( l - » )  + rG] ( ! '+ « ) ) +  1 =
l  + sRH  -  s [i2(l - G ) + r G \ H
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=  nM  |  (1 -  s)A L 'R  +  (1 -  s)G(R - r ) L  + HG ( R  -  r )
In the above expression A JJ =  L' — L is the loan crunch that each entrepreneur 
suffers because of the declining value of projects, i.e.
A L '— L - L  = ct'sHG(R  -  r)1 -  <t'( 1 -  sRH  -  I)
Substituting A U  and L  in the above expression and operating simple algebraic ma­
nipulations we get A F r6ii .
ii) Derivation of AYre£- The loan crunch that each entrepreneur suffers because of
the declining value of buildings is A L' =  L' — L  . Of the initial population of entrepreneurs 
a fraction (1-s) survives at date 1 while a fraction s  dies (and all their intermediate input 
depreciates). Hence the contraction in loans due to the declining projects’ value affects 
only the output of a fraction (1-s) of projects. Of the surviving entrepreneurs a fraction 
(1 — G) adopts the highly productive technology so that a reduction of one unit in the 
loan implies a loss of R  units of real estate output; a fraction G adopts instead the low- 
productive technology so that a reduction of one unit in the loan implies a real estate 
output loss of r units. Combining these steps we obtain AYre>2 -
iii) Derivation of AYre $. Asymmetric information affects only the relative size of 
the loan extended to good and to bad entrepreneurs. Hence we can focus on the output of 
the projects in which the living entrepreneurs use the building personally equipped (say
2/re)- With asymmetric information each entrepreneur receives a loan of L  at t =  1 /2 . 
Hence, at date 2 she obtains a real estate output of
VP =tfre
a ' ( ( s ( ( l - G ) R  + Gr)H + e)
1 -  <t'( 1 -  s RH  -  £) + H [(1 - G ) R  + rG\
In an economy without asymmetric information the expected resale price of the project/equipped  
building of a good entrepreneur would be E'(p) — R. Hence she would receive a loan of 
V  and
ct'(sRH +  £)yP =c/re 1 -  (T’{\ -  sR H  -  I) 
while for a bad entrepreneur E'(p) =  r and
+ H (1 -  G)R
Vre~
a'(srH  + 1)
.1 -<7'(1 - s R H - t )
+ H Gr
To get the average per-living entrepreneur yP.e in the benchmark economy let us take 
the weighted sum of the last two expressions. By subtracting the first expression from this 
weighted sum and operating simple algebraic manipulations, we get the loss in the average 
per-capita output of living entrepreneurs due to asymmetric information
cr'sH [(i*2(l -  G) +  r2G) -  ((1 -  G)R  +  Gr)2]
Vre ~  1 -< t'(1  - s R H - t )
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o ' s H G { l - G ) { R - r )2 
1 -  o'{\ -  sR H  -  i)
Finally, multiplying by (1 — s ) nM , we get AY^ .e,3-
A Framework with Good Entrepreneurs’ M oral Hazard
Let us assume that also good entrepreneurs enjoy a private benefit B ' from the bad 
technology, with H ( R — r) < B ' < B. The ex-ante equilibrium is not affected: each 
entrepreneur (whatever her type) will choose to borrow and invest up to the capacity limit 
and will be expected to implement the good technology. Let us define as L* and L** the 
levels of loan at and below which respectively the bad and the good entrepreneurs shift to 
the bad technology. L * is as in the basic analysis; L** solves
R(L** +  H)( l  — s) = (B'+ r{L** + H ) ) { \ - s ) i.e.
D/
L** = -z HR  — r
Now we show that if L ' <  L* and L  <  L** the amount lent to each entrepreneur at 
t = 1/2 will be
a' (srH  +  t)L =
1 -  <7'(1 -  sRH -  i)
In fact, if V  <  L* and L <  L** (i.e. if also the crunch induced by the shift in 
the project choice of the bad entrepreneurs is strong enough) necessarily also the good
entrepreneurs will shift to the bad technology. In this case E'(p) =  r and, after sub-w
stituing E'(p) into L', L' =  L . In this economy the total real estate output will be
"I
(1 — s)L +  H rnM.
Proof o f Proposition 3
We prove that, if the condition stated in Proposition 3 is met, an entrepreneur run­
ning the good technology will reject renegotiation. As argued below, this trivially implies 
that also an entrepreneur running the bad technology will reject renegotiation. An en­
trepreneur’s expected net return from running the good technology is
( 1 -  s)Re (.) =  ( R - R b ( . ) ) ( 1 - s)L' +  R H ( 1 - s) =
-  (R n B)(i z) (sE'(p)H +  £y  I A
where the RHS of the equality comes simply from substituting the equilibrium value of 
L'. Taking the first derivative of RE(.) with respect to the gross interest rate RB, and 
considering that the entrepreneur and the bank take as given the liquidation price E'(jp) 
(that is a market price determined by the decisions of all the agents), we get
=  ( i  _  sVsE 'M H  +  M  ( 1 - ^ - 1 - ^d R B ^  [p)M +  i)CT (1 _ r B ( 1 _  s y  +  l a , y
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Clearly if the condition stated in Proposition 3 holds the entrepreneur will reject the 
offered contract and renegotiation will fail. If the entrepreneur runs the bad technology 
this will hold a fortiori since the productivity of the bad technology is r < R  (just subtitute 
r to R  in the above expression).
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Chapter 2
Bank Capital, Bank  
Supervision and Real E state  
A ctivity
Abstract
Employing evidence from banks’ balance sheets and from construction activity, we find 
evidence of a two way link between banks’ capitalisation and real estate activity in the 
Nordic crisis (1990-1994). We also find that an inaccurate bank supervision magnified this 
link, exacerbating the impact of the decline in real estate activity on banks’ capitalisation.
2.1 Introduction
The link between declines in real estate activity and banking busts has been a 
stylised fact of several recent crises (Texas, 1985-1987; New England, 1991-1992; 
Nordic countries, 1990-1994; South East Asia, 1997-1998). During these depres­
sions banks experienced big loan losses, with an important fraction of their losses 
concentrated in real estate loans (development loans and mortgages). Because of 
the resulting capital fall, banks were allegedly forced to shrink their loans to satisfy 
regulatory capital requirements. Real estate activity appeared to suffer particularly 
from this credit crunch. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many developers who 
were denied funds from their customary banks were forced to a major downward re­
vision of construction plans (Harris, Boldin and Flaherty, 1994; Peek and Rosengren, 
2000). On the regulatory side, in many countries the contraction in bank capital and 
lending followed episodes of financial liberalisation that challenged bank supervi­
sion. Because of the tougher competition induced by liberalisation, banks had tried
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to preserve profit margins redirecting their lending towards sectors “less familiar” 
to them, like real estate (Sheng, 1996). This portfolio-reshuffling had strained su­
pervisors’ monitoring and credit assessment (Klingebiel, 2000; Wihlborg, Hutchison 
and Mueller, 1994).
The objective of this chapter is twofold. The first target is to assess whether 
a two way link between banks’ capitalisation and real estate activity was at work 
during the crisis that hit Finland, Norway and Sweden from 1990 to 1994. Our 
hypothesis is that a fall in bank capital, resulting in a crunch of the loans extended 
by customary banks to developers and real estate buyers, led to a contraction of 
real estate activity. In turn, by eroding builders’ returns, the decline in real estate 
activity negatively affected repayments on outstanding bank development loans, 
leading to a further capital and credit crunch and so on. The strong reliance on 
customary banks of developers and, to a lower extent, of real estate buyers is gen­
erally recognised as a distinguishing feature of the real estate sector. In commercial 
real estate the idiosyncratic nature of many projects makes an assesment difficult 
for new lenders, hindering the substitutability of loans of customary banks (Peek 
and Rosengren, 2000); in residential construction the small size of many builders 
makes them “opaque” and dependent on local, informed banks (Harris, Boldin and 
Flaherty, 1994). In turn, it is frequently argued that real estate activity has a rela­
tively strong impact on banks’ financial status and capitalisation (Browne and Case, 
1992). Jaffee (1994) analyses the reasons for which banks axe inclined to accumulate 
risky real estate loans in their portfolios during real estate booms, ending up with 
suffering disproportionate losses on these loans during real estate crises. According 
to his hypothesis, bank lending can create a self-generated expansion of demand, 
with a loan increase spurring a rise in real estate prices and activity and this in turn 
increasing the demand for loans. Sheng (1996) maintains that, when lending to real 
estate, “[...] banks assume that collateral value alone, particularly real property, is 
sufficient to demonstrate good credit, instead of assessing the underlying cash flow 
capacity of real estate developers to service their debt”. Moreover, “[...] there is a 
fallacy of composition problem in real estate lending. Each developer assumes that 
his or her project is good at the margin, but forgets (as does the banker) that if all 
developers were to make the same assumption, there would be such an oversupply
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of property that prices would fall sharply”.
The second target of the chapter is to assess whether the accuracy of bank 
supervision affected the magnitude of the link between banks’ capitalisation and real 
estate activity. As argued in more detail below, our hypothesis is that low quality 
of bank supervision magnified the feedback from declines in real estate activity to 
banks’ capitalisation. Jaffee (1994) argues that during the Swedish real estate boom 
and bust bank supervisors were probably as inexperienced as the bankers in dealing 
with the recently deregulated environment. Sheng (1996) maintains that “[...] in 
the 1990s the failure to adequately address bank supervision resulted in weak banks 
that were unprepared to compete in global markets”.
We verify our hypotheses in two stages. In section 2, we check whether the con­
ditions behind the two hypotheses were satisfied, using anecdotal and circumstantial 
evidence from bank supervisors, from developers and from real estate buyers. In 
section 3, we perform a simple econometric analysis to test our hypotheses, using 
data from banks’ balance sheets and from banking supervisory authorities. Over­
all, the evidence supports our hypotheses, even though the small number of data, 
severely limiting the degrees of freedom, suggests strong caution in interpreting the 
econometric results.
The chapter is related to the recent analyses on the effects of capital crunches 
on real activity (Bernanke and Lown, 1991, Peek and Rosengren, 1995, 1996, 2000 
and Hancock and Wilcox, 1997 for the US; Vihriala, 1997 for Finland). From 
a methodological point of view, our econometric analysis on Nordic countries is 
close to that of Hancock and Wilcox (1997) for the US. They carry out a panel 
analysis for 47 US states relating five measures of real estate activity to bank capital 
surpluses and shortages. Our approach differs from theirs in two ways. First, we 
explicitly analyse the two way interaction between real estate activity and bank 
capital, testing the dependence of bank capital on real estate activity and on relevant 
banking and macroeconomic variables. Second, we take a preliminary step towards 
analysing whether the accuracy of bank supervision affects the feedback from real 
(estate) activity to banks’ capitalisation.
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2.2 Anecdotal and Circumstantial Evidence
From 1990 to 1994 Finland, Norway and Sweden were hit by a deep recession with 
a remarkable fall in real estate activity and prices and a deep banking crisis (for an 
overview see Bordes, Currie and Soderstrom, 1993 and Jaffee, 1994). Banks expe­
rienced huge losses, especially on real estate loans, and a fall in their capitalisation. 
By the end of 1994 (earher in Norway), thanks also to public support, the crisis was 
over and banks’ capitalisation had recovered.
In this section we employ anecdotal and circumstantial evidence to detect whether 
the conditions behind our hypotheses were satisfied. We identify four aspects: i) 
loan loss provisioning; ii) link bank capital-real estate lending; hi) substitutabihty 
of the loans of undercapitalised banks; iv) accuracy of bank supervision.
Throughout this section we will consider both loans to developers and to buyers 
of real estate. Since we focus on the link between bank capital and real estate 
activity rather than real estate prices, for our purposes it is irrelevant whether a 
crunch in bank credit hit the supply or the demand for real estate.
Loan Loss Provisioning If supervisors allowed long delays in loan loss provi­
sioning, the impact of a dechne in real (estate) activity on bank capital would be 
weak and diluted over time. Nordic Supervisory Authorities were stricter than be­
fore the crisis forcing banks to a more realistic evaluation of their portfohos in order 
to prevent further moral hazard, but greater flexibility was used in writing-off loans 
than in the US (Koskenkyla, 2000; Berger, Kyle and Scahse, 2001). The internal 
report prepared by the Swedish Regulatory Authority to summarise supervisors’ 
experience during the crisis (Finans-Inspektionen, “Experiences from the Swedish 
Financial crisis from a supervisory perspective”) highlights supervisors’ stiffening in 
the statement of losses in the accounts. According to the report Swedish regulators 
required that
“[...] expected losses and reduced values of assets be shown in the accounts 
when incurred [•••]”. In this way “[...] the size of the problems could be clarified 
[...]” even though “[...] the major risk of this method is that the dimension of 
the problems could be exaggerated”.
For Finland we gathered anecdotal evidence with direct interviews. During 
the crisis Finnish regulators adopted a flexible attitude towards problem loans and
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implemented the Basle capital requirements gradually from 1991 to 1994. However, 
according to a former head of the Government Fund Support:
“[...] the private auditors of the Scopbank or of the Savings Bank of Fin­
land (to a lower extent those of the troubled commercial bank Kansallis-Osake- 
Pankki), lobbied for a faster writing off of loans and a stricter implementation 
of capital requirements. This happened also under the pressure of banks’ 
shareholders who feared that without a rapid clearing of the banks’ portfolios 
the likelihood of a public intervention would increase, together with the risk 
of a dilution of their value at stake in the banks” -1
Plausibly, this moderate stiffening in loan loss provisioning requirements exacer­
bated banks’ undercapitalisation. However, especially in the late stage of the crisis, 
for a number of banks this stiffening was part of a plan of public support. This 
public support took place directly through capital infusions and indirectly through 
ad hoc asset management companies (AMCs), like Arsenal in Finland and Securum 
and Retriva in Sweden (for an overview of this public support see Koskenkyla, 2000). 
AMCs bought many impaired loans at a price above their market one dampening 
their impact on bank capital. In other cases they were only assigned the task of im­
proving the marketability of some bad loans, obtaining however mixed results. For 
instance, while it is generally agreed that the AMCs helped in exploiting economies 
of scale in asset securitization, it is unclear whether they improved the collection 
and transmission of information on bad loans (Klingebiel, 2000).
Link B ank C ap ita l-R ea l E s ta te  Lending When suffering a depletion of their 
capital, banks could shrink non-zero weight securities rather than loans, especially 
if they want to preserve long-term relationships with their borrowers. In a compan­
ion empirical paper (Minetti, 1999) we tested the presence of a capital crunch on 
the liability side of banks’ balance sheets using the same data-set on Nordic banks 
employed in the econometric analysis of section 3. The results appear substantially 
consistent with a capital crunch.2 That said, even in the presence of a link be­
tween bank capital and total bank loans, Nordic banks could have squeezed loans
1 “[...] even though it was also clear that the Government would not take actions like the 
nullification of shareholders’ equity in the banks that had been implemented in Norway”.
2The analysis tests whether changes in banks’ capitalisation have explanatory power for changes 
in deposits. For results contradicting the capital crunch hypothesis in the Finnish recession see, 
instead, Vihriala (1997).
48
asymmetrically across sectors, shielding real estate.3 Figures 1 and 2 respectively 
show real housing (or real estate) loans and the share of total bank loans given for 
housing (or real estate) purposes in Finland and in Norway (Swedish statistics do 
not contain analogous figures).4
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200
Norway (real estate)
Finland (housing)180
160
140
120
100
89Q3 90Q3 91Q3 92Q3 93Q3 94Q3 95Q3 96Q3 97Q3 98Q3
Q uarter
Souces: Statistics Finland and Statistics Norway
Figure 1. Real Housing (Real Estate) Loans. Finland and Norway
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Figure 2. Housing (Real Estate) Bank Loans as a Percent of Total Bank Loans
(Finland and Norway)
3Peek and Rosengren (1996) find that in New England, in the early nineties, undercapitalised 
banks crunched real estate loans strongly and that this crunch was large especially for those real 
estate borrowers most likely to be bank dependent.
4 Bank housing (real estate) loans: for Finland banks outstanding housing loans; for Norway 
housing loans from commercial banks+savings banks. Total bank loans: for Finland banks’ lending 
outstanding; for Norway total loans from commercial banks+savings banks.
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In Norway real estate loans axe depressed until the beginning of 1993 while in 
Finland housing loans decline later (1990-1995). This different timing is consistent 
with the fact that the recession started earlier in Norway, partly as a result of the 
1986 oil shock. In relative terms, in Finland the share of housing loans is increasing 
until 1992 and then decreasing until 1996; in Norway the share of real estate loans 
falls or is stable over the first three years of the nineties recovering after 1994. 
Bank loan dynamics is not very informative since it is not possible to disentangle 
the extent to which the loan shrink resulted from a fall in the demand or in the 
supply. To obtain sharper evidence, in figure 3 we report the mix (ratio) between 
housing (real estate) bank loans and total housing (real estate) loans in Finland 
and Norway.5
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Figure 3. Mix (Ratio) Bank Housing (Real Estate) Loans versus Total Housing 
(Real Estate) Loans (Finland and Norway)
In both countries, the mix appears lower dining the alleged credit crunch (note 
again the different timing).
The reduction in the mix suggests that the contraction in bank housing (real 
estate) loans would have derived not from a reduction in the demand, that presum­
ably would have affected homogeneously all the sources of real estate finance, but 
from a crunch in the supply of bank credit. Note, however, that, while this hints
5 Bank housing (real estate) loans: see note 5. In both countries total housing (real estate) 
loans consist of the housing (real estate) loans extended by all lenders, including the State.
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at a possible role of the decline of banks’ capitalisation in the crunch of bank real 
estate funding, the correlation between banks’ capitalisation and the mix could be 
spurious. For instance, the decline in this real estate finance mix could have been 
the outcome of the contractionary monetary policy followed by the central banks of 
Norway and Finland in the late eighties/ early nineties associated with the work­
ings of a bank lending channel. Testing the presence of a bank lending channel in 
four European housing markets, Iacoviello and Minetti (2000) find that monetary 
policy shocks affect the above mix in Finland but not in Norway. Moreover, long 
run institutional factors related to changes in the involvement in real estate finance 
of the different financial institutions and of the State could have mattered.
S u b stitu tab ility  in  th e  Sources of E x te rn a l F inance Even if undercapi­
talised banks shrank real estate loans remarkably, in the presence of high substi­
tutability with alternative finance (loans by well-capitalised banks, mortgage banks, 
finance and insurance companies or by the State) the impact on real estate would be 
marginal. Previous evidence for Finland and Norway hints at low substitutability 
between bank and non-bank finance, at least for residential real estate. Iacoviello 
and Minetti (2000) find that the “mix bank-mortgage lending/total mortgage lend­
ing by all the housing finance institutions” has power in explaining changes in real 
house prices in Finland and Norway.6 However, low substitutability with non-bank 
finance is not enough to lock borrowers into their customary banks. Thanks also 
to injections of public capital, several Nordic banks avoided capital depletion and 
could have offset any credit crunch of undercapitalised banks. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the fall in bank funding constrained developers and real es­
tate buyers. For Norway the “Report on the building and construction markets” of 
1992 (Norwegian Real Estate Association) reads:
“The banking crisis has intensified and it appears that both the public and 
the industry are facing far more difficulties to cover financial needs than we 
assumed in September (1991)”. And also: “The crisis in the banking sector 
has reduced banks’ willingness to give out loans, and has also hardened their 
requirements for collateral. As a result many potential real estate buyers have 
been forced to withdraw their loan applications to banks” .
6This analysis follows the spirit of Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993). They study the impact 
of the mix bank loans/commercial paper on real activity in order to disentangle a bank lending 
channel of monetary policy from a balance sheet channel.
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A ccuracy of B ank Supervision We focus on supervisors’ information on prob­
lem loans. Low quality of supervisors’ information could signal that supervisors 
did not monitor banks efficiently, allowing them to take excessive risks. In addi­
tion, during the crisis, a low quality of supervisors’ information could have hindered 
the correct assessment of banks’ assets, leading supervisors to put pressure also on 
sound banks. The mentioned internal report of the Swedish Regulatory Authority 
(Finans-Inspektionen, “Experiences from the Swedish Financial crisis from a super­
visory perspective”) highlights supervisors’ lack of information on problem loans
“[...] in many banks it has not been possible to measure the profitability 
of products, groups of products or customers. Such deficiencies had serious 
consequences -such as- [...] incorrect pricing of loans, products and services 
[...] ” . The assessment was problematic also because “ [...] at the level of banks’ 
management sufficient information about the quality of loan portfolios seems 
to have been missing
Analogously, the 11 Valuation Guidelines” of the Valuation Board 
read:
“The current problem in evaluating non-completed projects and collateral 
is that the turn-over is low and the information weak. The consequence of this 
lack of information is that the market estimates become more uncertain [...] ” 
and also “ [...] in today’s situation there is lack of marketing information which 
creates fundamental uncertainty. Furthermore other important information 
is missing about relevant revenue-influencing factors so that a meaningful 
treatment of information becomes impossible”.
Also for Finnish banks, according to a former head of the Govern­
ment Fund Support,
“[...] not only supervisors, but also auditors and the bank management 
often lacked information about the prospects of loans during the crisis” .
2.3 Econometric Evidence
2.3.1 M ethodology
Overview  In this section we test: i) the presence of a two way interaction be­
tween the capitalisation of the banking system and construction activity; ii) the 
negative correlation between the accuracy of supervision and the magnitude of this 
interaction.
To investigate the two way link between banks’ capitalisation and construction 
activity we estimate a two-equation model using data from Finland, Norway and
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Sweden. The first equation relates investment in construction to an indicator of 
banks’ capitalisation and to other relevant explanatory variables. The second equa­
tion relates the indicator of banks’ capitalisation to construction investment and to 
other relevant explanatory variables. In principle, construction investment is only 
one of the possible measures of real estate activity and, perhaps, not the most indi­
cated for capturing a feed-back from a decline in real estate activity to developers’ 
loan repayments and, therefore, to banks’ capitalisation. A better proxy would be, 
for instance, the number of construction projects started and not completed or, 
to a lower extent, the value of total new construction projects. However, for the 
three Nordic countries analysed unavailability of data on alternative measures of 
real estate activity forced us to choose construction investment.7
To investigate whether the accuracy of supervision affects the feed-back from 
construction to banks’ capitalisation, in the second equation we include an inter­
active variable obtained by multiplying construction investment by a proxy of the 
accuracy of bank supervision. As an input-side proxy we take the number of pro­
fessional supervisors employed in the regulatory agency (see below for details).
The period of observation is 1989-1996, for a total of 24 annual observations, 
8 for each country. The first annual observation will be lost because of the way 
we construct the indicator of banks’ capitalisation. The small sample size and the 
resulting limited number of degrees of freedom will lead us to interpret the results 
of this econometric analysis with strong caution.
V ariables Below we describe the variables (exact definitions and data sources 
are in Appendix). In deciding whether to specify the variables in levels or first 
differences we generally adopted the criterion of the goodness of fit.
Dependent variables
The dependent variable of the first equation is the “investment in construction 
of residential and non-residential buildings and other construction” realised in the 
country (const). We scaled investment (expressed in Swedish Kronas and deflated
7For the US, Peek and Rosengren (2000) use four measures of real estate activity: value, number 
and square footage of total new construction projects and the percentage change in employment 
in the construction industry.
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by the consumer price index) by the population of the country. The results were 
almost identical scaling construction by GDP.
The dependent variable of the second equation is the “country aggregate bank 
capital deficit” (bd). We can roughly define this country aggregate capital deficit as 
“the sum of the discrepancies between the regulatory capital and the actual capital 
of each bank of the country”. To calculate the real aggregate bank deficit we used 
a modified version of the method used by Hancock and Wilcox (1997) for the US. 
We gathered data on 71 Nordic banks or groups of savings banks (21 for Sweden, 
15 for Finland, 35 for Norway) from the international rating agency IBCA. The 
three samples of banks cover between 90% and 95% of the bank loan provision 
in their countries. For each bank we estimated a proxy of the required TIER-1 
capital at the end of year t , set by the Basle agreement at 4% of risk-weighted 
assets, in the absence of asset adjustments during year t (i.e. with the bank keeping 
risk weighted assets at their end-of-year t-1 level). Lacking detailed data on risk 
weighted assets, especially for the first years, we multiplied the outstanding loans 
of each bank at the end of year t-1, adjusted by a correction factor, by 0.04. Since 
loans are likely to underestimate risk weighted assets and it is reasonable that 
banks want to build a buffer above regulatory capital we tried a grid of correction 
factors ranging from 1.1 to 1.5, obtaining qualitatively similar results. We report 
the results obtained multiplying loans by 0.055, i.e. using a correction factor of 
5.5/4. We then subtracted this proxy of the required TIER-1 capital in the absence 
of asset adjustments from the actual equity capital at the end of year t reporting the 
difference when negative (when positive we set the capital shortage at 0). Finally, 
we summed the capital shortages of the banks of each country to obtain a proxy 
of the aggregate capital shortfall (bd) of each country in each year (expressing it in 
positive terms). For each country (sample) we scaled the aggregate capital shortage 
by the total assets (a) of the banks in the sample, calculated at the end of the 
previous year.
The hypothesis of the model is that in each year the banks used the available 
information to estimate the equity capital at the end of the year. Whenever they 
detected a discrepancy between the projected capital and the required capital in 
the absence of asset adjustments they strove to reach the targeted capital/asset
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ratio cutting loans, including real estate ones, during the year. In turn, the crunch 
in loan supply affected real estate activity, forcing developers to revise construction 
plans downward and, through a reduction of the repayments on the outstanding 
construction loans, depleting bank capital. The resulting increase in capital shortage 
further squeezed real estate loans and so on.
Exogenous variables: first equation
With perfect credit markets, construction investment can be thought as a func­
tion of general economic conditions, of population dynamics and of the user cost of 
real estate (Jaffee, 1994). We include the change in the unemployment rate (Au) 
to capture the effect of general economic conditions, expecting a negative sign on 
its coefficient. We include the population growth rate (Apop/pop) to capture the 
role of demographic factors in real estate demand, expecting a positive coefficient. 
Finally, we include the lending rate (Ir) and the house price inflation (Ahp/hp) to 
capture the impact of the user cost. We expect a positive sign of the coefficient of 
house price inflation. As to the lending rate, while in principle we would expect a 
negative coefficient, it would not be entirely surprising to find a positive one. In 
fact, as Browne and Case (1992) argue, interest on construction loans is commonly 
accrued until the project is completed and does not impose an immediate cash flow 
constraint; moreover the interest rate could pick up investors’ hopes of appreciation 
not entirely captured by house price inflation.
Exogenous variables: second equation
The most interesting exogenous variable in the second equation is the interactive 
variable obtained by multiplying const/pop by our proxy for the accuracy of bank 
supervision. As anticipated, for each country as a proxy we use the number of 
professional supervisors employed by the regulatory agency, scaled by the M2 of 
the country expressed in US dollars (supvs/M ). The intuition is that a bigger 
pool of professional supervisors allows a more accurate information gathering on 
banks’ assets. In turn, this helps to contain banks’ moral hazard in loan granting 
and facilitates the correct evaluation of banks’ assets. Therefore, we expect the 
interactive variable to have a positive sign, dampening the negative relationship 
between construction and the aggregate capital shortage.
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There are two problems associated with the use of this variable. First, the 
number of professional supervisors is a rough input-side proxy for the accuracy 
of bank supervision. Second, we were unable to trace the number of supervisors 
back to the period under study with enough confidence. Therefore, we consider 
the number of supervisors employed in 1998-2000 scaled by the M2 of the country 
in 1998. The data were obtained either directly from the regulatory authority (for 
Norway) or, for Sweden and Finland, from the database recently constructed by 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). While we have the obvious incentive to gather 
older and more accurate data, there are reasons to believe that supervisory practices 
change relatively little over time (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001). In view of these 
problems we adopt a cautious step-wise approach including this interactive variable 
only in a second specification.
The second equation includes two additional groups of exogenous variables. The 
first consists of sector-specific “banking” variables that can affect banks’ capitali­
sation through profitability and loan loss reserves. We include the ratio operating 
expenses/(average of the last two end-of-year total assets) (opex/aav) expecting 
a positive sign and, in the second specification, the total public recapitalisation 
scaled by GDP (pubk/gdp), expecting a negative sign. The second group consists of 
indicators of general economic conditions. We include the change in the unemploy­
ment rate (Au), expecting a positive sign. We include the consumer price inflation 
(Acpi/cpi) to take into account the possible impact of inflation shocks, expecting 
a positive sign. Finally, we include the short term interest rate (r). An increase of 
the interest rate can have a positive direct impact on banks’ profitability through 
higher repayments and a negative indirect one reducing borrowers’ net worth; hence 
ex-ante its expected sign is ambiguous.
Specification Considering banks’ practice in loan provisioning, we expect that 
the decline in construction investment affects the aggregate capital shortage with 
some lag. This looks a reasonable prior also in the light of the anecdotal evidence 
presented in the previous sub-section, where we showed that Nordic supervisors 
adopted a stiffening but cautious approach in pushing banks to make provisions. 
Except for this prior the choice of lags is somewhat arbitrary, especially because
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construction includes short projects, like those for single-family houses, and longer 
projects, like those for office buildings. We tried similar lag structures with no 
qualitative difference in the results.8
Below we report the basic specification (i.e. not augmented with public recapi­
talisation and with the proxy for the accuracy of bank supervision). In the second 
specification public recapitalisation appears in the second equation lagged one year.
We estimate both specifications by OLS. A drawback of using OLS is that some 
of the explanatory variables, such as the indicators of general economic conditions 
or house price inflation, could be endogenous, leading to inconsistency of the OLS 
estimates. Including such variables in lags shields somewhat from their possible 
endogeneity. A more robust method to prevent possible endogeneity would be IV 
estimation. However, besides the difficulty of identifying reliable instruments, the 
limited sample size discouraged us from using IV estimation. It is well known that, 
while they feature appealing asymptotic properties, IV estimators can have very 
bad small-sample properties.9
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2.3.2 R esults
In Table 1 we report the results obtained with the two chosen specifications. In the 
first equation the aggregate bank capital shortage affects construction investment 
with the expected negative sign (at the 5% level of significance). In the second 
equation we find a negative impact of construction on banks’ capitalisation (with 
the coefficient being weakly significant at the 10% level in the first specification).10
8We also included linear trends in the two equations with no significant difference in the results.
9For instance, in small samples it can be the case that the probability that the IV estimators 
are closer than the OLS estimators to the true coefficients is below 0.5. For a discussion of the 
finite sample properties of IV estimators see Davidson and Mackinnon (1993). For a related study 
that estimates an equation for real estate activity with similar explanatory variables by OLS see 
Browne and Case (1992).
10As to the other independent variables, in the first equation the coefficients of the change in 
unemployment rate and of the lending rate appear significant and with the expected sign. House 
price inflation and population growth rate are not significant. In the second equation none of the
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In the second specification the interactive variable (const/pop) (supvs/M ) is not 
significant even though, interestingly, it appears with the expected positive sign. 
Overall, the results suggest the presence of a two way interaction between banks’ 
capitalisation and construction investment but offer little evidence on the role of 
bank supervision in this interaction. More evidence is clearly needed, especially on 
the latter point.
Given the low number of degrees of freedom these results should be treated 
with caution, even though we obtained analogous estimates with alternative spec­
ifications. In particular, the results for the second equation are weak. This again 
could derive from the low number of degrees of freedom. However, we offer one 
alternative explanation for the difficulty in capturing banks’ capitalisation, based 
on the afore-mentioned role of Asset Management Companies in the late stage of 
the Nordic crisis. AMCs bought many impaired loans at a price above their market 
one, dampening their impact on banks’ balance sheets (Klingebiel, 2000). It is rea­
sonable that, despite the stiffening of banking regulation, this contained the impact 
of real estate activity and of economy-wide fundamentals on banks’ capitalisation. 
However, a rigorous test of this argument is beyond the scope of this analysis.
2.4 Conclusion
We have presented evidence on the fink between banks’ capitalisation and real estate 
activity in the Nordic crisis of the first half of the nineties, exploring also the role
exogenous variables is significant but, except for unemployment, they appear with the expected 
sign.
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Table 1: Regression Results 
Ordinary Least Squares Estim ates
1st eq u ation  
b d /a
D ep . v a r .=  c o n s t /p o p  
(1)
-0 .263  **
A u
(0.12)
-0 .121 ♦♦♦
A p o p /p o p
(0.039)
-0 .359
A h p /h p
(0.61)
0.006
lr
(0.009)
0.079
(0.03)
**
R 2 0.907
2nd eq u ation  
con st /p o p
D ep . var. 
(1)
-1 .20
=  b d /a
(2)
* -1 .49
o p e x /a av
(0.636)
0.154
(1.33)
0 .179
(con st /  p op ) (su p v s /M )
(0.224) (0.26)
0 .3 3 e + 0 6
p u b k /g d p
(1 .14 .+07)
-0 .123
A u -0 .141
(0.177)
-0 .119
A c p i/c p i
(0.133)
0.152
(0.147)
0 .193
r
(0.122)
0.130
(0.144)
0.151
(0.091) (0.104)
R 2 0.682 0 .696
Notea: * * * Coefficient significant at th e  10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively
S tandard  errors in parentheses. Xhe regressions Include country-dum m les
that the accuracy of bank supervision could have played in this link. The analy­
sis has implications that go well beyond the real estate sector. Being a very volatile 
component of aggregate demand, real estate investment is thought to have an im­
portant role in the business cycle (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). In addition, in 
countries in which the banking sector represents the bulk of the financial system, 
like in the three Nordic countries we have analysed, a decline in real estate activity
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could propagate to the rest of the economy by eroding banks’ net worth.
Our analysis hints at a role of an accurate bank supervision in weakening the 
link between real estate activity and banks’ financial status. The next pressing step 
is finding stronger evidence on this point, starting from the use of more precise 
indicators for the accuracy of bank supervision.
2.5 D ata Appendix to  Chapter 2
Micro bank balance sheets data
-Loans, Equity Capital and Total Assets (end of year): IBCA Bank Data Scope 1998
Aggregate banking variables
-Operating Expenses as Percent of Average Assets: OECD Profitability of Banks (var­
ious numbers)
-Public Recapitalisation: Finland, information kindly provided by the Bank of Finland, 
Financial Stability Department; Norway, Norges Bank, Financial Markets Department, 
Economic Bulletin 2/95; Sweden, information kindly provided by the Riksbank
-Number of Professional Supervisors (1998-2000): Norway, data kindly provided by 
Kredittilsynet (The Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway); Finland 
and Sweden, data from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)
Macro variables
- Unemployment Rate, Consumer Price Index, GDP (year averages): Primark Data- 
Stream
- Population (year average): Demographic Yearbook, United Nations
- Investment in Construction of Residential and Non-Residential Buildings and Other 
Construction: OECD International Statistics (various numbers). Swedish data were cor­
rected from 1993 by a factor suggested by Statistics Sweden;
- Lending Rate (year average), Short Term (Money Market) Interest Rate (year aver­
age), Money+Quasi Money (end of 1998): IMF International Financial Statistics;
-House Price Index: Finland (Residential Property Prices): BIS; Norway (New De­
tached Houses Price Index): Primark Datastream; Sweden: Transacted Houses Price In­
dex: Statistics Sweden
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Chapter 3
The Credit Channel o f 
M onetary Policy and the  
Housing Market: 
International Empirical 
Evidence
Abstract
This analysis tests a credit channel of monetary policy (especially a bank-lending chan­
nel) in the housing market. We argue that the relevance of the credit channel depends 
on the structural features of the housing finance system, in particular efficiency and in­
stitutional organisation. We employ a structural VAR approach to analyse this issue in 
four European housing markets (Finland, Germany, Norway and the UK). Our results 
support the existence of a broad credit channel and, in some contexts, of a bank-lending 
channel. More importantly, the findings show across countries a clear-cut relationship be­
tween presence of a credit (bank-lending) channel, efficiency of housing finance and type 
of institutions active in mortgage provision.
3.1 Introduction
Since Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the literature has shown a renewed interest in 
the credit channel of monetary policy. According to this view, widespread imper­
fections in the credit market, such as asymmetric information or imperfect contract 
enforceability, result for consumers and firms in a wedge between the opportunity 
cost of internal funds and the cost of external funds. In turn, this external finance 
premium depends on monetary policy. Tight monetary policy not only raises market
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rates of interest but also the external finance premium, thus discouraging invest­
ment and consumption. The explanations of this fink are twofold. The balance 
sheet view argues that the bridge between monetary policy and the external finance 
premium is represented by the financial position of borrowers. Tight money affects 
borrowers’ net worth, either reducing their current cash flows (increasing interest 
on debt burdens) or the value of their pledgeable assets. This feeds back on the 
external finance premium required by external lenders. The bank lending channel 
view, on the other hand, focuses on lenders’ financial status. Tight money drains 
reserves and retail deposits on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets. Faced with 
this deposit drain, banks can react by increasing their funding through managed 
liabilities (such as certificates of deposit) or shrinking assets (loans and securities). 
In the presence of an upward sloping supply for managed liabilities, banks may find 
it too costly to fully offset the reduction in retail deposits and opt to reduce their 
assets. The lending view argues that the impact is relatively stronger on loans than 
on securities. In fact loans and securities are imperfect substitutes because loans 
are riskier and less liquid. Therefore tight money causes an inward shift of credit 
supply that especially affects borrowers with limited access to non-bank sources of 
external funding.
The credit channel literature has produced mixed results (see Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). A strong focus has been placed on identifying contractions in credit 
aggregates resulting from inward shifts in the demand for funds (fully consistent 
with the traditional monetary transmission mechanism) from shifts in supply re­
sulting from a credit channel. A second crucial issue of this empirical literature 
has been to disentangle the bank-lending from the balance sheet channel (Kashyap, 
Stein and Wilcox, 1993). In this sense, much work has been done on the relative 
impact of monetary policy on firms with different dependence on bank funds, such 
as small and big firms (see Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).
This chapter extends the analysis of the credit channel of transmission on the 
households’ demand side focusing on the housing market. Our aim is twofold. On 
the one hand, we want to assess the presence of such a channel in the housing mar­
ket (possibly disentangling a bank-lending from a balance sheet channel). Secondly, 
we want to relate its presence, as far as possible, to the structural characteristics
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of the housing finance system, especially its institutional organisation and its level 
of efficiency. Clearly, the analysis has implications that go well beyond the housing 
market. Housing can play an important role in the business cycle, not only be­
cause housing investment is a very volatile component of demand (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995), but also because changes in house prices are thought to have impor­
tant wealth effects on consumption (IMF, 2000) and investment choices (Topel and 
Rosen, 1988).
There are three main motivations for our analysis. First, housing markets feature 
puzzles in terms of quantity and of price dynamics hard to reconcile with the tra­
ditional monetary transmission mechanism. For instance, as Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) observe, the response of residential investment to innovations in short-term 
rates is generally sharp and persistent. These feature does not match the dynamic 
response of long term rates (the ones that mainly drive residential expenditure) that 
traditionally under-react to innovations in short term rates and revert fast to their 
initial level. Secondly, as argued in Section 2.1, there are reasons to expect that the 
housing market is particularly exposed to the credit channel, hence representing a 
better environment to capture its presence than the broader economy. Lastly, by 
exploiting the cross-country heterogeneity in European housing finance systems, we 
can verify whether there exists a “reasonable” link between institutional context 
and evidence of a credit channel, thus offering an important robustness check for 
our findings.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the credit 
channel in the housing market emphasising the role of the structural features of 
the housing finance systems (2.1), especially their institutional framework (2.2) and 
their efficiency (2.3). Section 3 explains the empirical methodology (3.1 and 3.2) and 
presents the results of the empirical analysis (3.3). Section 4 concludes. Appendix 
1 and 2 respectively describe the structural characteristics of the housing markets 
analysed and the data used.
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3.2 The Credit Channel and Housing Finance Sys­
tem s
3.2.1 The Credit Channel Sensitiv ity  o f H ousing
The credit channel of monetary policy can be expected to be relatively effective in 
the housing market. Starting from the balance sheet channel, “housing demand is 
linked directly to consumer balance sheets by features like down-payment require­
ments, up-front transaction costs, like closing costs and “points” and minimum 
income-to-interest payment ratios” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, page 45).1
The lending channel is also likely to be relatively strong both at the source 
(depository institutions) and at the destination (households). At the source, in 
countries where mortgage standardisation and securitisation are not widespread, 
the relative illiquidity of mortgages could matter. If banks want to keep a buffer 
against liquidity shocks, they might be encouraged to shift from less to more liquid 
loans or to securities. At the destination a crunch in bank mortgages will probably 
result in actual lack of funds for house purchases whenever mortgage funding from 
specialist mortgage lenders or from the State is not a sufficient buffer. In fact, 
households have inherently less financing opportunities than firms.
3.2.2 Credit Channel and the Institutions for R eal E state  
Finance
The first structural aspect that can affect the credit channel in the housing market 
(especially the bank-lending channel) is the institutional organisation of the housing 
finance systems. Broadly speaking, the systems of the countries that we analyse 
(Finland, Germany, Norway, UK) can be grouped as follows:
• Bank oriented model (Finland, UK, in part Germany);
• Mortgage bond model (in part Germany);
• State model (Norway and in part Finland).
1In countries where equity withdrawal is not widespread, we can also expect that homeowners’ 
housing demand is strongly tied to their housing wealth.
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\The bank-oriented model is characterised by a strong presence of depository in­
stitutions (banks and mortgage banks) in mortgage provision. In the early 1990’s, 
Finnish banks provided about 80% of housing funding (Nordic Council, 1992). In 
the UK, depository institutions have a market share of around 90%. In Germany, 
commercial and savings banks and credit cooperatives cover about 45% of the mar­
ket competing mainly with mortgage banks and Bausparkassen. The banking sys­
tem is the strongest candidate for a bank-lending channel. The dependence of 
borrowers on depository institutions is generally high. Moreover, the amount of 
loanable funds is likely to depend strongly on monetary policy, because of the gen­
eral reliance of banks on reservable retail deposits. In particular, banking systems 
with low concentration are more prone to the existence of a lending channel, given 
the traditional difficulty of small banks in accessing wholesale funding (Guiso et al., 
1999).
The mortgage bond model is characterised by the strong role of specialist mort­
gage institutions (mortgage banks). These intermediaries fund themselves mainly 
through the wholesale market. Outside our sample, Swedish mortgage banks gen­
erally fund themselves issuing long-term housing bonds (with adjustable rates) to 
institutional investors. German mortgage banks adopt a similar mechanism of fi­
nancing (mortgage and municipal bonds). Bausparkassen, instead, rely on savings 
generated from long term (6-18 years) housing finked contracts and on government 
subsidies. Because of this funding mechanism, the mortgage bond model is less 
likely to be characterised by a bank-lending channel. Monetary policy is likely to 
have limited credit supply effects if specialist mortgage lenders with easy access 
to wholesale funding are major players and offer contracts highly substitutable to 
those of depository institutions.
Finally, the State model is characterised by a relevant State involvement (directly 
or indirectly trough public banks). In Finland, the State Housing Fund provides 
between 10% and 20% of mortgage loans. In Norway, this figure has averaged 
around 40% in the 1990’s. State mortgage loans are generally restricted to social 
housing (Finland) or to particular categories of beneficiaries (Norway).
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\3.2.3 Credit Channel and the Efficiency o f H ousing Finance
The second structural feature that is likely to affect the importance of a credit 
channel is the “efficiency” of the housing finance system. In a comparative study 
of European housing finance systems, Diamond and Lea (1992) propose a number 
of qualitative indices to evaluate their efficiency. In particular, three aspects are 
relevant for the presence of a credit channel:
1. depth of the funding system for housing finance institutions;
2. presence of a diversified range of mortgage lenders and
3. sharing of credit risk.
A deeper market for wholesale funding can undermine at the source the effec­
tiveness of a bank-lending channel by reducing the dependence of housing finance 
institutions on retail deposits. A wider, diversified range of mortgage finance in­
stitutions can weaken at the destination the bank-lending channel reducing the 
dependence of households’ house purchases on bank credit. The sharing of credit 
risk, instead, mainly determines the strength of the balance sheet channel, as we 
clarify below.
The efficiency of a housing finance system is the result both of the historical evo­
lution of the system and of regulatory constraints. A regulatory ceiling on deposit 
rates can prevent banks, after tight money, from offsetting the drain in deposits by 
increasing the return paid to depositors. Similar arguments apply for restrictions 
on market funding. In some countries previously, depository institutions have been 
prevented from issuing bonds in the open market,2 which has implied a strong fink 
between retail deposits and assets. Entry restrictions are again likely to mainly af­
fect the effectiveness of the bank-lending channel allowing a smaller range of lenders 
alternative to depository institutions. For these reasons, the lending channel is likely 
to have become weaker after the financial liberalisation that occurred in many coun­
tries during the 1980’s.3 The abolition of ceilings on interest rates and of portfolio
2 This was for instance the case for UK Building Societies whose ceiling on funds raised from 
the market was increased from 20% to 40% by the Building Society Act of 1987.
3 Liberalisation consisted of abolition/relaxation of ceilings on deposit rates and of portfolio 
restrictions on market funding of lenders; abolition/relaxation of entry and product restrictions in 
the market for housing finance; abolition/relaxation of quantitative controls on mortgages.
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\and entry restrictions (disintermediation) would have respectively deepened the 
market for banks’ liabilities and reduced the dependence of households on banks for 
mortgage funding.
Risk sharing is mainly reflected in the level of minimum income-to-interest- 
payment ratios and of down-payment requirements. These quantitative controls 
affect the link between borrower’s net worth and the availability of funds from 
bank and non-bank intermediaries. It is unclear in this case whether financial 
liberalisation has significantly altered the strength of these balance sheet effects 
(see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). As a result, the impact of financial liberalisation 
on the two channels may have been different, with a tendency to weaken the bank- 
lending channel but with limited effects on the balance sheet channel.
Table 1 classifies the housing finance systems of Finland, Germany, Norway and 
the UK according to institutional framework and level of efficiency,4 in the three 
aspects previously indicated.5 As the Table shows, we choose this set of countries 
because they display strongly diverse housing finance systems, hence fulfilling the 
heterogeneity criterion mentioned among the motivations of the analysis. Appendix 
1 provides additional evidence in support of this argument. Needless to say, this 
classification is only meant as an approximate qualitative guide for the interpreta­
tion of the empirical results and should not be overstated.6
3.3 Econom etric Evidence
3.3.1 Empirical M ethodology
For each country, we rim four VARs (in the form of a vector error correction model) 
in order to assess the presence of a credit channel and to disentangle a balance
4For this purpose, we refer mainly to the works by Diamond and Lea (1992), Booth et al. 
(1994), Lea, Welter and Dubel (1997) and the European Mortgage Federation (EMF, 2000).
5 Given the impossibility of distinguishing, even at a qualitative level, whether the presence 
of the state affects the effectiveness of the bank-lending channel, (what we defined as) state and 
banking model are bundled together.
6The literature has recently considered the financial conditions of depository institution in 
explaining the short-run relevance of the lending channel. Intuitively, the cost for a bank of 
wholesale funding is correlated to its financial health, as measured by its capitalisation, profitability 
or share of non-performing loans (Kashyap and Stein, 1998). However the financial status of 
depository institutions is likely to change often and can be of limited use in explaining the medium- 
long run relevance of the lending channel.
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\sheet from a lending channel. The variables used and the identification scheme are 
summarised in Table 2. Appendix 2 describes data sources and time periods used 
in the regressions.
. 1. The first VAR includes: GDP, CPI inflation, a short term interest rate, real 
house prices, housing loans by banks and other depository institutions, and 
total loans by banks and other depository institutions. The results from this 
VAR are substantially uninformative for detecting a credit channel. A reduc­
tion in total (housing) loans after tight money could reflect a shrink in loan 
demand, therefore being consistent with the traditional monetary transmis­
sion mechanism.7 However the change in housing loans can give a clue on the 
quantitative relevance of a possible credit channel.
2. The second VAR includes: GDP, CPI inflation, a short term interest rate, real 
house prices and the Spread between a mortgage interest rate on outstanding 
or, when available, new housing loans and a benchmark interest rate. A  rise 
in the Spread between the mortgage rate and a safe rate of compaxable matu­
rity (e.g. a  government bond yield) could capture the increase in the external 
finance premium associated with a credit channel. However, the use of the 
Spread encounters three major problems. First, the price is only one of the 
terms of mortgage contracts. For instance, an increase in the default probabil­
ity of the borrower could result in higher required collateral rather than higher 
mortgage rate. Second, if quantity rationing were pervasive in the credit mar­
ket, the Spread would fail to capture an increase in non-price rationing of 
mortgage demand. Finally, in the 1980’s some of the analysed countries have 
witnessed a progressive shift from long-term, fixed mortgage rates to variable, 
reviewable and renegotiable ones. The Spread between a variable mortgage 
rate and a long-term benchmark rate could also reflect a liquidity premium 
(possibly time-varying) not associated with agency or monitoring costs. As 
mentioned above, we tried to match the maturity of the benchmark safe rate
7 A reduction in loans is not even a necessary condition for a credit channel (Bernanke, 1995): 
households could try to compensate a reduction in their own wealth by borrowing more from 
external sources. Hence tight money could elicit an increase in loan demand that, if strong enough, 
could overwhelm any crunch in loan supply resulting from a credit channel.
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with the actual length of fixity of the mortgage rate in order to overcome this 
problem.
Moreover, unavailability of detailed data on mortgage rates applied by differ­
ent lenders prevents us from using the analysis of the Spread to disentangle 
a lending from a balance sheet channel (for instance detecting whether the 
Spread on bank mortgages increases more than that on mortgages from non­
depository institutions). Hence, we generally focus on the spread on mortgages 
by depository institutions or the one on an average mortgage rate (Germany) 
inferring from its behaviour only information on the existence of a broad credit 
channel (balance sheet and/or bank lending).
3. The third VAR includes: GDP, consumer price inflation, a short term nomi­
nal interest rate, real house prices, and the ratio of housing loans by all “non­
depository” financial institutions and the State to all housing loans. We argue 
that the analysis of the external finance Mix (that is, the fraction of housing 
loans by “non-banks”) is the best way to disentangle a lending channel. As ar­
gued in the introduction, if managed liabilities are not a perfect substitute for 
deposits, a drain in reserves and deposits will lead to a relatively strong crunch 
in bank mortgages and to an increase in the Mix. The Mix will plausibly in­
crease also as households try to compensate the reduction in bank mortgages 
with mortgages by other institutions. However, in the presence of imperfect 
substitutability between bank and other mortgages, this compensation is only 
partial and the crunch in bank supply affects housing demand. Therefore the 
analysis of the Mix requires two steps: to analyse whether monetary policy 
affects the Mix (VAR 3) and if so to analyse whether changes in the Mix affect 
the housing market (VAR 4).
4. I f  monetary policy affects the Mix, we run a fourth VAR with GDP, CPI 
inflation, external finance Mix and real house prices. We look at the effects 
of an exogenous Mix increase, what we call “external finance shock”. If the 
Mix has any explanatory power in a house price reduced form equation that 
already includes income and inflation as controls, its incremental explanatory
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power supports the existence of an independent bank-lending channel.8
The analysis of the finance Mix was first proposed by Kashyap, Stein, and 
Wilcox (1993) (who analysed the response of the Mix between bank loans and 
commercial paper to innovations in the Fed Funds rate) and has recently been 
used in the analysis of a lending channel in the automobile market (Ludvig- 
son, 1998). As stressed by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), the Mix does not 
completely solve the endogeneity problems. If different types of borrowers 
address preferentially different institutions for mortgage finance, a change in 
the Mix could simply reflect a different change in the demand for mortgages 
by these groups. For instance, in Finland banks compete with the State in 
the provision of mortgage finance but public funding is restricted to social 
housing (or single family houses). If tight money reduces the demand for so­
cial housing or single-family houses more than other segments of the demand, 
the Mix bank funding/State funding could decrease; however, this would only 
capture a different behaviour of consumers on the demand side.9
In all the specifications we use house prices as a cyclical indicator in the housing 
market. In principle, another way to test for the presence of a credit channel 
in the housing market would be to analyse the behaviour of housing investment. 
There are reasons, though, to think that house prices are more suitable to our 
analysis. First of all, since in the housing market quantities adjust sluggishly, prices 
could be more informative in capturing changes in housing demand in the short 
run. Secondly, house prices can play a crucial role in the transmission of monetary 
policy working through credit supply shifts. On the one hand, house prices affect 
borrowers’ (homeowners) wealth and credit capacity (see Stein, 1995, and Kiyotaki 
and Moore, 1997 for theoretical models). On the other, they influence lenders’ net
8Following Ludvigson (1998), we do not include the interest rate in this equation. In fact, if 
the interest rate indicates monetary policy, then including some interest rate measure would mean 
that changes in the Mix marginally reflect non-monetary effects. If the bank-lending channel is 
operative, then monetary policy should affect the Mix, and the Mix should affect house prices, 
but there should be no reason to expect that the Mix affects house prices when some variable 
that captures monetary policy stance is included in the VAR. Therefore the innovation in the Mix 
captures both monetary policy shocks and non-policy induced shocks, like, for instance, credit 
crunch episodes.
9 As it will become clearer below, in our sample this endogeneity issue arises especially for 
Finland but lack of long time-series data undermines the possibility of running specific tests on 
the cyclical behaviour of particular segments of housing demand.
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worth and, potentially, the amount of credit they extend. Specifying the VARs 
using quantities rather than prices would omit these interactions.
3.3.2 The Identification Schem e
The econometric methodology for the identification of the monetary shock in VARs 
1, 2 and 3 relies on the common trends approach developed by King, Plosser, Stock 
and Watson (KPSW, 1991) and Warne (1993). The approach uses the cointegra­
tion properties of the data to achieve identification using both short and long run 
restrictions. When a group of variables in a VAR is found to be non-stationary but 
cointegrated, a useful specification for their dynamics is a vector-error-correction 
model (VECM). A VECM places non-linear, reduced rank restrictions on the ma­
trix of long run impacts from a VAR. KPSW distinguish between structural shocks 
with permanent effects on the level of the variables from those with only temporary 
effects. The permanent shocks are the sources of the so-called common stochas­
tic trends among the series. The number of these shocks equals the number of 
variables in the system less the cointegrating relationships between them. The 
remaining transitory innovations equal the number of cointegrating relationships 
(intuitively, a cointegrating vector identifies a linear combination of the variables 
that is stationary thus eliminating the trend, so that shocks to it do not eliminate 
the steady state in such a system).
The VAR model needs not to be fully identified: partial identification of either 
the transitory or permanent shocks is possible. Furthermore, one can separate 
the transitory shocks by adding some untested restriction on their impact effect. 
We identify the monetary shock as the transitory innovation that does not affect 
contemporaneously GDP and CPI inflation, but that can have impact effects on all 
the other variables. In addition, the shock also has to satisfy long run neutrality, 
both by having zero long run effect on GDP (and the other real variables) and by 
keeping relative prices of houses and consumer goods constant.10 Therefore, GDP, 
inflation, real house prices and other real variables will revert back to their initial
10The monetary shock will not affect the relative prices of the two goods in the long run, but 
the permanent shocks in the VAR (that we do not focus upon here) in general will. However, it 
can affect the CPI and house price index (by the same amount), since we impose the zero long 
run restriction on CPI changes, not on levels.
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steady state once the effects of the shock die out.
We run augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests on the levels of the series.11 
The tests show that the variables are integrated of order l .12 The results from 
the cointegration tests are mixed. Depending on the country and the time periods, 
the rank test statistic signals two to four cointegrating vectors. We rely on widely 
used plausibility arguments to solve the dilemma, opting for a common rank of 3. 
This allows us to identify the monetary shock in a neat way, by using zero impact 
restrictions of the monetary shock on GDP and CPI inflation only.13 On the basis 
of this, we specify the first three VARs in the form of a vector error correction 
mechanism (VECM).14 This combination of short and long run restrictions turns 
out to be successful, as the contractionary monetary shock elicits a rise in the 
interest rate and a negative response of GDP and consumer prices, all suggestive of 
a tight monetary policy stance.15
In VAR 4 we use a more conventional identification scheme to capture the effects 
of a Mix shock. Economic theory is in fact silent about the permanent effects of a 
Mix innovation. In order to identify it, we rely on a recursive scheme, ordering the 
Mix after GDP and consumer price inflation and before real house prices.
3.4 Country Specific Results
3.4.1 Finland
The evidence supports the existence of a bank-lending channel and leaves room for 
a balance-sheet channel.
Figure 2.A shows the responses of real housing and total loans to a monetary
11 More details on this and on the cointegration tests are available in the Appendix.
12 In Germany, the unit root null hypothesis for inflation, interest rates and real house prices is 
rejected. Note, however, that it is not necessary that each time series in a common trends model 
is non-stationary. Loosely speaking, a stationary variable is simply cointegrated with itself, and 
can therefore be fitted in a common trends framework (Warne, 1993).
13We departed from this rule only for one of the regressions for Norway. See the first footnote 
in the subsection on Norway.
14Each VECM is estimated with a lag length of 2 to 4, depending on which was sufficient to get 
serially uncorrelated residuals.
15We also tried the recursive identification scheme ordering the interest rate after GDP and CPI 
inflation in the VAR (not imposing the long run monetary neutrality restriction). The results of 
this specification were similar to those reported here.
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contraction, using quarterly data from 1978:4 to 1999:3, along with one standard 
error asymptotic confidence bands. Both housing and total loans fall after tight 
money. Figure 2.B shows the response of the Spread between mortgage rate on 
new housing loans by banks and 3-year benchmarking interest rate16 to a negative 
monetary shock.17 The Spread increases significantly after the contraction, and its 
time pattern closely matches that of the money market rate. Its behaviour hints 
therefore at the existence of a broad credit channel.
In addition, the analysis of the finance Mix supports the workings of a bank- 
lending channel. We construct the Mix as the sum of housing loans by the State plus 
other minor non-depository lenders over housing loans by all institutions (including 
commercial, savings and cooperative banks) and analyse its behaviour in two steps. 
First, using data from 1987:1 to 1999:3 (that is after the liberalisation of interest 
rates), we find a significant increase in the Mix following tight money, with the 
response staying significant until ten quarters after the shock (Figure 2.C). This 
result looks consistent with the structural characteristics of the Finnish market for 
housing finance. Finnish banks rely strongly on retail sight deposits (EMF, 2000) 
and their access to wholesale funding occurs at a higher cost than for mortgage 
credit institutions in other Nordic countries (Kosonen, 1993, and Booth et al., 1994). 
These difficulties could explain the response of the Mix. The finding also suggests 
that financial liberalisation could have had a minor role in weakening a bank-lending 
channel at the source (i.e. increasing the substitutability between retail deposits and 
wholesale funding).18
We then analyse the impact of the Mix (Figure 2.D). Real house prices fall signif­
icantly after an increase in the Mix. This suggests that the composition of mortgage 
finance can play an important role in affecting housing demand. The result appears 
consistent with the characteristics of the Finnish system. The bulk of mortgages 
from non-depository institutions come from the State (from 1990, through the State
16The benchmark rate maturity reflects the fact that in Finland loans have typically adjustable 
rates with adjustment periods of 3-5 years (Kosonen, 1993). Maclennan, Muellbauer and Stephens 
(1999) report a share of 90% of adjustable rates mortgages.
17In this case the sample includes quarterly data from 1988:1 to 1999:3. Therefore the sample 
extends entirely after the abolition of interest rate ceilings (occurred in 1987).
18Financial liberalisation in the second half of the 1980’s resulted in Finland in the abolition 
of the ceilings on deposit and mortgage rates and in the progressive deepening of the market for 
bank bonds.
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Housing Fund). State mortgages can represent a buffer for shocks in bank funding 
only to a limited extent. In fact, state funding is restricted to social housing (rental, 
cooperative and owner occupied) and to financing the construction of single-family 
houses. Moreover state loans are means-tested. As a result, the substitutability 
between private-bank and alternative funding is likely to be imperfect, implying 
the relevance of mortgage distribution for households’ house purchases.
3.4.2 Germany
We find evidence (though not conclusive) of a balance sheet channel but no evidence 
of a bank lending channel.
Figure 3.A shows responses of total loans and housing loans by banks, using 
data from 1974:2 to 1998:4.19 A monetary contraction leads to a significant decline 
in total bank loans. Housing loans fall only slightly. This could be due to long-term 
relationships between banks and customers that induce banks to insulate their loan 
portfolios from monetary disturbances.
The Spread between the average 10 year fixed mortgage rate and the government 
10 year bond yield widens after a monetary contraction and stays positive for about 
3 years (Figure 3.B). Even in the 1990’s mortgages with fixed rate have been origi­
nated also by commercial and savings banks, they are more typical of non-depository 
institutions, such as mortgage banks or Bausparkassen. Since the latter are shielded 
from fluctuations in reservable deposits, the increase in our Spread could capture 
the effect on the external finance premium of a deterioration in borrowers’ net worth 
(i.e. a balance sheet channel).
We then analyse the Mix, using data from 1974:2 to 1998:3. The variety of 
institutions in the German housing finance system renders the construction of the 
Mix complex. We consolidate all the institutions traditionally relying on reservable, 
short-term retail deposits. We then construct the Mix as the sum of housing loans 
from Bausparkassen and Mortgage Banks over total housing loans from all financial
19The availability of relatively long time-series and the absence of significant structural changes 
in the regulation of the housing finance system led us to use relatively long time periods in the 
analyses. The regression for the Spread starts in 1982, as we found consistent time series for the 
interest rates only starting after that date.
76
\institutions.20 Tight money (Figure 3.C) leads to a rise in the Mix, which displays 
a hump-shaped response, peaking after two years and returning to the baseline 
after four. This seems consistent with the characteristics of the German market 
for funding. According to Diamond and Lea (1992), German funding markets are 
segmented. First, they feature relative sluggishness of market deposit rates. More 
important is the segmentation of the bond market. In particular, commercial and 
savings banks can issue unsecured debt but cannot issue mortgage bonds (unlike 
mortgage banks). They are also strongly discouraged by the regulator from issuing 
derivative securities. As a result, banks rely mainly on retail general funding and 
especially on savings deposits (EMF, 2000). The behaviour of the Mix can also 
be explained by the degree of concentration of the banking system. Except for the 
three big banks, the system is made by a network of small banks with difficult access 
to the wholesale market. In particular, the main financiers of house purchases are 
savings banks and credit cooperatives (approximately two thirds of bank housing 
loans once we exclude mortgage banks). There is a vast range of sizes among these 
banks but the majority is small and operates on a regional basis.
The Mix shock (Figure 3.D) does not affect real house prices significantly, in­
dicating good substitutability of depository institution mortgages with mortgages 
from other institutions. This result is not surprising. The mortgage market in Ger­
many appears well diversified and competitive (Diamond and Lea, 1992). Although 
the contracts offered by depository and non-depository institutions are not entirely 
homogeneous, especially in the length and in the rate (fixed or renegotiable), these 
differences do not appear to justify a marked non-substitutability.
3.4.3 Norway
We find lack of evidence of a credit channel
Figure 4. A shows total loans and housing loans by depository banks21 in response
20The denominator includes therefore, besides mortgages from the two mentioned institutions, 
mortgages from commercial, savings, regional banks and from credit cooperatives. The definition 
of housing loans includes mortgages secured by real estate (about 90% of the aggregate) and a 
residual category o f ’’other” housing loans (for redevelopment etc.).
21 This specification includes four cointegrating vectors. The identification restrictions imposed 
on the monetary shock are similar to all other cases. The only difference is that the monetary 
shock cannot affect house prices in the impact period.
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to a monetary shock, using data from 1988:3 to 1999:4. Loans and real house prices 
fall significantly.
The response of the Spread between the mortgage rate22 and the 5-year gov­
ernment bond yield provides very weak evidence for the credit channel hypothesis. 
The Spread (Figure 4.B) is not significantly affected by a monetary contraction. 
Further evidence comes from the analysis of the Mix (Figure 1, bottom row). Over 
the sample period, Government Lending Institutions have originated an important 
fraction of mortgages. At the end of the 1990s, commercial and savings banks’ 
share in the market had risen to around 80%. Finally, finance and credit companies 
that fund themselves mainly through the wholesale market cover a minor share. 
We construct the Mix as the sum of loans from state and non-depository financial 
institutions over total housing loans.23 Figure 4.C shows its response to a negative 
monetary shock. The response appears insignificantly different from zero.
This result could reflect the deepening of the market for bank funding in the 
Norwegian housing finance system. According to Lea, Welter and Dubel (1997), 
the access to the wholesale market has improved for depository institutions over the 
1990’s, reducing the banks’ dependence on retail deposits (even if deposits represent 
the main source of funding, with an approximate share of about 60% of banks 
liabilities). The EMF (2000) maintains that banks have increasingly enjoyed easy 
access to wholesale general funding (in the form of bank bonds, loans from other 
monetary financial institutions and other general funding).24 Quite interestingly 
instead, arguments related to the average size of Norwegian banks are not of help. 
In fact, concentration in the banking system is quite low with the strong presence 
of a myriad of small savings banks alongside a few medium-sized commercial banks.
22Interest rates on mortgage loans from banks were available for Norway starting only in 1995. 
Before that date, we used the interest rate on long and medium term loans. The bulk of mortgage 
loans in Norway have reviewable rates, but a non marginal fraction have renegotiable rates. For 
this reason, and for the likely pooling with loans with medium-long term fixed rates, we opted for 
a medium term rate as benchmark.
23 As shown in Figure 1, because of the declining importance of public funding the Mix exhibits 
a strong decline over the whole sample passing from 45% in late 1980’s to a value of little more 
than 15% at the end of the 1990’s.
24The EMF also reports that ’’from 1995 until 1998 Norwegian banks have faced a much faster 
growth in lending than in deposits and have increasingly relied on funding from other sources...” 
(2000, page 29)
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3.4.4 The U nited  K ingdom
The evidence supports the existence of a bank-lending channel and leaves room for 
a balance-sheet channel.
The first VAR runs from 1978:1 to 1999:4. Tight money reduces on impact 
mortgages of depository institutions. Total loans decline only slightly and with 
some lag (Figure 5.A). Real house prices react with the expected negative sign.
The response of the Spread between the average mortgage rate on building 
societies mortgages and the 3-months Treasury bill rate (Figure 5.B) offers some 
evidence of a broad credit channel.25 The Spread stays marginally positive for about 
3 years.
We construct the Mix as housing loans of non-depository financial institutions, 
insurance companies, pension funds and the State (excluding banks and building 
societies) over total housing loans by all institutions. After the Corset abolition in 
1980 and especially from the late 1980’s, real estate agents and centralised mortgage 
lenders have competed with building societies and banks in mortgage provision. 
The bulk of funds of these non-depository institutions (and of insurance companies) 
come from the wholesale market, shielding them from fluctuations in retail deposits. 
The Mix increases following a negative monetary innovation (Figure 5.C), showing 
evidence of a crunch in bank and building societies mortgage supply stronger than 
the crunch in the mortgage supply of non-depository institutions. In turn, a positive 
innovation in the Mix reduces significantly real house prices that axe well below the 
baseline around 6 quarters after the shock (Figure 5.D). Hence, the hypothesis of 
a bank-lending channel appears supported. On the one hand, the causality from 
monetary actions to the Mix shows that monetary policy can affect the composition 
of mortgage supply. On the other, the good marginal explanatory power of the Mix 
hints at the relevance of the composition of external finance for housing demand.26
The relevance of monetary policy for the Mix would appear controversial. As
25Here the VAR runs from 1985:1 to 1999:3 (a period that extends after the UK housing finance 
system reforms of the 1980’s including the 1986 Building Societies Act). We choose a three- 
month rate as benchmark because the majority of mortgages in UK have a rate reviewable at the 
discretion of the lender.
26 Moreover, unlike in the Finnish system, the homogeneity in the mortgage products is also 
associated with substantial homogeneity in the range of beneficiaries of mortgage loans across 
institutions. This implies that the change in the Mix cannot be explained by changes in the 
composition of demand.
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Diamond and Lea (1992) report, the UK funding market stands for one “of the 
most fully integrated and developed funding markets, almost as far as the United 
States” (page 221). Banks have relatively easy access to the wholesale market 
and the constraint imposed on Building Societies wholesale funding is not binding. 
Diamond and Lea report the limit imposed to issuance of unsecured debt by Building 
Societies as a major inefficiency. In such a fluid and liberalised context it would 
have been equally plausible to find a weak link between monetary policy and the 
composition of finance.
The effect of the Mix on house prices is instead in fine with reasonable ex­
pectations. Having aggressively entered the mortgage market in the 1980’s, non­
depository institutions have seen their market share declining in the 1990’s (Figure 
1, bottom row27).28 W ith a market share of less than 10%, they probably repre­
sent too tiny a buffer to effectively shield households from a reduction in mortgages 
from banks and building societies. As suggested by Kashyap and Stein (1994), in 
the presence of non-negligible costs from switching from one lender to the other the 
argument of the “marginal” lender could fail, and the relative sizes of the bank and 
non bank intermediary sectors could matter.29
3.5 Conclusions
We have analysed and tested the presence of a bank-lending channel and more 
generally of a credit channel in four European housing markets featuring different 
institutional frameworks and different levels of efficiency in the funding and mort­
gage systems. Table 3 summarises the econometric evidence. While robust evidence 
of a bank lending channel emerges for Finland and the UK, we find at most evidence 
of a balance sheet channel for Germany, and lack of evidence of a credit channel 
for Norway. The results suggest that, despite the process of integration, residual
27The figure also includes a negligible, declining market share of the Government.
28According to Lea, Welter and Dubel (1997), following the sharp rise of market rates in 1988, 
centralised lenders were hit both financially and in originations with heavy pre-payments as they 
had to adjust their rates when the funding rate index (Libor) changed. Banks and building societies 
could avoid this adjustment because retail savings rates sluggishly responded to market rates.
29It would seem therefore that neither the increased freedom of entry in the market for housing 
finance nor the relaxation of funding restrictions and liberalisation of market rates have led to a 
full flexibility of the UK system.
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heterogeneity characterises European housing markets and eventually, the transmis­
sion mechanism of monetary policy. The results for Finland, Norway and Germany 
are in line with the analyses by Diamond and Lea (1992), Booth et al. (1994), Lea, 
Welter and Dubel (1997) and EMF (2000). The Finnish housing finance system, 
despite financial liberalisation, is affected by frictions: banks heavily rely on retail 
deposit funding and have a predominant role in mortgage origination. At the oppo­
site extreme, Norway has enjoyed a clear improvement in the funding mechanisms 
of housing finance institutions and greater competition among mortgage financiers 
(EMF, 2000). Finally, the rigidity of the German markets, marginally affected by 
deregulation, explains the evidence of a balance sheet channel suggested by the be­
haviour of the Spread; the lack of a bank-lending channel could be the by-product 
of the historical richness of non-depository mortgage providers. The evidence for 
the UK is partially at odds with the studies mentioned, instead. While in the UK 
the funding market for depository institutions is considered to be well developed 
(Diamond and Lea, 1992), we find that a monetaxy policy shock affects the Mix 
“mortages from depository institutions/ mortgages from all mortgage providers”. 
The result that in turn the Mix affects housing demand is instead consistent with 
households’ heavy reliance on depository institutions for mortage provision.
Throughout the chapter we have avoided quantitative comparisons across coun­
tries, limiting our analysis to qualitative differences in the sign, shape and signif­
icance level of the VAR impulse responses. We think that, in order to address 
the transmission of monetary policy, this approach is relatively safe even if our 
conclusions should still be treated with caution.
The normative implications of the analysis for the conduct of monetary policy 
are relevant. In a framework with a single monetary policy (which is the case for 
Germany and Finland and in perspective for the UK), the choice of the appropriate 
intermediate targets can encounter relevant difficulties with strongly asymmetric 
transmission channels. The question then becomes whether the process of integra­
tion or phenomena like the diffusion of mortgage securitization will progressively 
sweep these asymmetries away.
The second conclusion is methodological. Recent studies (Maclennan, Muell- 
bauer and Stephens, 1998) have strongly questioned the usefulness of VARs for
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Vanalysing asymmetries in housing finance systems. The consistency of our results 
with the descriptive evidence by Diamond and Lea (1992) and the other mentioned 
studies suggests that, at least if restrained to qualitative inference, VARs can surely 
represent a useful technique.
82
Appendix to Chapter 3
T able  4.1: S tructu ral features of housing finance systems
C ountry Institu tional
fram ework
Efficiency
Funding M arket M ortgage m arket Risk-bearing
Finland Banking and 
state system 
Strong role of 
banks
State funding 
restricted in 
scope and 
beneficiaries
Strong reliance of banks on retail 
deposits and limited use of general 
wholesale funding (like bank bonds)
Limited use of mortgage bonds; no use of 
mortgage backed securities (EMF)
Limited possibility of 
diversifying away from 
banks
State funding limited 
to particular types of 
mortgages/borrowers 
(BGMR)
LTV ratios 
around 70-80%
UK Banking system
Strong role of
depository
institutions
(banks and
building
societies)
Competitive (DL)
Good access of depository institutions to 
wholesale general funding
Building societies can issue mortgage 
backed securities
Sources of inefficiency:
limits on building societies unsecured
debt
capital requirements unfavourable to 
issuing mortgage-backed securities (DL 
and EMF)
Weak role of non­
depository mortgage 
lenders
Integrated and 
competitive system
No restrictions on 
contracts (DL)
LTV ratios up 
to 80% 
(without 
insurance) and 
100% with 
insurance
Germ any Banking and 
mortgage bond 
system
Low
concentration 
in banking 
system
Segmented (DL)
strong reliance of banks on retail 
deposits (mortgage backed securities 
issued at a very small rate)
Sources of inefficiency
-Deposit rates sluggish below market
rates
-Banks cannot issue mortgage bonds 
-Only Bausparkassen can issue contract 
savings
-Limits on insurers favour mortgage 
bonds (DL and EMF)
Strongly competitive
Well diversified range 
of alternative 
mortgage-lenders
Commercial and 
savings banks have 
overcome the funding 
segmentation through 
ownership of the 
specialised institutional 
funding sources (DL)
LTV ratios >  
80% restricted 
only to repeat 
buyers
Regulator 
constrains LTV 
ratio below 
80% for 
mortgage bank 
and
Bausparkassen
mortgages
Norway Banking and 
state system
Good access of commercial and savings 
banks to wholesale market (bank bonds 
and other general funding) (EMF)
Strong and increasing 
competition in market 
for mortgage loans 
(LWD)
LTV ratios 
around 80%
Note: DL refers to Diamond and Lea (1992); LWD refers to Lea, Welter and Dubel (1997); BGMR 
refers to Booth et al. (1994), EMF refers to European Mortgage Federation (2000).
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T able  4.2: Overview of the  econometric Specifications
V A R VARIABLES () ID EN TIFIC A TIO N  O F ID EN TIFIC A TIO N  SCHEM E
1
Y, D P, R, HP, HL, TL 
(Loans )
M O N ETA R Y  PO LIC Y  
SHOCK
Com binations of short and  long 
run  restrictions; m onetary  shock 
does not affect
contem poraneously Y  and  D P 
and has zero im pact on all the  
variables in the  long run.
2
Y, D P, R, HP, 
SPR EA D  (Spread )
3
Y, D P, R, H P, MIX 
(Mix )
4 Y, D P, MIX, HP MIX SHOCK
Recursive. The MIX shock does 
not affect contem poraneously Y  
and D P
Variables: Y (real GDP), DP (consumer price inflation), R (money market rate), HP (real house 
prices), HL (real housing loans from all institutions), TL (total loans from all institutions), SPREAD 
(mortgage rate, RM, minus benchmark safe rate, RL), MIX (ratio of housing loans from “non-banks” 
to total housing loans).
Table 4.3: Sum m ary of the  Em pirical Findings
C ountry
Response to  a  negative m onetary shock
Response 
to  Mix 
increase
C redit channel?
Bank loans 
and housing 
loans
Spread =  
bank 
m ortgage - 
benchm ark 
ra te
M ix (Housing 
loans non 
bank /  T otal 
Housing 
loans)
Real
House
Prices
Balance
sheet
B ank
lending
Finland B L ft h l U SPREAD ft MIX ft H P ft Possible Yes
Germ any B L ft HL <=> SPREAD ft MIX ft H P o Yes No
Norway B L ft h l U SPREAD <=> MIX o No No
UK BL o f t  HLft
SPREAD
o f t
MIX ft H P ft Possible Yes
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Figure 1: The data used. HP and Y  indicate (log of) real house prices and G D P. Third row shows the  
m oney market rate (R). Fourth row plots the Spread (SP) between m ortgage rate and a safe rate o f  
sam e m aturity (interest rates are expressed in basis points). F ifth  row shows log o f real loans from  
banks for housing (HL) and all other purposes (BL). Sixth  row shows the M IX variables, constructed  
as the ratio between housing loans from State and non-depository institutions versus to ta l housing  
loans.
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Im pulse responses of the V A R  in the countries analysed. For each country, Figure A  shows response o f  
to ta l real bank loans, bank housing loans and other macro variables to a m onetary contraction. Figure 
B shows responses o f the Spread m ortgage rate/lon g term  safe rate o f equal m aturity to  a m onetary  
contraction. Figure C shows the response of M ix (housing loans from non-banks over to ta l housing  
loans) to a m onetary contraction. Figure D  shows the response o f the macro variables to  a  positive  
innovation in the MIX.
Figure 2.A: FINLAND: R ESPO N SES ± 1 S .E . B A N D S TO  A M O N E T A R Y  SHOCK, LO ANS
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Figure 2.C: FINLAND: R ESPO N SES -bl S.E. B A N D S TO  A M O N E T A R Y  SHOCK, MIX
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Figure 3.A: GERMANY: RESPONSE +1S.E. BANDS TO A MONETARY SHOCK, LOANS
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Figure 3.B: GERMANY: RESPONSE +1S.E. BANDS TO A MONETARY SHOCK, SPREAD
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Figure 3.C: GERMANY: RESPONSE +1S.E. BANDS TO A MONETARY SHOCK, MIX
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Figure 4.A: NORWAY: RESPONSE rfclS.E. BANDS TO A MONETARY SHOCK, LOANS
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Figure 4.B: NORWAY: RESPONSE ±1 S.E. BANDS TO A MONETARY SHOCK, SPREAD
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Figure 5.A: UK: RESPONSE +1S.E. BANDS TO A MONETARY SHOCK, LOANS
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Figure 5.B: UK: RESPONSE -i-lS.E. BANDS TO A MONETARY SHOCK, SPREAD
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Annex 1: Structural features of the housing markets
In stitu tional framework
M ain m ortgage lenders and  percen t recent m arket share
Finland: Deposit banks and B ank of F inland (68), S ta te  and  other specialist lenders
(32) (source: S tatistics Finland)
UK: Banks (68.6), building societies (24.9), o ther specialist lenders (6.5) (source:
Lea, W elter and Dubel, 1997).
Norway: Savings banks (40.8), commercial banks (33), m ortgage in stitu tions (1.5),
S ta te  banks (16.1), insurance companies (8.2), o ther (0.4) (source: Lea, W elter 
and Dubel, 1997).
Germany: P rivate  commercial banks (21), m ortgage banks (16), credit co-operatives (14),
savings banks (25), Bausparkassen (11), regional banks (13) (source: Lea, 
W elter and Dubel, 1997)
Funding m ethods (depository institu tions)
Sources o f  fund ing  for banks and  other depository in stitu tio n s  (retail deposits include  
accounts and  savings deposits; wholesale general fund ing  includes bank bonds, loans from  
other m oneta ry  in stitu tions and  other m inor techniques)
Finland: banks: retail deposits (90%), wholesale general funding (10%) (source: EM F
2000)
UK: banks  (exact figures not available); building societies, retail deposits (75%),
wholesale general funding (25%) (source: EM F 2000)
Norway: commercial banks, retail deposits (50%), wholesale general funding (47%);
savings banks, retail deposits (61%), wholesale general funding (37%); (source: 
EM F 2000)
Germany: Mortgage bonds, mortgage backed securities, deposits (exact figures not available)
Loan to  value ratios
Finland 70% (source: M aclennan, M uellbauer and Stephens, 1998)
UK 95% (source: M aclennan, M uellbauer and Stephens, 1998)
Norway 80% (source: M aclennan, M uellbauer and Stephens, 1998)
Germ any 65% (source: European M ortgage federation, 2000)
Degree of liberalisation
S e t 1: Ceilings on deposit and  lending in terest rates; fund ing  restrictions
Finland:
UK:
Norway:
Germany:
Abolition of ceilings on loan rates in 1987
E nd of collusive interest ra te  cartel w ith the  abolition of the  corset in 1980; 
relaxation of constraints on funding of Building Societies in 1986 (Building 
Societies Act)
Abolition of ceilings on bank lending rates in 1985
Abolition of “the  regulation on interest ra te  ad justm ent (Z insverordnung)” in 
1967. Persisting collusive m ortgage rates
Set 2: E n tr y  and  portfolio  restrictions 
UK: Abolition of the  Corset in 1980.
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Annex 2: Data description
Summary tables of time periods and variables used in the s (source in brackets).
Loans s
Country Years Variables
Finland 78:4 -  99:3 HE =  Residential Property Prices (source: BIS)
R =  Money Market Rate (Datastream (DS))
HL =  Banks’ Outstanding Housing Loans (Statistics Finland) 
TL =  Banks’ Lending Outstanding (Statistics Finland)
Germany 74:2 -  98:4 HE =  Residential Real House Price Index (Aufina/ERA; the original annual 
series was made quarterly through interpolation assuming an ARIMA(0,2,0) in 
the original series))
R =  3 months Money Market Lending Rate^(DS)
HL =  Private Commercial Banks Housing Loans (DS)
TL =  Private Commercial Banks Total Loans (DS)
Norway 88:3 -  99:4 HP =  New Detached Houses, Price Index (DS)
R =  3months Forward Rate (DS)
HL =  Housing Loans Commercial Bank +  Savings Banks (Statistics Norway) 
TL =  Total Loans Commercial Bank +  Savings Banks (Statistics Norway)
UK 78:1 -  99:4 HP =  Nationwide East Anglia House Price Index (DS)
R =_Inter-bank 3 months interest rate (DS)
HL =  Building Societies Loans For House Purchase +  Bank Lending Secured On 
Dwellings (DS)
TL =  Total Loans, Banks And Building Societies (DS)
Spread (RM-RL) s
Country Years Variables
Finland 88:1 -  99:3 RM =  Interest Rate On Banks New Housing Loans (Bank o f  Finland) 
RL =  Long Benchmarking Interest Rate, 3 Years (Bank o f  Finland)
German
y
82:4 -  99:4 Industrial Production A nd Producer Price Inflation used instead o f  Y  A nd  DP  
RM =  Mortgage Rate, 10 year Fixed Average (DS)
RL =  10 year Government Bond Yield (DS)
Norway 88:3 -  98:4 RM =  Interest Rate On Long Term And Medium Term Loans Until 95:4; 
Interest Rate On Mortgage Loans From Banks From 96:1 (Statistics Norway)
RL =  Interest Rate On 5 Year Bonds (Statistics Norway)
UK 85:1 -  00:2 RM =  Building Societies, Mortgage Average Rate (DS) 
RL =  Treasury Bill Rate (Office for National Statistics)
Mix s
Country Years Variables
Finland 87:1
99:3
MIX =  Housing Loans from all other lenders /  ( Housing loans from all other 
lenders +  Housing Loans from Depository Banks and Central Bank)
Germany 74:2
98:3
MIX =  Housing loans from Bausparkassen and Mortgage Banks /  Total 
housing loans from all the financial institutions
Norway 88:3
99:4
MIX =  Housing loans from state and non-depository fin. institutions /  Total 
housing loans
UK 87:1
00:2
MTX =  General Govt +  Insurance Companies and Pension Funds +  Other 
Financial Intermediaries Loans Secured on Dwellings /  Total Loans Secured on 
Dwellings
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Annex 3: Unit root and cointegration tests
Augmented Die tey-Fuller tests for unit root
Country Varia
bles
Unit root 
test 
statistic
Sample period
Country Varia
b
Unit root 
statistic
Sample
period
Finland Y -0.84 78:4 -  99:3 Norway Y 0.579 88:3 -  99:4
DP -2.14 78:4 -  99:3 DP -4.248** 88:3 -  99:4
R -1.84 78:4 -  99:3 R -1.88 88:3 -  99:4
HP -1.58 78:4 -  99:3 HP -0.12 88:3 -  99:4
HL -2.40 78:4 -  99:3 HL 2.66 88:3 -  99:4
TL -1.36 78:4 -  99:3 TL 1.306 88:3 -  99:4
SP -3.48** 88:1 -  99:3 SP -2.44* 88:3 -  99:4
MIX -0.33 87:1 -  99:3 MIX 2.43 88:3 -  99:4
Germany Y -0.45 74:2 -  98:3 United Y -0.94 63:2 -  99:3
DP -4.94** 74:2 -  98:3 Kingdo DP -2.24 63:2 -  99:3
R -3.17* 72:2 -  98:3 m R -2.846 63:2 -  99:3
HP -4.74** 72:2 -  98:3 HP -1.486 63:2 -  99:3
HL -0.84 74:2 -  98:3 HL -0.29 63:2 -  99:3
TL -0.30 74:2 -  98:3 TL -0.287 63:2 -  99:3
SP -1.72 82:4 -  98:3 SP -0.834 86:1 -  99:3
MIX -0.84 74:2 -  98:3 MIX -2.98* 86:1 -  99:3
Note: */** indicates rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at 5/1% significance level.
Cointegration tests (sample periods as in the Appendix 1)
Countries Model with Suggested Cointegration rank 
(at 90% confidence level)* 
Lambda-max Trace
Finland Y, DP, R, HP, HL, TL 3 3
Y, DP, R, HP, SP 3 3
Y, DP, R, HP, MIX 2 2
Germany Y, DP, R, HP, HL, TL 3 3
Y, DP, R, HP, SP 4 3
Y, DP, R, HP, MIX 3 2
Norway Y, DP, R, HP, HL, TL 4 3
Y, DP, R, HP, SP 4 3
Y, DP, R, HP, MIX 4 4
United Y, DP, R, HP, HL, TL 3 2
Kingdom Y, DP, R, HP, SP 4 2
Y, DP, R, HP, MIX 3 3
* To save space, the corresponding test statistics are not included. They are available from the authors 
upon request.
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Chapter 4
Diversified Banking and the  
Costs of Financial D istress
Abstract
We construct a model in which, by borrowing simultaneously from relationship and 
from transactional banks ( “diversified funding”), a firm prevents its banks from restruc­
turing opportunistically bad projects with the only only of seizing assets during the re­
organisation. Transactional banks veto the continuation of a bad firm that relationship 
banks would continue only to seize assets during the restructuring. They do so, because, 
having less information than relationship banks, they expect to be “losers” in the seizure 
of assets. At the same time, because of this asymmetry in the information between rela­
tionship and transactional banks, diversified funding reduces the probability that banks 
succesfully reorganise a good project. We characterise the conditions under which a firm 
prefers diversified funding.
4.1 Introduction
Firms appear to diversify their links with banks, funding their activity both through 
relationship and transaction loans. Even in Germany and Japan, in which relation­
ship banking is widespread, firms-banks links range from a tight long-term rela­
tionship with the haus-main bank to the transactional funding provided by arm ’s 
length ones (Aoki and Patrick, 1994; Edwards and Fisher, 1994).1 The target of 
this chapter is to rationalise this fact analysing how the costs of financial distress 
affect a firm’s debt structure, meant in our framework as the nature of the finks 
established by a firm with its banks (relationship or transactional).
1An independent bank in Germany or Japan with no managers on the board of the funded 
firm could be an example of transactional bank. Note that in the paper a bank could be broadly 
interpreted as any non-atomistic lender.
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Our analysis fits economies in which most firm restructurings occur outside 
courts, through a plan devised by the banks (and occasionally other major cred­
itors) of the firm. During these private reorganisations, regardless of the original 
priority, the restructuring of claims follows a bargaining process in which the power 
of each party is determined also by her information on the firm and the sector in 
which the firm operates. We show that diversified funding, i.e. borrowing both 
from relationship and from transactional banks, minimizes the risk that banks op­
portunistically restructure bad projects with the only intent of seizing assets during 
the reorganisation. However, with respect to borrowing only from relationship 
banks, diversified funding reduces the probability that banks succesfully reorganise 
a good project. The firm’s choice of the debt structure trades off this benefit and 
cost.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider a distressed firm with uncer­
tain prospects. The firm can be a “lemon”, whose assets will have necessarily to be 
liquidated sooner or later, or a good firm worth restructuring. We compare two sce­
narios. In the first scenario the firm has built relationships with all its banks (“pure 
relationship funding”); in the second scenario the firm has borrowed also from trans­
actional banks (“diversified funding”).2 Let us start from the case in which the firm 
is a “lemon” and has built relationships with all its banks. Relationship banks could 
push for private restructuring of the firm to avoid immediate in-court liquidation 
and use their superior information and bargaining power to seize collateral during 
the reorganisation (or simply increase the value of their collateral).3 On the other 
hand, dispersed stakeholders, (public bond-holders, small trade creditors, workers 
or shareholders), would have no interest in the costly restructuring of this bad firm. 
This would result in the firm’s assets being seized by better informed banks and 
the firm eventually being liquidated with no residual for claimants that are passive
2In our framework the third scenario, in which the firm borrows only through transaction loans, 
is always dominated. Borrowing only through transaction loans implies that the probability that 
the restructuring of a good firm is successful is lower than with a diversified funding strategy. 
Moreover, to avoid the opportunistic continuation of bad projects at date 1, the entrepreneur can 
rely on a diversified funding, generating a conflict on their continuation between relationship and 
transactional banks.
3For Japan Sheard (1994) mentions the cases in which the main bank “[...}intervenes but then 
forces the firm into bankruptcy after having secured its own claims. Sometimes main banks have 
forced firms into bankruptcy after a period of intervention[...]”.
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in the restructuring. However, since they are passive players and receive only infor­
mation filtered by the restructuring pool, dispersed stakeholders will not be able to 
distinguish a lemon from a good firm. Hence, dispersed stakeholders will either let 
the firm go ahead, or, when possible, require a costly signalling from the banks to 
be convinced that the firm is worth restructuring.
Consider what happens, instead, if the firm is a lemon and has borrowed both 
from relationship and from transactional banks. Unlike dispersed stakeholders, 
non-atomistic transactional banks are active players in the reorganisation and, even 
though with some noise, can assess the quality of the projects from the direct anal­
ysis of the firm’s documents.4 Unlike relationship banks, transactional banks have 
lower quality information on the firm. Because of this limited information transac­
tional banks have less bargaining power than relationship banks and expect to be 
losers in the seizure of assets that will occur during the opportunistic restructur­
ing of the bad firm. Hence, diversified funding, by creating an asymmetry between 
their bargaining powers, can induce a conflict between relationship and transac­
tional banks that prevents the opportunistic continuation of the bad firm.
Now let us assume that the firm is a good one worth restructuring. While in the 
first scenario the reorganisation will be managed only by well informed banks, in 
the second scenario informed, relationship banks will have to coordinate with less 
informed, transactional banks. Therefore, the probability that the banks imple­
ment with success the reorganisation of this good firm will be lower with diversified 
funding.5
We show that, if the advantage of relationship banks in information gathering 
is neither too big nor too small, the benefit of diversified funding will prevail on its 
cost. In fact, in this case diversified funding will imply enough asymmetry between 
the information and bargaining power of transactional and of relationship banks to 
induce a conflict on the continuation of a bad project. At the same time diversi­
fied funding will induce a small reduction in the probability that banks succesfully 
coordinate the restructuring of a good project. Such a result holds irrespective of
4Analysing corporate restructurings in Germany, Brunnen and Krahnen (2000) write: “[...]once 
distress has become public every lender will collect more information about the borrower in or­
der to prepare a future possible workout. In particular, if  a creditor pool has been formed, the 
informational advantage of the housebank is shared by the pool[...\”
5We ignore any loss of coordination due simply to the presence of multiple creditors.
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whether or not we allow for screening on projects’ quality. However, we show that 
the impact of other characteristics of the firm on the choice of funding depends on 
whether screening is feasible or not. The most interesting result pertains to the re­
deployability of the assets of the firm: we show that, when no screening mechanism 
is available, higher redeployability makes the choice of diversified funding less likely 
but the converse is true when screening is feasible.
The results of the analysis hinge on the dual role that we attribute to infor­
mation. On the one hand, information facilitates the contribution of a bank to 
the success of a restructuring and especially “shared” information facilitates coor­
dination among banks. This is the traditional, positive role of information that has 
been emphasised by the literature on banking. On the other, information contributes 
to determine the bargaining power, i.e. the “seizing ability” , of a bank during a 
restructuring. The legal literature (e.g. Levmore, 1982) has suggested that infor­
mation acquisition can lead to “creditor misbehaviour” , that is the possibility of 
using information to seize assets at the expense of other creditors or the debtor. 
In 2.3 we analyse two ways in which information can affect the ability of a bank 
to seize assets during a reorganisation. First, when the assets of the firm have 
heterogeneous redeployability, an informed bank could have better knowledge on 
the redeployability of the different assets and “cherry-pick” the most generic ones, 
leaving assets less generic and saleable to other stakeholders.6 Second, an informed 
bank could have early knowledge on the prospective failure of the firm and manage 
to obtain additional security on its outstanding loans at the expense of “unaware” 
stakeholders.
The analysis is at the intersection of two strands of the literature. The first de­
velops alternative explanations of the coexistence of bank and public (arm’ s length) 
debt. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Besanko and Kanatas (1993) construct a 
trade-off based on the possibility for banks of monitoring to prevent entrepreneurs’ 
moral hazard and on the lower cost of arm’s length financing. Diamond (1991) 
obtains sequential substitution showing that initially firms borrow from banks, be­
6 Similar assumption are in Diamond and Raj an (2001) and in Welch (1997). Diamond and 
Rajan (2001) argue that a bank is more efficient than dispersed investors in selling assets. Welch 
(1997) argues that during formal reorganisations, thanks to information and control over the day- 
to-day liquidity of the firm, banks can pressure the court more effectively.
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fore moving to cheaper public debt when they have built enough reputation. The 
closest paper in this strand is Rajan (1992). Rajan (1992) shows that borrowing 
from arm’s length financiers reduces the rents that a close bank can extract from a 
firm but also reduces the probability of efficient liquidation by limiting the control 
rights of the close bank in liquidation. Unlike these studies, besides the different 
explanation we offer, we rationalise the mix transactional/relationship bank debt 
rather than the mix bank debt/public debt. The second strand of the literature 
analyses how the costs of financial distress affect the firm’s debt structure. Bolton 
and Sharfstein (1996) show that the number of banks can reduce the risk of strategic 
default by entrepreneurs. Diamond (1992) and Bergloef and Von-Thadden (1994) 
show that borrowing from two banks and diversifying the priority and maturity of 
debt can achieve the same goal. None of these papers examine how the costs of fi­
nancial distress affect the nature of the finks established by a firm with its multiple 
creditors.7While we are silent about the costs and benefits of single versus multiple 
relationships or of single versus multiple transactional banks, our contribution is to 
show how the dual role that creditors’ information has in a reorganisation, simulta­
neously affecting their effectiveness in the reorganisation and their ability in seizing 
collateral, can rationalise firms’ choice of diversified multiple banking.
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 contains the basic model. In 
section 3 we extend the model to allow for screening on projects’ quality. Section 4 
concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
4.2 The M odel
4.2.1 Setup
E nvironm ent The economy lasts for three dates (i=0,l,2) and can be in two 
states of nature, “good” or “bad” , respectively with probability i  and l-L  The 
state of nature realises and is common knowledge at date 1.
7Another group of studies derives the mix debt-equity that incentivates the party in control 
to take the efficient liquidation decisions ( Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1994; Berlin, John and Saunders, 1996). Focusing on ex-ante decisions of the entrepreneur rather 
than ex-post decisions in distress, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Huang and Xu (2000) 
show that multiple banking can prevent entrepreneurs from choosing bad projects by reducing the 
probability that they are refinanced at intermediate stages.
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There are one entrepreneur and two bankers. The entrepreneur and the bankers 
are risk neutral and consume on date 2. There is initially only the final good.
Technology At date 0, besides storage (accessible also by banks), the entrepreneur 
can activate one indivisible project requiring I  units of final good. The project can 
be of high quality with probability tth or low quality with probability 1- 7r^. No one 
observes quality at date 0.
At date 1, if the good state realises, the project, whatever its quality, returns 
A  units of verifiable, consumable assets plus Y  units of non-verifiable, consumable 
final good accruing privately to the entrepreneur. If, instead, the bad state realises 
the project incurs distress and the entrepreneur and the banker(s) that have funded 
the project must decide whether to continue in order to reorganise it at date 2 or to 
liquidate. The returns in the bad state are as follows. If the project is not continued 
at date 1 or is continued but at date 2 restructuring fails it yields 0. If the project 
is successfully restructured and is of good quality it still returns A  +  Y  at date 2. 
If the project is successfully restructured but is of low quality a t date 2 it yields no 
final good and the assets have to be redeployed outside the firm with a return of 
A A  units of final good (A <1).8
At date 1, if the project is continued, the entrepreneur and the bankers bear 
(enjoy) non-monetary restructuring costs (benefits). The entrepreneur bears a cost 
L' > 0 whatever the project’s quality; each banker bears a cost L B > 0 if the 
project is bad; if the project is good each banker enjoys a no matter how small 
benefit L q > 0. The assumption that a lender enjoys a benefit from restructuring 
a good project allows to simplify the analysis and could be dispensed with. L q can 
proxy, for instance, for the ex-post gain in reputation that a lender could derive 
from the continuation of a good project.9
At date 1, after the state of nature becomes common knowledge, banks can 
monitor. Monitoring determines the probability of success of the restructuring.
8The assumption that A <1 captures the fact that assets are generally worth more inside than 
outside a firm.
9 Edwards and Fisher (1994) write that in their interviews with German banks a consideration 
frequently mentioned “[...] as affecting the decision whether to reorganise a firm in financial 
distress was the effect on bank’s image ”. Such image-effects had a positive impact on banks’ 
willingness to reorganise rather than liquidate. We think reasonable that these image-effects are 
present especially when ex-post the restructured projects turn out to be good.
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Precisely, if px  is the total monitoring of the bank(s), the probability of success 
will be px, whatever the project’s quality. Thanks to its familiarity with the firm, a 
relationship bank finds monitoring easier. In particular, if p j  is the monitoring effort 
of a bank of type J , the disutility of monitoring is p2jC j/2 with J  = B  (relationship 
bank), A  (arm’s length or transactional bank) and ca > cb. W ithout implications 
for the results and to simplify the analysis later on (2.3), we let p j  take values in 
the interval [0, .
We introduce restrictions on the parameters:
A ssum ption  1
A£>  I
A ssum ption  2
U  < ir2hY A —
CA
A ssum ption  3
k  = ^ x a - l b > 0
cb
Assumption 1 will guarantee the feasibility of lending at date 0. Assumption 
2 will guarantee that, if uncertain on the quality of the project, the entrepreneur 
wants to continue it at date 1. Assumption 3 will guarantee that a relationship 
bank always wants to continue a bad project at date 1.
E ndow m ents an d  P references At date 0 the entrepreneur has no final good; 
each banker has 7/2 units of final good. We assume away interbank lending so 
that this assumption on endowments implies that two banks are needed to fund the 
project (multiple banking). In 3.3 we will show that in our framework, even allowing 
for single banking, this would be dominated by multiple banking. For simplicity we 
focus directly on multiple banking.
Entrepreneur and bankers derive a utility from consumption of u{C2 ) = C2  
where C2  axe the units of final good or assets consumed at date 2.
In fo rm ation  At date 1, after the state of nature becomes common knowledge and 
the bankers choose their monitoring, the bankers privately observe the quality of the 
project and their restructuring cost (benefit) of continuation. The assumption that
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transactional and relationship banks have equal information on the quality of the 
project proxies for the fact that among the active participants in a restructuring the 
informational asymmetry on the reorganised project tends to vanish (Brunnen and 
Krahnen, 2000). In fact banks’ representatives work together in the reorganisation, 
attend meetings, analyse documents of the firm and so on. As to the entrepreneur’s 
lack of information on the quality of the project this could be rationalised by in­
terpreting the entrepreneur more as an uninformed owner or as a “representative” 
of the dispersed stakeholders of the firm (shareholders, public-debt holders, trade- 
creditors etc.) than as an informed entrepreneur-manager. Playing only a passive 
role during reorganisations, dispersed stakeholders have no access to firms’ doc­
uments, relying on the parties active in the restructuring to obtain information. 
However, even interpreting the entrepreneur as an entrepreneur-manager we think 
reasonable that she has less information on the prospects of a restructuring than 
on the prospects of the firm in “normal times”.
The monitoring realised by a banker at date 1 is observable both by the other 
banker funding the project and by the entrepreneur but is not verifiable and there­
fore non-contractible.
Except for the above, everything else is common knowledge.
C on trac ts  and  B argaining At date 0, after choosing the number of relation­
ships, the entrepreneur contracts with the banks. Since the endowments of the two 
banks must be lent in full to activate the project, the contract specifies only the 
allocation of the contractible returns (assets). The date 0 contract can be rene­
gotiated at dates 1 and 2 if the bad state realises. We analyse explicitly a simple 
bargaining only for the restructuring time (t=2). For any bargaining occurring at 
date 0 or at date 1, we assume that the entrepreneur has 0 bargaining power and 
the two banks have the same bargaining power. The allocation of the bargaining 
power out of restructurings is not crucial for the results.
These assumptions allow us to concentrate on the bargaining in the date 2 
reorganisation. Each party active in the reorganisation, i.e. each bank, carries 
a necessary expertise for the reorganisation and, by threatening to withhold such
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expertise, can force renegotiation.10 The bargaining power of the parties in the 
renegotiation is related to the information they have gathered on the firm (i.e. 
their date 1 monitoring). In 2.3 we will analyse two ways in which the information 
of a banker can affect her power in bargaining over resources (assets) during a 
restructuring. In particular, we will consider the case in which an informed bank has 
early warnings on the distress of the firm and the case in which, when the assets of 
the firm have heterogeneous redeployability, an informed bank has better knowledge 
on the redeployability of the single assets. Till then, we take the link between the 
information of a banker and her bargaining power during a reorganisation as a 
primitive assumption, focusing on its implications.
Summary
D ate 0:
• (Funding strategy) The entrepreneur chooses the number of relationships, i.e. 
pure relationship banking (two relationships), diversified funding (one rela­
tionship) or pure transactional banking (no relationships).
• (Date 0 contract) The entrepreneur contracts with the two bankers.11 The 
bankers lend their endowments and the project starts.
D ate 1 :
• (Monitoring) The state of nature is publicly revealed and each banker chooses 
her monitoring.
• (Continuation) The banks observe the quality of the project. Entrepreneur 
and banks decide simultaneously whether to continue. If and only if they
10 These “forced renegotiations” have been extensively used by the literature on banking since 
Rajan (1992). In these renegotiations one or more parties carry out an action necessary for 
the project. By threatening to withold this action, the party can force a renegotiation of the 
original contract and trigger a reallocation of the surplus. In our case each bank is necessary 
for the implementation of the restructuring and can threaten to withold her contribution to the 
restructuring.
11 The entrepreneur first decides how many relationships to establish and only in a second stage 
contracts with the banks. A rationale for this two-stage approach is that establishing a rela­
tionship with a bank requires time, especially when a relationship involves the presence of bank 
representatives on the board of the firm (as in Germany or in Japan).
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all choose continuation the project is continued and they bear (enjoy) their 
restructuring cost (benefit).12
D ate 2:
• (Restructuring) Restructuring fails or succeeds. If it succeeds, entrepreneur 
and bankers bargain over the returns and consume.
In Figure 1 we summarise the game with the net returns at each date:
D A T E O  D A T E  1 D A T E  2
G o o d  s t a t e
H e s t r u  c t u  r i n  g  s u c c e e d s  ( A + Y )(A + Y )
P r o j e c t  
s t a  rte d
B a d  s t a  te
R e s t r u c t u r i n g  s u c c e e d s  (A.A)
Figure 1. Game Tree
4.2.2 Equilibrium
At date 0, in choosing the funding strategy, the entrepreneur maximises her expected 
return.13
At date 1, in the good state, the entrepreneur and the banks are allocated the 
assets according to the date 0 contract and the entrepreneur gets the non-verifiable 
final good Y. In the bad state, for each of the three possible funding strategies 
(pure relationship banking, diversified banking and pure transactional banking), we 
solve the model by backward induction. First, we analyse the bargaining at date 2
12The restructuring game between entrepreneur and bankers is a simultaneous moves game of 
incomplete information and the resulting equilibrium a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
13Even if the entrepreneur proxied for the dispersed stakeholders of the firm, it would be rea­
sonable to include shareholders among the dispersed stakeholders and implicitly assume that the 
management chooses the debt structure to maximise shareholders’ returns. Moreover, senior dif­
fuse stakeholders could influence the financial decisions of the management, too.
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conditional on the project being continued at date 1 and on its restructuring being 
successful. Then we determine the continuation decision at date 1. Then we derive 
banks’ monitoring at date 1 and after that we solve for the optimal contract at date 
0. Finally, having solved the model separately for the different funding strategies, 
we derive the entrepreneur’ choice of funding at date 0.
Both in this section and in section 3 we rule out equilibria in which agents play 
weakly dominated strategies.14
P u re  R ela tionsh ip  B anking
In this subsection we analyse the case in which the entrepreneur chooses to enter 
relationships with both banks.
R e s tru c tu rin g  At date 2, conditional on the reorganisation being successful, each 
bank, threatening to withdraw her expertise from the reorganisation, can trigger a 
renegotiation of the contract and bargain over the contractible surplus (assets). The 
total contractible surplus S  is equal to A  if the project is good and A A  if it is bad (the 
restructuring costs and benefits are sunk at this stage). The bargaining power of 
each player in the renegotiation is related to her monitoring at date 1. In particular, 
if pBi  is the information gathered by relationship bank i (i=l,2) and p r  =  P b i  + P B 2 
is the total information gathered by the two banks, the bargaining power of bank i is
P B i / ( PB i  + P B 2 ) (remember that the entrepreneur does not monitor). Assuming, for
P b i  P b 2
instance, a Nash bargaining game of the form max(S) pT (S ) pT , each relationship 
bank obtains an amount of assets A si  with
if the project is bad and
A Bi =  - ^ X A
P b i  + P B 2
A Bi =  - 2 2 — A
P b i  + P B 2
if the project is good. The entrepreneur gets Y  if and only if the project is
14We can adopt a tremblig-hand refinement of the equilibrium to rule out such equilibria.
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good.15
C ontinuation  At date 1, in deciding whether to continue, each agent needs to 
evaluate only her net expected return if the project is continued (continuing if it is 
positive). For a bank this is given by
— ----- (Pb i  + P b 2 ) ^ A  — L 3  — p s i X A  — L 3
P b i  + P B 2
if the project is bad and analogously by ps iA  + L G if the project is good. As 
to the entrepreneur her net expected return if the project is continued is 7rsh(pBi +  
Pb2 )Y  — L ', where irah stands for the entrepreneur’s subjective probability that the 
project is good if continued and p b i  +  P b 2 is the probability of success of the 
restructuring.
L em m a 1 At date 1, with pure relationship banking, all the agents will choose 
to continue the project regardless of its quality.
Lemma 1 shows that with pure relationship banking also bad projects, i.e. 
projects that the entrepreneur, if she were able to disentangle them, would liq­
uidate, will be continued. Relationship banks, having good information on the 
firm, know that their seizing ability will be high during the reorganisation and 
opportunistically continue a bad project to seize assets during the reorganisation.
M onito ring  At date 1, in choosing monitoring p s i , each bank takes into account 
the equilibrium in the following stages. Thoughout the analysis we consider the case 
in which banks’ optimal monitoring is always an interior solution, i.e. lower than 
their monitoring capacity ^ .16 We will consider corner solutions only in 2.3, when
15The weights — —  could also derive from an exogenous allocation function of the type 
IP ^  1 T IP 5  2
assumed in conflict theory (Welch 1997; Hirshleifer 1995). Welch (1997) focuses on in court 
reorganisations and the crucial variable that determines the bargaining power of the banks is the 
expenses on lobbying (lawyers etc.). We focus mainly on out-of-court reorganisations and in this 
framework information is likely to play a crucial role. In particular Welch (1997) defines the shares 
of resources a  accruing to the parties in conflict as a a(La,L j )  =  n L j / ( m L a +  n L j ) where La and 
Lj  stand for the bargaining power of the two parties during the legal bankruptcy and could be 
proxied by the number of lawyers. In our case the L's correspond to the p's (levels of information) 
and could be proxied, for instance, by the number of representatives on the board. Also in our 
case the parameters m and n are set equal to 1.
16 It will become clear that a necessary and sufficient condition for this to happen is
A [ 7 T , t  +  ( l - T / t ) A ]  1
c B  ^  2 -
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this will allow to simplify the analysis. Therefore
PBi =  argm ax PBiA (irh +  (1 -  nh)X) -  (1 -  irh)LB +  whLG -  ^ P%i
The sum of the first three terms gives the bank’ s net expected return from the 
project and p2c s / 2 is the disutility of monitoring. The solution is
p. j =  r s  =  l K ± ( L ^ ) A J  i =  1 2
c b
D ate 0 Contract Since the initial contract can always be renegotiated if the bad 
state obtains, the only relevant contractible variable is the assets allocated to the 
bankers if the good state obtains (let it be Rbi for i = 1,2). The bankers have the 
same power out of restructurings. Since in this scenario the banks are symmetric 
in the bad state, the assets A  will be splitted equally in the good state. Hence, 
Rbi =  A /2  for i = 1,2. Since, from Assumption 1, £A/2 > 1 / 2  this guarantees that 
each bank will find convenient to lend 7/2 at date 0.
Diversified Funding
We now analyse the case in which the entrepreneur enters a  relationship with one 
bank only and borrows through a transaction loan from the other. When the 
discussion overlaps with the previous subsection we do not elaborate.
Restructuring For the relationship bank it is easy to see that, if the reorganisa­
tion is successful, the return from the bargaining is the same as with pure relation­
ship banking. For the transactional bank the return is:
A a — — —— A A  (bad project);
P b  + P a  
PAA A  =  --------- ; A  (good project)
P b  + P a
Continuation For the relationship bank the net expected returns if a bad (good) 
project is continued are as with pure relationship banking. For the transactional 
bank the net expected return if a bad project is continued is p a ^A  — L B (paA +  L °  
if a good project is continued). Proposition 1 shows that the transactional bank
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will never choose to continue a bad project if her informational disadvantage is not 
too small.
Proposition 1 At date 1 , with diversified funding, if  its informational disad­
vantage (ca — cb) is not too small, the transactional bank will always liquidate a 
bad project. The project will be continued if and only if  good.
In the Appendix we provide a sufficient condition on ca — cb-
The result in Proposition 1 arises from the different information of the two banks 
that implies different abilities in seizing collateral (assets) during the restructuring. 
Since the transactional banker knows that, because of her lower quality information, 
her bargaining power in the reorganisation will be low, she prefers liquidating and 
saving the restructuring cost.
Henceforth, we assume that the condition set in Proposition 1 is satisfied and 
that with diversified funding a bad project is never continued at date 1.
M onitoring Taking into account that at date 1 a bad project will always be 
liquidated, the relationship bank and the transactional bank choose monitoring 
solving
p*j =  argmax \nh(pjA + LG) -  ^-P 2j  J  = A ,B  
The monitoring decisions are respectively
KhA * irhA
P b  =  —  > Pa  =  —
c b  ca
Date 0 Contract Unlike with pure relationship banking, at date 0 the relation­
ship bank expects a higher return than the transactional bank in the bad state. 
Hence the transactional bank will be allocated more assets than the relationship 
bank in the good state. Formally, let R b  be the return of the relationship bank in 
the good state. R b  can be derived equating the total expected returns of the two 
banks after substituting for their rationally expected monitoring levels and then 
solving the obtained equation, i.e., after simple algebraic manipulations,
(1 -  i)7rhA(p*B -  p*a) +  £(2Rb  -  A) +  caPa ~  cBp f ) =  0
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Since R b does not affect the following decisions of the banks or the en­
trepreneur we do not need to solve for it explicitly.
P u re  T ransactional B anking
The last strategy of the entrepreneur is to have two transactional banks. Lemma 
2 shows that, under the condition set in Proposition 1, this strategy is always 
dominated.
L em m a 2 The entrepreneur never chooses to borrow only through transaction 
loans.
In our framework borrowing only through transaction loans implies that the 
probability that the restructuring of a good firm is successful is lower than with 
diversified funding. This is the standard result that relationships are beneficial 
because they facilitate information gathering. Moreover, in order to avoid the op­
portunistic continuation of a bad project at date 1, the entrepreneur can choose 
diversified funding, inducing a conflict on the continuation of a bad project between 
the relationship and the transactional bank. Therefore pure transactional banking 
is certainly suboptimal.
Choice o f Funding
We now analyse the entrepreneur’s choice of funding at date 0. On the one hand, 
pure relationship banking implies a higher probability of success of restructurings 
because it allows both banks to gather better information on the firm. However, 
pure relationship banking increases the risk that a bad project is opportunistically 
continued. On the other hand, diversified funding hampers the information ac­
quisition of the transactional bank. However, by inducing a conflict between the 
transactional and the relationship bank, the entrepreneur avoids the temporary 
continuation of a bad project. Proposition 2 summarises the first result.
P ro p o sitio n  2 Assume that the condition in Proposition 1 is satisfied. The 
entrepreneur will strictly prefer diversified funding if and only if
Propositions 1 and 2 together show that, if the informational gap between a 
relationship and a transactional bank (c^ — eg) is not too big and not too small, 
diversified funding will be preferred. If the informational advantage of a relationship 
bank is not too small, a transactional bank co-funding the firm will expect to be a 
“poor fighter” during the date 2 private reorganisation and will not find convenient 
to continue a bad project. On the other hand, if the informational gap is not too big, 
by adopting diversified funding the firm will suffer only from a moderate reduction 
in the probability of success of restructurings.
The trade-off relationship-diversified funding can also be related to the other 
parameters. We provide details on Y , V  and A (for the other parameters analogous 
considerations hold). A lower Y  and a higher V  increase unambiguously the scope 
for diversified funding. In fact, Y  and L' do not affect the expected return of the 
transactional bank if a bad project is continued and, hence, the condition that 
guarantees that with diversified funding a bad project is liquidated at date 1 (see 
the proof of Proposition 1). At the same time a lower Y  implies a smaller loss from 
the informational deficit of diversified funding and a higher U  implies a higher cost 
for the entrepreneur from the continuation of a bad project. As to A, that can be 
interpreted as the average redeployability of the firm’s assets, Proposition 2 shows 
that, ceteris paribus, a lower A increases the scope for diversified funding. This 
happens because with pure relationship banking lower asset redeployability reduces 
the incentive of relationship banks to monitor at date 1.
In the next section we explore which of these implications still hold if we allow 
for mechanisms for screening the quality of the project.
4.2.3 Inform ation as “Seizing” A bility
Up to now we have taken the link between the information of a bank and its seizing 
and restructuring abilities during a reorganisation as exogenous. We now analyse 
two ways in which information can affect banks’ ability in seizing assets during a 
reorganisation. For simplicity, and since this feature of the model is less novel, 
we still keep exogenous the positive impact of information on banks’ restructuring 
ability.
A first way of finking information to seizing ability is allowing for an heteroge­
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neous redeployability of the assets of the firm, with some assets being more generic 
and some others being more specific. A relationship bank could have better infor­
mation on the redeployability of the different assets and, during a reorganisation, 
“cherry-pick” the most generic ones, i.e. the assets that can be redeployed at the 
highest price. We formalise this idea using our framework.
We assume that the assets A  of the firm consist of N  tools, each of size A /N . N / 2 
tools are generic and, if redeployed, return AH A /N  units of final good with XH <  1 
while N /2  have a low redeployability XL < XH. X can then be reinterpreted as the 
asset average redeployability, i.e. A =  (XH +  AL)/2. We assume also that during 
the restructuring the two banks can claim an equal amount j  of assets and their 
claims cannot be contingent on the redeployability of the assets. 1 7  Moreover, if 
both banks claim (do not claim) any fraction of a tool, each will get half of the 
return from its redeployment. Finally, we assume there is imperfect information on 
asset redeployability. In particular, a bank of type J  ( J  =  A, B  respectively for 
a transactional and for a relationship bank) observes a noisy signal V'iG3}) on the 
redeployability of any tool i (i = with the noise of the signal depending
on the date 1  monitoring p} of the bank, ipiipj) can take two values: ^  and 
ip f. At date 1 , conditional on 'ij)i taking value , the redeployability of a tool will 
be high with probability 2 p j  +  ( 1  — 2 p } ) / 2  and low with probability ( 1  — 2 p } ) / 2  
(and conversely if ■0i takes value ip f). For any p j  the unconditional probabilities 
of ip f and ipf are 1/2. Finally, for simplicity, we consider the polar case in which 
a relationship bank suffers no disutility from monitoring (eg =  0 ) so that it will 
trivially choose p*B = X (its monitoring capacity). The rest of the framework is 
unaltered.
It is straightforward that the probability of success of a reorganisation will 
be 2 pBi = 2 pB = 1  with pure relationship banking and \  + p \  with diversified 
funding. Then, we derive the returns to a relationship and to a transactional bank 
conditional on a project being continued at date 1  and being succesfully restruc­
tured. If the project is good, both with pure relationship banking and with diver­
sified funding the return of each bank will be If a project is bad, observing a
17For instance, the banks could vote and manage to get approved a restructuring plan that 
assigns ^  units of assets to each bank.
I l l
\noiseless signal on asset redeployability, a relationship bank will always claim the 
tools with the high redeployability. Hence, with pure relationship banking, each 
relationship bank will get A bi = W ith diversified funding, the transactional 
bank will always claim the tools for which the observed value of is ip f. It is easy 
to show that the return of the transactional bank if a bad project is successfully
, hence lowerrestructured will be A a — \ A  j^ (2pA +  (1 — 2p*A)\)X  +  (1 — 2p*A) \ X 1 
than the one of the relationship bank (A  — A a ) and increasing in p*A. In fact, for 
each tool i the transactional bank expects to observe 'ipf (or ipf) with probability 
The probability that the redeployability of tool i, conditional on ^  =  'ifj?, is 
actually high (XH) is 2pA +  (1 — 2p*A) \ ,  while the probability that is low (XL) is 
(1 — 2pA)^- Moreover, the transactional bank knows that if a tool is highly rede- 
ployable, it will be claimed also by the relationship bank and the two banks will get 
XHA /2 N  each; if, instead, it has low redeployability it will not be claimed by the 
relationship bank and the transactional bank will get XL A /N . Finally, each tool 
that is not claimed by the transactional bank will not be claimed by the relationship 
bank if and only if it has actually low redeployability. This happens with probability 
2 p*A +  ( 1  — 2 p*A) \  and in this case each bank will get jpjXL from its redeployment. 
Combining these steps, the gross expected return of a transactional bank is A a = 
4 { [(2p*A +  (1 -  +  (1 -  2 p i) lA i ] +  [(2pJ +  (1 -  2 p i) i ) lA L] }  =
=  4  [(2p-A +  (1 -  2p J)l)A  +  (1 -  2 p \ ) \ \ L] .
In this slightly modified framework, the results of Proposition 1 and 2 hold with 
minor changes in the numerical conditions. 18
A second way of linking information to seizing ability is introducing uncertainty 
on the prospects of the firm. If such an uncertainty exists, an informed bank 
could have earlier signals on the prospective failure of the firm and exploit these 
timely information to gain additional security on its loans at the expense of other, 
“unaware” stakeholders. Analysing the behaviour of the First National Bank of 
St. Paul (FNB) before the American Lumber Company (ALC) bankruptcy, Welch 
(1997) writes “[...] having reasonable certainty that the corporation was insolvent
18In practice, given the simplifying assumption that eg =  0, now Propositions 1 and 2 impose 
restrictions only on cA. For example, it can easily be shown that the condition in Proposition 2
becomes  ^ <  L •2 c A  Y r c h
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the bank sought to gain an additional security interest in the inventory and equip­
ment of ALC. ALC attempted to deny the interest but ultimately the bank was 
in a position of control This could have been facilitated by the fact that
“[...] outside formal bankruptcy other (i.e. non-bank) creditors need not even be 
informed of the reallocation of claims caused by side payments or additional secu­
rity given to an outstanding loan [...]” . Analogously, Edwards and Fisher (1994) 
recognise the possibility for well informed German banks of obtaining additional 
collateral as soon as they have detected the distress of the firm. They report the 
results of a survey among receivers conducted in Germany by Hesselmann and Ste­
fan (1990). According to this survey, in receivers’ opinion, in Germany “obtaining 
additional collateral” is the most frequent measure taken by a bank after early de­
tection of distress. According to Sheard (1990) in Japan such a practice of main 
banks “[...]is more likely to be possible for smaller unlisted firms than for larger 
public ones”. Sheard’s argument is that other creditors will probably detect this 
behaviour of a main bank, preventing it. This argument appears consistent with 
our analysis since the “other creditors” are likely to be centralised lenders (proxied 
in our model by the transactional bank) that have frequent contacts with the main 
bank.
4.3 Screening
4.3.1 Setup
In Section 2 we ruled out screening on the quality of the project. To analyse 
screening we now assume that at the continuation stage a relationship bank, thanks 
to its familiarity with the firm, can implement an unproductive, extra-restructuring 
effort L. We allow the disutility of this effort L(e) to be a continous random variable 
with L(e) — L +7, e 6  [e, e], E(e) = 0 and e —e < L B. The realisation of 7  becomes 
known at the continuation time. To avoid issues of free-riding or delegation we 
assume that at date 1 only one relationship bank can implement L  and that, if two 
relationship banks have funded the firm at date 0 , at date 1  “nature” randomly 
chooses the bank that can implement L. Ex-ante each of the two relationship banks 
has probability 1/2 of being able to implement L.
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C on trac ts  and  B argaining A contract between the entrepreneur and the bankers 
specifies now the allocation of the assets and the extra-restructuring effort L that 
the bankers have to sustain at date 1  if the project is continued. As before a contract 
can always be renegotiated. In particular, we now assume that the entrepreneur 
can always force a renegotiation at date 1  and that in any date 1  renegotiation she 
has all the bargaining power so that the date 1  contract maximises her expected 
return. We also assume that, if the entrepreneur is indifferent among contracts, the 
parties will agree on the one with the lowest L, i.e. the one that brings the lowest 
expected disutility to the bank that can implement L.
Assumptions 2 and 3 are modified as follows:
A ssum ption  2 b
L' < TThA Y  min
A ssum ption  3b
1 1 - i X
ca cb
) x a _ l B > q
cB
Assumption 2b will guarantee that at date 1  the entrepreneur always wants to 
continue if she is sure that, if continued, the project will be good. Assumption 
3b will guarantee that, if screening is not implemented, a relationship bank always 
wants to continue a bad project at date 1 .
4.3.2 Equilibrium  
Diversified Funding
It is straightforward that, also under Assumptions 2b and 3b, Proposition 1 will 
hold, guaranteeing the liquidation of a bad project with diversified funding. Hence, 
no screening mechanism will be implemented at date 1  and the analysis is as in 
section 2 .
P u re  R ela tionsh ip  B anking
The analysis for the restructuring stage at date 2 is unaffected. Hence, we can start 
from the date 1  continuation decision.
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C ontinuation  At date 1, for a relationship bank the net expected return if a bad 
project is continued will be
^ Bl  (P b i  + p b 2 )-A 4  — L B — L*(e) =  pBi \ A  — L B — L*(e)
P b i  + PB2
and p s iA  +  L G — L*(e) if a good project is continued. In the expressions L*(e) 
stands for the disutihty of the extra-restructuring L* that the relationship bank has 
to implement if the project is continued.
Before the continuation decision the entrepreneur contracts on L* with the bank 
that can implement it. Lemma 3 solves for the contract:
L em m a 3 With pure relationship banking, if screening is feasible, in the bad 
state the contract specifies L*= p Bi\A  — LB—e for the bank that can implement the 
additional restructuring. The project will be continued if and only if  it is good.
Lemma 3 shows that, when screening is feasible, also with pure relationship 
banking the entrepreneur can prevent the continuation of a bad project. Moreover,
the size of the extra-restructuring effort p*Bi\A  — L B — e that is realised by one
relationship bank is positively related to its monitoring. 1 9
M onito ring  In choosing monitoring pBi each banker rationally takes into ac­
count the equilibrium in the following stages. Therefore
Pm =  arS max ^PBiA +  LG -  i (pBiXA -  L b -  e) -  j
The term in square brackets is the return to the bank if the project turns out to 
be good net of the expected disutihty from the extra restructuring (a bad project 
has 0 net expected return because it is always liquidated). The solution is
=* 7TfcA(l-|A) . n 0
P b i  — P b  — - —^  2 =  1,2
cb
19Screening has two costs. The direct one, i.e. the disutility of the extra-restructuring effort, is 
borne entirely by the bank that implements L. The indirect one, affecting both the relationship 
banks and the entrepreneur, is the distortion in the level of monitoring (see further on in the 
analysis).
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Note that with screening, since banks know that the size of the extra-restructuring 
effort they could be asked to implement is positively related to their monitoring, 
banks’ monitoring is distorted downwards. In particular, p*B is below the monitoring 
p*B realised by the relationship bank with diversified funding.
Choice o f Funding
If screening is feasible, both pure relationship banking and diversified funding lead 
to the continuation of good projects only. Therefore it is sufficient to compare p^, 
i.e. the probability of success of the restructuring of good projects, in the two types 
of funding. W ith diversified funding the transactional bank is naturally hindered 
in its monitoring; with pure relationship banking both banks have high ability in 
monitoring but their monitoring gets distorted downwards by the expectation of 
having to implement L.
Proposition 3 Assume that the condition set in Proposition 1 is satisfied. I f  
screening is feasible, the entrepreneur will strictly prefer “diversified” funding if and 
only if
CA
Propositions 1 and 3 together show that, also with screening, there exists an 
intermediate range of informational gaps for which diversified funding prevails. Un­
like without screening, the choice of funding is instead unrelated to Y  and I / ,  since 
a bad project is always liquidated at date 1 , regardless of the funding strategy. 
Hence, the restructuring cost L' is now ininfluential and Y  becomes a scale variable 
that does affect only the size but not the sign of the gap between the entrepreneur’s 
expected return with pure relationship banking and with diversified funding. More 
interestingly, unlike without screening, the higher is the redeployability A of the 
firm’s assets, the easier will be that diversified funding dominates pure relation­
ship banking. In fact, a high A implies that the gain for the relationship banks 
from continuing a bad project is high. As a result also the downward distortion of 
monitoring induced by screening will be high.
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4.3.3 Single and M ultiple Banking
We now allow for single banking. We assume that, before the funding choice, the 
firm can set up its activity in one location, where it can borrow from two banks 
as in the previous analysis, or in a second location where there is a third bank 
that has I  units of final good at date 0 and can therefore perform single banking. 
Analogously to the two banks in the model, this third bank has all the bargaining 
power vis-a-vis the entrepreneur at dates 0  and 1  and, during the reorganisation, has 
bargaining power equal to the relatively share of its monitoring, i.e. 1. Analogously 
to the two alternative banks, this third bank can run monitoring p j  ( 0  < p j  < | ) ,  
with the disutihty of monitoring being PjCj f  2 (respectively J  = B  if the bank 
becomes a relationship one and A  if it becomes a transactional one) and ca > cb-In 
the Appendix we show that in our framework, single banking (i.e. having one 
transactional or one relationship bank instead of two) is always be sub-optimal. We 
develop the case with screening but the extension to the case without screening is 
straightforward. The sub-optimality of single banking is a by-product of the chosen 
monitoring technology rather than having a “deep” economic meaning. However, 
by now a number of explanations exist on the trade-off between multiple and single 
banking (for an overview see Ongena and Smith, 2000) and this trade-off is outside 
the scope of the analysis.
4.4 Conclusion
We have presented a model that rationalises the choice of a firm to borrow simul­
taneously from relationship and from transactional banks. The analysis relates the 
choice of a diversified funding to the informational gap between relationship and 
transactional banks and to a number of characteristics of the firm.
We identify at least one extension. In the chapter we have carried out the anal­
ysis in a regulatory and legal vacuum. Introducing the regulatory and legal system 
explicitly would affect our results. For instance, a straightforward implication of 
the model is that a bankruptcy law tough in protecting small stakeholders from 
the “abuses” of big creditors would reduce the frequency of diversified debt struc­
tures and increase the frequency of relationship banking. Further research is clearly
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needed to relate the nature of the firm-bank links prevailing in a financial system 
with the ruling bankruptcy law.
4.5 Appendix to  Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 1
Assumption 2 implies that the entrepreneur never liquidates a project. Prom As­
sumption 2 we know that, even if uncertain on the quality of the project and if only a 
transactional bank had monitored at the level maximising her expected return from a good 
project (Pa =  ^ ~ ) i  the entrepreneur would continue. Hence we can focus on the two rela­
tionship banks. No bank ever liquidates a good project. In fact, continuing a good project 
returns L G at least. Therefore, the lowest level of monitoring of each is p*B =  i e.
the monitoring the bank would realise if it expected a liquidation of the bad project by the 
other bank. However no bank would liquidate a bad project at this monitoring level since 
her expected return from its continuation would be XA — L B (>  0 from Assumption 
3).
Proof o f Proposition 1
Prom Lemma 1 we know that the relationship bank and the entrepreneur will always 
choose to continue a project. Hence we can restrict the attention to the transactional 
bank. Having defined K  in assumption A3, a sufficient condition for the transactional 
bank never being willing to continue a bad project is
XA
'  c b  c a  c a
> K
In fact in this case p \X  A  < L B and the transactional bank will always choose 
liquidation.
Proof o f Lemma 2
Follow the case of diversified funding assuming however that both banks behave like 
the transactional bank analysed in that case. Both with pure transactional funding and 
with diversified funding a bad project will always be liquidated (see Proposition 1). Hence 
we can focus on the case in which the project is good. The total monitoring of the two 
transactional banks will be 2p*^  with
* 27rhA  „ „ 71-hA 7ThA
2pA =  — —  < P b +Pa =  —— +  —  
ca cb  ca
In the above expression pB +Pa is the total monitoring when diversified funding is chosen. 
Thus the probability of success of the restructuring of a good project will be lower with a 
pure transactional banking than with diversified funding and pure transactional banking 
will always be dominated.
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Proof o f Proposition 2
At date 0 the entrepreneur will choose the funding that maximises her expected return. 
The entrepreneur’s expected return from pure relationship banking (as of date 0) is
eY + { i - e ) ( * h2p*BY - L ' )
The entrepreneur’s expected return from diversified funding is
CY +  (1 -  () [irh(p*B+ p \ ) Y  -  L'wh]
Note that the two expressions differ: i) in the probability of success of the restructur­
ing Pt ] ii) in the expected entrepreneur’s restructuring cost that with pure relationship 
banking is (1 — 7Vh)L' higher because also bad projects are restructured. Comparing 
the two expressions and substituting the values of p*B , p*B and p*A, after simple algebraic 
manipulations, we obtain the result in Proposition 2.
Proof o f Lemma 3
As proved in Lemma 1, the relationship bank that does not have to bear the additional 
restructuring will always choose continuation of a good project. We can then focus on the 
optimal L. The optimal contract maximises the entrepreneur’s expected return if the 
good project is continued, i.e. 7T^(psi +  PB2 )Y — L \  where, as before, 7T^  stands for 
the entrepreneur’s subjective probability that the project is good if continued. Note that 
L  affects only irsh. In particular, in estimating the probability 7Tsh that the project is good 
if continued, if L* < max \psiXA — L B — e, 0] the entrepreneur will set 7 < 1 .  In fact, 
in this case, with some positive probability the bank that has to implement L* will choose 
continuation also of a bad project. Otherwise the entrepreneur will set 7T^  =1. Moreover, 
from Assumption 2b, when 7T^ =1 the entrepreneur will always choose continuation. The 
best contract sets L  at the minimum level such that 7T^  =1, i.e. L* = pB{XA — L B — e. 
The bank that has to implement L* will always choose continuation if the project is good 
since it will expect a return of at least pBiA +  L G — pBiXA +  L B +  e — e >  0.
Proof o f Proposition 3
The expected return of the entrepreneur (as of date 0) is
iY  +  ( l -£ )7 rh(p*TY - L ' )
where p^ =  p*B +  pA with diversified funding and Pj. =  2p*B with pure relationship 
banking. Therefore it is sufficient to compare p£. in the two types of funding, i.e.
* —* A A  A  — \ \ A  1  1  — A — cb
Pb +P a > 2Pb  <— >■ —  +  —  >  2 ------- «—  —  > ---------------- «— * — ----------  <  A
c b  c a  c b  c a  c b  c a
Single and M ultiple Banking
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To prove that single banking is always sub-optimal it is sufficient to observe that, since 
the monitoring technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, the amount of information 
produced by one bank is always less than the amount of information produced by two 
banks. For instance, take the case of one versus two relationship banks. Even if the single 
relationship bank had no signal to send, its level of monitoring p*B would be lower than 
the total one of two relationship banks. Formally
p *b  =  ? ± A <  27rh A ( l  -  ±A) ^ A < A i 2 _ X) 
cb cb
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Chapter 5
Financial D istress, A sset 
H eterogeneity and the  
Optimal Nature o f Creditors
Abstract
We construct a model that rationalises the choice of an entrepreneur to borrow both 
from relationship and from transactional banks ( “diversified funding”). We derive endoge­
nously the optimal degree of diversification as a function of the nature of the assets of the 
firm, especially their redeployability and their heterogeneity, and of the costs of restruc­
turing the firm in distress. Having better information on asset redeployability and on the 
prospects of restructuring, relationship banks could have the incentive to continue a firm 
only to recover the most generic assets. By creating an asymmetry between the informa­
tion of relationship banks and of transactional ones, diversified funding creates a conflict 
among banks that prevents the opportunistic continuation of bad projects. However, this 
informational asymmetry can lead to the premature liquidation of good projects.
5.1 Introduction
In the last two decades a growing literature has documented and analysed the 
redistributions of claims that can occur in the reorganisation of distressed firms. 
A typical finding of this literature is that shareholders receive value even when 
creditors are not paid in full, violating the absolute priority of claims (Weiss, 1990). 
More recently, based on the experience of countries in which many restructurings 
occur outside courts, some studies (e.g. Penati and Zingales, 1997) have stressed the 
possible appropriation of resources by big creditors active in restructurings at the
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expense of small stakeholders that play a passive role in these reorganisations. 1 In 
this chapter we construct a model in which, by borrowing both from relationship 
and from transactional banks (diversified funding), a firm can discipline its banks 
during a private reorganisation, preventing them from extracting resources.2At the 
same time, diversified funding can be costly because it can induce the premature, 
inefficient liquidation of good projects. The model allows to derive endogenously 
the optimal degree of diversification of the links established by a firm with its banks 
and especially to relate this degree of diversification to observable characteristics of 
the firm.
The intuition of the analysis is as follows. In the model a relationship bank 
differs from a transactional bank for its better information on the firm. Banks’ 
information plays a dual role during a reorganisation. On the one hand, an informed 
bank knows which assets of the firm axe more easily redeployable and, hence, has 
a stronger ability in seizing assets during a reorganisation.3To make this dimension 
relevant we assume that the assets have different redeployability in the secondary 
market. On the other hand, an informed bank can disentangle a good project 
worth restructuring from a bad one worth liquidation more easily and, therefore, 
has a stronger restructuring ability. We show that relationship banks could choose 
to continue a bad firm temporarily with the only intent of seizing assets during 
its reorganisation. By creating an asymmetry between the information and the 
seizing ability of relationship banks and of transactional ones, diversified funding 
creates a conflict among banks that prevents the opportunistic continuation of bad 
projects. However, diversified funding hinders coordination in the restructuring of 
good projects, possibly leading to their premature liquidation.
The chapter builds on the model contained in chapter 4. By specialising and 
elaborating that more general framework, we are able to derive endogenously the
1 Analysing the restructuring of the Italian Ferruzzi Group, Penati and Zingales (1997) finds 
evidence of a redistribution of claims from small stakeholders to the big banks active in the 
restructuring.
2 Even in Germany and in Japan, in which bank-firm relationships are widespread, most firms 
establish different links, ranging from a tight long-term relationship with the haus-main bank to 
the transactional funding provided by arm’s length ones (Aoki and Patrick, 1994; Edwards and 
Fisher, 1994).
3A comparable assumption is in Diamond and Rajan (2001), that argues that a bank is more 
efficient than dispersed investors in selling assets.
124
optimal degree of diversification of the firm-banks links as a function of character­
istics of the firm such as the nature (redeployability and heterogeneity) of its assets 
and the costs of restructuring the firm in distress. 4  In related work (Guiso and 
Minetti, 2002) we are testing the empirical implications of the model using data 
from small US businesses.
Besides being finked with the mentioned literature on the redistribution of claims 
during reorganisations, the chapter is related to the analyses on the implications of 
the costs of financial distress for firms’ choice of debt structure. In this strand the 
closest paper is Bolton and Sharfstein (1996), which endogenises the optimal number 
of creditors by showing that a higher number reduces entrepreneurs’ incentive to 
make strategic default but increases the costs of liquidity defaults. Another related 
paper is Hart and Moore (1995) which derives the optimal distribution of priority of 
claims among creditors. 5  Hart and Moore (1995) show that, by combining classes of 
debt with different priority, a firm can commit not to overinvest (empire building) 
without incurring in debt-overhang.
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 contains the model. Section 3 
draws conclusions and empirical implications. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
5.2 The M odel
5.2.1 Setup
E nvironm ent The economy lasts for three dates (i=0,l,2). At date 1 a “good” 
or a “distress” state realises, respectively with probability i  and l  — l  (£ > 1). At 
date 2  the distress state can turn into “bad” with probability (l  — £)j  or “very bad” 
with probability (1 — ^)(1 — 7 ). The state of nature is common knowledge at each 
date.
There are one entrepreneur and two bankers. The entrepreneur and the bankers 
are risk neutral and consume on date 2. There is initially only the final good.
4Unlike in chapter 4, we also endogenise the positive aspect of banks’ information during 
restructurings as banks’ timely knowledge on the quality of the projects. However, the lower 
level of generality of the model in this chapter hinders the tratment of other issues, such as the 
implications of firm’s screening on projects’ quality for the choice of diversified funding.
5In a related vein see also Diamond (1993), Levmore (1982) and Rajan (1992).
125
Technology At date 0, besides storage (accessible also by banks), the entrepreneur 
can activate one indivisible project requiring I  units of final good. The project can 
be of high quality with probability 7 or of low quality with probability 1 — 7r^. No 
one observes quality at date 0 .
At date 1 , if the good state realises, the project, whatever its quality, returns 
A  units of verifiable assets and Y  units of non-verifiable final good accruing privately 
to the entrepreneur. If the distress state realises the entrepreneur and the banker (s) 
that have funded the project can liquidated or reorganise it over dates 1 and 2. We 
specify the sequence of events and the returns in distress below.
Henceforth we assume that the assets produced by the firm consist of N  tools, 
each of size A/ N.  If the good state realises or the distress state realises but the 
project is reorganised over dates 1  and 2  and is of good quality, each tool can 
be fully consumed. If the distress state realises and the project is reorganised 
but is of bad quality all the produced tools must be redeployed outside the firm 
generating a lower level of consumption. 6  We assume that, while y  tools have 
a high redeployability XH < 1, i.e. if redeployed return AHA / N  units of final 
good, y  have a low redeployability \ L < XH. Let A denote the asset average 
redeployability, i.e. A =  \ {XH +  AL).
E ndow m ents and  P references At date 0 the entrepreneur has no final good; 
each banker has 7/2 units of final good. We assume away interbank lending so 
that this assumption on endowments implies that two banks are needed to fund the 
project (multiple banking).
The entrepreneur’ s utility function is u(C2 , L [ , L'2) = C2 —L[ —L'2 while bankers’ 
utility function is u(C2 , L 2 ) = C2  — L\  — Z^- Q 2 stands for the units of final
good or assets consumed at date 2  and L't(Lt ) for any non-monetary restructuring 
cost that the entrepreneur (the bankers) bear at date 1 and 2. We allow any L't (Lt) 
to be negative, i.e. to be a private benefit of continuation.
T im ing  and  In fo rm ation
6This assumption captures the fact that assets are generally worth more inside than outside a 
firm.
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D ate 0:
• (Funding strategy) The entrepreneur chooses pure relationship banking (two 
relationship banks) or diversified funding (one relationship and one transac­
tional bank). In the analysis it will become clear that pure transactional 
banking (i.e. having two transactional banks) is always dominated. A rela­
tionship and a transactional bank differ for the information they have at date 
1  and at date 2  (see below).
• (Contract) The entrepreneur contracts with the banks. The banks lend their 
endowment and the project starts.
D ate 1:
• If the distress state realises, a relationship bank fully observes the quality of 
the project and asset redeployability. A transactional bank observes only noisy 
signals on these, with the noise of these signals chosen by the entrepreneur at 
date 0 .
• (Date 1 continuation) Entrepreneur and banks decide simultaneously whether 
to continue. If and only if they all choose continuation the project is continued 
and they bear (enjoy) their restructuring cost (benefit) . 7  The entrepreneur 
has a cost L\ =  0 of continuation. Each bank has a cost L \ , where L\ is the 
realisation observed by the bank at date 1  of a continuous random variable 
L\ ~  f  [in, L \ ], with Ln<  0 and L\ > 0.
D ate 2:
• (Date 2 continuation) Both banks observe the quality of the project. En­
trepreneur and banks decide simultaneously whether to continue. The en­
trepreneur (each bank) has a cost of continuation L 2 > 0 (L'2 > 0).
7The restructuring games between entrepreneur and bankers are simultaneous moves games of 
incomplete information and the resulting equilibrium a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
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• (Restructuring)The returns from the restructuring realise and the agents con­
sume.
In Figure 1 we summarise the game with the net returns at each stage:
D A T E  0  D A T E  1 D A T E  2
P roje ct  
s t a r t e d
B a d p r o j e c t  (A. A )
G o o d  p r o j e c t  (A +YD i s t r e s s  s t a t e -
V e r y  b a d  s
B a d  p r o j e c t  (0
Figure 1. Game Tree
We introduce restrictions on the parameters:
A ssum ption  1
A£> I
A ssum ption  2
y  ^  r ' >>_______ — _______ v
2 > irh + F(0)2(1 -
A ssum ption  3
a |  > l 2 >
Assumption 1 will guarantee the feasibility of lending at date 0. Assumption 2 
implies that at date 2 , in the bad state, the entrepreneur continues if and only if 
she is confident enough that the project is good if continued. Assumption 3 implies 
that at date 2 , in the bad state, a bank continues a bad project if and only if it can 
recover enough generic assets.
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In fo rm ation  S tru c tu re  We now specify the information on the quality of the 
project and on asset redeployability observed by a transactional bank at date 1 . 
A transactional bank observes a signal <p(p*) on the quality of the project and a 
signal ipi(p*) on the redeployability of tool i with i = 1 , N . As anticipated, the 
common noise p* of these signals, i.e. the informational gap between the trans­
actional and the relationship bank, is chosen by the entrepreneur at date 0. At 
date 1 , conditional on <p taking value ipG, the project will be good with probability 
p*+(l-p*)?Ch and bad with probability (l-p*)(l-7r^); conditional on taking value 
ipB, the project will be good with probability ( 1  -p*)TTh and bad with probability 
p* -f - (l-p*) (1 -7Th). For any p* the unconditional probabilities of ipG and tpB are 
71^ and (1 -7Tfc). Analogously, conditional on ip^  taking value ip**, the redeployabil­
ity of tool i will be high with probability p*+ (l-p*)(l/2 ) and low with probability 
(l-p*)(l/2) (and conversely if takes value ipf). For any p* the unconditional 
probabilities of ip*1 and ipf are 1 / 2 .
C o n trac t At date 0, since the endowments of the two banks must be lent in full 
to activate the project, the contract specifies only the allocation of the verifiable 
returns (assets). We assume that this allocation cannot be contingent on the state 
of nature, on the quality of the project or on the resale price of the assets. We 
assume that the entrepreneur has no bargaining power and the banks have the 
same bargaining power.
In what follows we consider an equilibrium in which both banks are allocated 
A / 2 units of assets. In Lemma 2 we will prove that in equilibrium this is necessarily 
true and, therefore, the banks find convenient to lend at date 0  (in fact, from 
Assumption 1, tAj*! > 1/2). If the assets must be redeployed and both banks claim 
(do not claim) any fraction of a tool, each bank will get half of the returns from its 
redeployment.
5.2.2 Equilibrium
We proceed by backward induction first determining banks’ returns if the project is 
continued at date 2. Then we determine the continuation decision at date 2. Then 
we determine the continuation decision at date 1  and finally the entrepreneur’ choice
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of funding at date 0 .
We rule out equilibria in which agents play weakly dominated strategies. We 
also assume for simplicity that, when an agent is indifferent between continuation 
and liquidation, she chooses liquidation.
R e s tru c tu rin g  The only non-trivial case is when the project is bad and the state 
is bad. Since a relationship bank has perfect information on redeployability, it will 
always claim the tools with high redeployability in full. The transactional bank will 
always claim the tools for which the observed value of 'ipi is ip** in full.
Lem m a 1
With diversified funding the expected return of the transactional bank A a and of 
the relationship bank A g if a bad project is continued in the bad state are respectively
bank, having noisy information on the redeployability of the single tools, expects
relationship bank.
D a te  2 C on tinuation  We now solve for the continuation decision at date 2 
Lem m a 2 Let
At date 2, in the bad state, if  p*=l, i.e. with pure relationship banking, the
A - A \
With pure relationship banking the expected return of both relationship banks if  
a bad project is continued in the bad state is A^.
Lemma 1 shows that a transactional bank has less to gain from the continuation 
of a bad project in the bad state {A \ < A^ < A —A*a ). Intuitively, the transactional
to claim also tools with low redeployability and to leave some generic tools to the
^  4L2  — (A +  \ l )A 
P~  A(X -  XL)
project will always be liquidated. I f  p*—p, the project will be liquidated if  and only
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if bad. In the very bad state, for any p*, the project will be liquidated if and only if  
bad.8
Lemma 2 shows that at date 2 in the bad state, while with pure relationship 
banking a project will always be liquidated, with diversified funding, when p* =p, a 
project will be liquidated if and only if bad. Intuitively, this happens because 
with diversified funding the entrepreneur knows that a bad project will always 
be liquidated by the transactional bank, since the transactional bank expects a 
low return A*a from its continuation and the following redeployment of the assets. 
Loosely speaking the entrepreneur expects that, with diversified funding, there will 
be no collusion within the restructuring pool.
Lemma 2 allows also to vindicate the claim that both banks are initially allocated 
^  units of assets. In fact, ex-post the only asymmetry in their returns could come 
from the continuation of a bad project in the bad state, but this is ruled out by 
Lemma 2.
D ate 1 Continuation and Funding Strategy We now solve for the continua­
tion decision at date 1 (Lemma 3) and for the entrepreneur’s choice of funding at 
date 0 (Proposition 1).
Lemma 3 Assume that
(1 -  p)7rh < a L-~-  < min [1 -  7 , p +  (1 -  p)nh\
2  2
Let 1 — F(p) = Pr(L1 > (1—p)7r^(^ —L2 )). A t date 1, if  p* = 1, a good project 
will never be liquidated; if  p* — p a good project will be liquidated with probability 
(1 — p)7Th( l  — F(p)).
Lemma 3 shows that with diversified funding, when p*=p, with some probability 
a good project will be prematurely liquidated at date 1. In fact, the transactional 
bank can observe a bad signal ipB at date 1  even if the project is good and, if its re­
structuring cost L\ is high, trigger liquidation. This possible premature liquidation
8 It is easy to see that any p*<p  and any p* between p  and 1 are dominated.
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of a good project arises from the poor information of the transactional bank and we 
interpret it as “lack of coordination” between the transactional and the relationship 
bank in the reorganisation of a good firm. Conversely, when p* = 1, i.e. with pure 
relationship banking, no good project will be “prematurely” liquidated at date 1  
because both banks will have full information on the quality of the project at this 
date.
P roposition  1 At date 0 the entrepreneur will choose pure relationship banking, 
i.e. p* = 1, if and only if  (1 —p)’Kh{l ~  F(p)) < 7 - Otherwise she will choose a 
“ degree of diversification” p.
Proposition 1 establishes the condition under which a firm prefers diversified 
funding. The entrepreneur will choose diversified funding if and only if the expected 
loss due to the certain date 2  liquidation of a good project in the bad state that 
realises with pure relationship banking (Lemma 2) ovewhelms the expected loss due 
to the date 1  possible premature liquidation of a good project that can realise with 
diversified funding (Lemma 3).
5.3 Conclusion and Empirical Im plications
We have presented a model that rationalises the choice of a firm to borrow simul­
taneously from relationship and from transactional banks. We have shown that, by 
exploiting the worse information that transactional banks have on the redeployabil­
ity of its assets, a firm can generate a conflict between transactional and relationship 
banks that prevents the strategic continuation of bad projects. However, by choos­
ing diversified funding, a firm reduces the information that is shared by all the 
banks, possibly leading to the premature liquidation of good projects.
The model has straightforward empirical implications. In the model p is a proxy 
for the (endogenous) degree of diversification of the firm-banks links. The closer 
is p  to 1  the less diversified are these links and the debt-structure close to pure- 
relationship banking. Looking at the expression for p and at Proposition 1 we 
can relate this degree of diversification to a number of characteristics of the firm 
including: the average redeployability A and the heterogeneity A — \ L of its assets
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and banks’ restructuring cost L 2 .
Asset average redeployability: p is inversely related to the average asset rede­
ployability. Intuitively, the higher is the average asset redeployability the higher is 
the diversification necessary to avoid collusion. In fact, the higher is the redeploya­
bility of the assets the higher will be banks’ incentive to continue also a bad project 
to seize them.
Asset heterogeneity: p is positively related to asset heterogeneity. A higher 
asset heterogeneity reduces the diversity in banks’ information necessary to induce 
a conflict between the transactional and the relationship bank.
Restructuring costs: p is positively related to banks’ restructuring costs. In fact, 
a higher restructuring cost implies lower banks’ incentives to continue a bad project 
with the only intent of seizing assets.
It should be kept in mind, however, that Proposition 1 predicts that beyond 
a threshold level of p  the required degree of diversification will become “too big” , 
i.e. will imply a too big coordination loss, and pure relationship banking will be 
preferred.
We are currently verifying these empirical implications using micro data from 
banks and firms.
5.4 Appendix to  Chapter 5
Proof o f Lemma 1
H LfFor each tool i the transactional bank expects to observe (or ) with probability 
The probability that the redeployability of tool i, conditional on 'ijji =  'ip ,^ is actually 
high (XH) i s p*A +  ( 1 —p \ ) \ , while the probability that is low (A^) is (1— p*A)\-  The trans­
actional bank knows that if a tool is actually highly redeployable, it will be claimed also by 
the relationship bank and the two banks will get XH A / 2 N  each; if, instead, it has a low 
redeployability it will not be claimed by the relationship bank and the transactional bank 
will get XL A / N . Finally, each tool that is not claimed by the transactional bank will not 
be claimed by the relationship bank if and only if it has actually low redeployability. This 
happens with probability p*A +  (1 — P*a) \  and in this case each bank will get XL from 
its redeplyment. Combining these steps the expected return of a transactional bank is
=  j  { [(P i +  (i - p \ ) h ) h xH + C1 - p 'aY N ]  +  [(pa +  (i - p a ) i ) 1 ^ ]  }
=  i  [(Pa  +  (1 - Pa ) } Y  +  (1 -  Pa ) i * l1
Proof o f Lemma 2
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1st case: p*=p. Banks’ decision.
At date 2: i) In the bad state a transactional bank will always choose to liquidate a 
bad project since L2 — ^(pA +  (1 — p)XL); ii) In the bad state a relationship bank will 
always choose to continue a bad project since L2  <  A^; iii) In the very bad state both 
banks will choose to liquidate a bad project since L2 >  0; iv) In both states both banks 
will choose to continue a good project since, from A3c, L2  <
Entrepreneur’s decision
Unlike the banks, the entrepreneur does not know the quality of the project at date 2. 
However, she knows that with a positive probability the outstanding project is bad (see 
the proof of Lemma 3 for a vindication of this claim) but that the transactional bank will 
always liquidate a bad project. As before, since from A3c L2 < Y,  the entrepreneur will 
always continue the project.
2nd case: p*=l. Banks’ decision.
i) In the bad state both a relationship and a transactional bank will choose to continue 
a bad project since, from A3b, L2  <  A^; ii) In the very bad state both banks will choose 
to liquidate a bad project since L2  >  0; iii) In both states both banks will choose to 
continue a good project since, from A3c, L2  <  ^  •
Entrepreneur’s decision.
In this case the entrepreneur knows that with probability greater than 7rfa+^ ^ y l(1_ 7r>) the 
oustanding project is bad (see again the proof of Lemma 3) and that the banks will want 
to continue a bad project. Since, from A3c L2 >  ~^l"^rp^ Qy2 ^i_ni }Y , the entrepreneur will 
always liquidate the project.
Proof o f Lemma 3
Entrepreneur’ s decision
The entrepreneur will always choose to continue at this stage since her cost of contin­
uing is 0.
Banks’ decision. 1st case: p*=p.
The project is good. For a relationship bank the return from continuing is
( f - £ 2 )7  + ( f - £2X1 - 7 ) =  f - l 2 > l 1
In fact the relationship bank expects that at date 2, in both states, only a good project 
will be continued with a return of ^  — £>2 -
For a transactional bank that has observed the expected return is
( 4  -  L )(p +  (1 -  p)nh) > h  
I  2
Thus a transactional bank observing <pG will always want to continue.
For a transactional bank that has observed ipB the expected return is
4 - L  )(l-p)7Th <LlZ 2
134
If Li >  ( 1 — p)7Th{  ^ — L2 ) a transactional bank observing (pB will liquidate. The 
probability that L\ >  (1 —p)lTh(^ ~  ^ 2 ) is 1 — F(p). Conditional on the project being 
good the transactional bank will observe ipG with probability p  +  (1 — p)^h and p B with 
probability (1 — p)7Th- Hence, at date 1 a good project will be liquidated with probability 
(.1 -  F(p)){l-p)7Th .
The project is bad. Since for a relationship bank the net expected return from con­
tinuing a bad project is 0 — L\, with probability F(0) a relationship bank will choose to  
continue. For a transactional bank the expected returns conditional on the value of the 
signal tp have already been described in the previous subsection. However now, condi­
tional on the project being bad, the transactional bank will observe <pG with probability 
(1 —p)7Th and <pB with probability p -(- (1 —p)7Th- Overall this implies that with probability 
greater than .F(O)2 a bad project will be continued vindicating the claim in Lemma 2.
Banks’ decision. 2nd case: p*=l
The project is good. In this case, at date 1, both banks share full information on the 
quality of the project. Moreover, they rationally expect that at date 2 in the bad state the 
entrepreneur will always liquidate. Hence both for the relationship and the transactional 
bank the return from continuing will be
( ^ - I 2) ( l - 7 ) > Z ,
The project is bad. With probability F(0)2 a bad project will be continued. In fact 
if both banks have L\ < 0  the project will be continued.
Proof o f Proposition 1
With pure relationship banking the entrepreneur expects that at date 2, in the bad 
state, a good project will always be liquidated with an expected loss of (l-£)jTTh(Y — L2 ).
With diversified funding the entrepreneur expects that with probabiltiy (l-p)7T^(i — F(p)) a 
good project will be liquidated at date 1 with an expected loss of (l-£)(l-p)iTh{l ~ F(p))7Th(Y— 
L2 ). Comparing the two losses we obtain the result of the Proposition.
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